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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Petitioner,

:

v.

:

HEATHER JO RODRIGUEZ,

:

Case No. 20040566-SC

Defendant/Respondent.

:

Respondent is not incarcerated.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court granted the State's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of
Appeals in State v. Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198, 93 P.3d 854, cert, granted, 100 P.3d
220 (Utah 2004). See Order dated October 18, 2004; Addendum A. The court of
appeals' opinion in Rodriguez is attached hereto as Addendum B. Jurisdiction is
conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (2002).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue: "Whether the dissipation of alcohol in the blood, without more, created an
exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless extraction of a blood sample from
respondent." Order dated October 18, 2004.
Standard of Review: On certiorari, this Court reviews "'the decision of the court
of appeals and not that of the district court.'" State v. Hansen. 2002 UT I25,1f25, 63 P.3d
650 (citation omitted). This Court reviews "'the decision of the court of appeals for
correctness.'" LI (citation omitted). The court of appeals applied the following standard

of review: "When reviewing a trial court's determination that exigent circumstances
justified a warrantless intrusion, we defer to the court's factual findings, but examine its
ultimate legal conclusion for correctness." Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 at \l (citing
CitvofOremv.Henrie. 868 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)).
In State v. Brake. 2004 UT 95, 103 P.3d 699, this Court "announced [its]
intention to review for correctness mixed questions of law and fact in search and seizure
cases and to undertake this task based on a totality of the circumstances." Brigham City
v. Stuart. 2005 UT 13,18, 519 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (citing Brake, 2004 UT 95 at Tfl5). "In
Brake, [this Court] cited a desire to develop uniform search and seizure standards to aid
law enforcement officers as the reason for adopting a less deferential standard when
reviewing whether a particular set of facts surrounding a warrantless search or seizure
offended constitutional protections. IdL. (citing Brake. 2004 UT 95 at ^14). In Stuart, this
Court applied the correctness standard, even though the court of appeals issued its
opinion in that case before this Court "modified the standard of review in Brake ." Id.
Similarly, this Court should apply the correctness standard of review to determine the
constitutionality of the blood draw in this case. Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution is determinative of the
issues on appeal. It reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
2

seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend. IV.
STATEMENT OF CASE
Heather Jo Rodriguez (Rodriguez) was charged with one count of automobile
homicide, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(1 )(a) (1999).
Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 at T}6; R- 3-4. "Rodriguez filed a motion to suppress any
evidence derived from the warrantless blood draw, which the trial court initially
granted." Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at Tf6; R. 72; 210. "However, after the State
petitioned for relief from the judgment, the trial court reconsidered and denied the
motion." Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at | 6 ; R. 206; 307; see. Addendum C.
"Rodriguez subsequently entered into an agreement with the State, pleading guilty to the
charge, but reserving her right to appeal the trial court's denial of her motion to
suppress." Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 at ^j6; R. 566:1-2. On December 2, 2002, the
trial court sentenced Rodriguez to "an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in
the Utah State Prison." R. 484. Rodriguez appealed the trial court's "denial of her
motion to suppress evidence and her subsequent conviction through a conditional guilty
plea." Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 at Tfl; R. 508-09.
On appeal, Rodriguez argued "the State's decision to obtain forcibly a blood
sample from her" violated the Fourth Amendment because it "was unsupported by either
3

probable cause or exigent circumstances." Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at ^|8. In
regard to exigent circumstances, Rodriguez argued "the trial court erred in failing to
examine the totality of the circumstances of this case before deciding that the drawing of
her blood was justified by exigent circumstances." Id. at ^|10. In response, the State
argued exigency existed because "the evanescence of blood-alcohol evidence coupled
with delays inherent in investigating an alcohol-related traffic accident constitutes
exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment.'" IJL (citations omitted).
The court of appeals did "not address the issue of probable cause" because it
found "the exigency question to be dispositive." Id. at f 9. Citing Utah's long tradition
of using the totality of the circumstances test to determine exigency and the United States
Supreme Court's use of the totality of the circumstances test in Schmerber v. California.
384 U.S. 757 (1966), to decide whether exigent circumstances existed to draw the
defendant's blood following a traffic accident, the court of appeals concluded:
exigent circumstances will be found, where the situation
involves blood-alcohol evidence, only when the "totality of
the circumstances," [Henrie, 868 P.2d at 1388], supports a
finding that the officer "was confronted with an emergency,
in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the
circumstances, threatened "the destruction of evidence."
Moreover, the mere fact that blood-alcohol evidence is
evanescent, although important to the equation, is insufficient
to create exigent circumstances by itself.
Rodriguez, 2004 UT app 198 at 1fl4.
The court of appeals then applied the totality of the circumstances test to
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Rodriguez's case and concluded the State did not show exigent circumstances justified
the warrantless blood draw. Id. at f 15. Specifically, the court of appeals noted that the
trial court found exigency based on "the dissipation rate of alcohol in the blood." IdL at
1J17. "However, the trial court left open the question of time," such as:
the proximity of the nearest magistrate; the alternatives
explored and discarded by the officers; the estimated delay
the officers faced in seeking a warrant; the impact that the
delay could have had on obtaining viable evidence; and the
point of time in the accident investigation when the decision
was made to extract Rodriguez's blood.
Rodriguez. 2004 UT app 198 at ^[17. The trial court's failure to consider "the question of
time" proved "fatal to its determination that exigent circumstances existed." Id, "It is
clear from the record that the decision to extract Rodriguez's blood was made soon after
the accident occurred, at a time 'when courts are open and search warrants can be readily
requested' either in person or by telephone." Id. at ^f 19 (citation omitted). Regardless,
"[n]either officer made any efforts to procure a warrant, or even inquire about the
availability of a magistrate, prior to performing the blood draw on Rodriguez." Id.
"Rather, both officers seemingly proceeded with the understanding that a warrant was
not necessary to extract Rodriguez's blood." Id. Thus, because "the State has shown
only that the warrantless blood draw occurred pursuant to routine procedure" and
exigency, by definition, "is the opposite of routine," the court of appeals reversed and
remanded Rodriguez's case, "instructing the trial court to suppress all evidence derived
from the warrantless blood draw." Id_atTf22.
5

The State filed a petition for a writ of certiorari asking this Court to address one
issue: Did the court of appeals err by refusing to hold that "the evanescence of blood
alcohol evidence alone creates an exigency that, coupled with probable cause, justifies a
warrantless blood draw?" Cert. Pet. at 1. The State did not ask this Court to address the
separate issue: if the court of appeals correctly held the totality of the circumstances test
was required, then did the court of appeals correctly apply the totality of the
circumstances test to Rodriguez's case? h i at 1, 5-10. Based on the State's petition, this
Court granted a writ of certiorari to decide one issue: "Whether the dissipation of alcohol
in the blood, without more, created an exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless
extraction of a blood sample from respondent." Order dated October 18, 2004.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
"On the afternoon of May 9, 2001, [] Rodriguez was driving southbound on Main
Street, in Salt Lake City, accompanied by her friend, Terry Stewart." Rodriguez, 2004
UT App 198 at ^[2. "Between 4:45 and 4:50 pm, soon after she passed through the
controlled intersection of 17th South and Main Street, Rodriguez abruptly turned left into
oncoming traffic, directly in front of a school bus." IcL_; R. 559:13, 35; 560:3, 8. The
"bus struck the passenger side of Rodriguez's car, throwing the car off of the road and
onto a nearby yard." Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 at Tf2; R. 559:16, 40. "The bus driver
immediately reported the accident," and "[paramedics arrived on the scene at 4:50 pm."
Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at ^2. "After removing Rodriguez from the vehicle, the
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paramedics determined that she was in critical condition and quickly moved her to an
ambulance, which transported her to LDS Hospital." IcL; R. 560:5. "The paramedics
then noted that Stewart had severe head injuries and determined that she was near death
and likely to die." Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at ^2. "They moved her to an
ambulance for transport to the University Hospital." IcL "At about that point, the first of
the responding Salt Lake City police officers arrived on the scene." IcL_; R- 560:3-4.
"As the officers began to examine the scene and look for possible witnesses they
were approached by someone who appeared to be a paramedic." Rodriguez. 2004 UT
App 198 at Tf3; R. 560:4-6. "That person told the officers that the occupants of
Rodriguez's car smelled of alcohol." IcL "When the officers looked in Rodriguez's car,
they found a purse, which turned out to be Stewart's." Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at
Tf3; R. 560:7. "In the purse the officers found an open, partially empty bottle of vodka."
Id. "Soon thereafter, the supervising officer arrived." Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 at
P ; R. 560:12-17. "He was informed of the circumstances surrounding the accident, the
apparent paramedic's observations, and the partially empty bottle of vodka found in the
car." Id "He immediately requested that dispatch send an officer to obtain a blood
sample from Rodriguez." IcL
"At 5:10 pm-no more than twenty-five minutes after the accident occurreddispatch instructed officer Nate Swensen to locate the driver and 'witness a blood
draw.'" Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 at f4; R. 560:19-21, 50. "Swensen first drove to
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the University Hospital, where "he learned that the driver had been taken to LDS
Hospital and that Stewart, the passenger, was expected to die." IcL "He then drove to
LDS Hospital." Id. "Although he did not know Rodriguez's name at the time, when
Swensen entered the emergency room he asked the staff to direct him to the 'patient that
was brought in from the traffic accident.'" Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at ^4; R.
559:73-74. "The staff directed him to the CT room where Swensen found Rodriguez
lying on a CT table, waiting for a CT scan." Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 at Tf4; R.
560:21-23, 51-52. "He noticed that she was being very uncooperative with the medical
staff, "her breath had a heavy odor of alcohol," "her eyes were red," and "her speech was
slurred." Id. "In general, Swensen described Rodriguez as'uncooperative,' 'very angry,'
and 'belligerent.'" Id Rodriguez "indicated a desire to leave" but the hospital staff
prevented her because "she was hooked up to their equipment." R. 560:57.
"Upon locating Rodriguez, Swensen asked her some questions, but found her to
be uncooperative." Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 at %5; R. 560:21-23, 51-52. "He then
waited between twenty and twenty-five minutes for the blood draw technician to arrive."
Id. Swensen testified he "just st[ood] there waiting" for "twenty to twenty-five minutes."
R. 560:53. "When the technician arrived, Swensen informed Rodriguez that they 'were
going to draw blood from her just as we do in accidents.'" Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198
at f 5; R. 560:24, 54. Swensen testified he did not have any reason to suspect a crime had
been committed, but knew only that he "was to witness a blood draw because of the
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traffic accident." R. 560:56. "The technician drew blood from an IV line that had been
inserted into Rodriguez's arm upon her arrival. The vials containing the blood were then
labeled, stored, and the blood was eventually tested. The test revealed that, at the time of
the blood draw, Rodriguez's blood-alcohol level was .39." Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198
at ^5; R. 560:24-27. "Stewart died and Rodriguez was charged with one count of
automobile homicide." Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 at 1J6; R. 3-4; 73; 97; 559:121.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. In Schmerber, the United States Supreme
Court held warrantless blood draws violate the Fourth Amendment unless they fall under
an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. The exception at issue in
this case is exigency. A warrantless blood draw satisfies the exigency exception only if
exigent circumstances and probable cause justify the warrantless bodily intrusion, and the
method chosen is a reasonable one, performed in a reasonable manner. The court of
appeals held the warrantless blood draw in this case violated the Fourth Amendment
because it was not justified by exigent circumstances. This Court should affirm because
the dissipation of alcohol in the blood, without more, did not create an exigent
circumstance justifying the warrantless extraction of a blood sample from Rodriguez.
Exigent circumstances are those that would cause a reasonable person to believe
immediate entry was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons,
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or the destruction of relevant evidence. Exigency is determined by looking at the totality
of the circumstances because it depends on the unique facts of the individual case. Thus,
both the Supreme Court and this Court have declined to create per se rules of exigency.
Although neither this Court nor the Supreme Court have directly addressed the issue of
per se rules of exigency in the area of DUI investigations, the Supreme Court's holding
in Schmerber indicates a per se rule of exigency in DUI cases would violate the Fourth
Amendment. In light of this Court's and the Supreme Court's case law, the court of
appeals correctly declined to hold that the dissipation of alcohol in the blood, without
more, created an exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless blood draw in this case.
Moreover, in its opening brief, the State asks this Court to consider the separate
issue of whether the court of appeals correctly concluded the totality of the circumstances
test was not met in this case. This Court should decline to review this issue because the
State did not ask this Court to review this issue in its petition and this Court did not grant
a writ of certiorari on this issue. Regardless, this Court should affirm because the court
of appeals correctly applied the totality of the circumstances test to this case.
Finally, when deciding this case, this Court should not consider the amicus brief
because it inappropriately enlarges the issue before this Court and relies on factual
information that was not presented to the trial court for factual findings and is not in the
record. Regardless, this Court should affirm the court of appeals' decision because, even
considering amici's information, the dissipation of alcohol from the blood alone did not
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create exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless extraction of Rodriguez's blood.
ARGUMENT
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM BECAUSE THE DISSIPATION OF
ALCOHOL IN THE BLOOD, WITHOUT MORE, DID NOT CREATE AN
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCE JUSTIFYING THE WARRANTLESS
EXTRACTION OF A BLOOD SAMPLE FROM RODRIGUEZ
"The right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures is one of the most
cherished rights guaranteed by the Utah and United States Constitutions." Stuart, 2005
UT 13 at Tf 15 (citation omitted). The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend. IV. "A 'cardinal principle' derived by this language is that
warrantless searches '"are perse unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."'" Stuart,
2005 UT 13 at^|15 (quoting Mincev v. Arizona. 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (quoting Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). This principle is "zealously guarded" in a
person's home and, by extension, in a person's body. l±_; see Schmerben 384 U.S. at
770 ("Search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, and, absent an
emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into the human body are
concerned."). "The importance of informed, detached and deliberate determinations of
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the issue of whether or not to invade another's body in search of evidence of guilt is
indisputable and great." Schmerber. 384 U.S. at 770. In fact, a person's body, like a
person's home, is "one of four domains expressly granted the security promised by the
Fourth Amendment." Stuart. 2005 UT 13 at 1fl5; see Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767 (noting
Fourth Amendment "expressly provides that 'the right of the people to be secure in their
persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated'" (emphasis
in original) (quoting U.S. Const. Amend. IV)). Thus, blood draws "plainly involve[] the
broadly conceived reach of a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment." k L
The human body "may, however, be subject to intrusion in exceptional
circumstances where 'the needs of law enforcement [are] so compelling that the
warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.'" Stuart,
2005 UT 13 at 1J16 (quoting Mincev, 437 U.S. at 394). These exceptions are "'jealously
and carefully drawn.'" State v. Ashe. 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987) (citation
omitted); see Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (noting presumption is "subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions"). One such exception is "the
presence of probable cause and exigent circumstances." Stuart, 2005 UT 13 at^l6
(citing Ashe. 745 P.2d at 1258-59). Under this exception, a warrantless blood draw
violates the Fourth Amendment unless: "(1) there are exigent circumstances that justify
the warrantless bodily intrusion; (2) there is a clear indication t h a t . . . evidence [of a
crime] will be found; and (3) the method chosen is a reasonable one, performed in a
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reasonable manner." State v. Palmer. 803 P.2d 1249, 1252 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citing
Schmerber. 384 U.S. at 768-72), cert, denied. 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991.
In this case, the court of appeals did "not address the issue of probable cause"
because it found the "exigency question to be dispositive." Rodriguez. 2004 UT App
198 at Tf9. It then rejected the State's argument that it should adopt a per se rule of
exigency in DUI cases and reversed because the State had not shown, under the totality
of the circumstances, that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless blood draw. L±_
at ffl[17-22. Instead, the State had "shown only that the warrantless blood draw occurred
pursuant to routine procedure followed by the Salt Lake City Police Department." Id. at
^[22. This Court granted a writ of certiorari to review one aspect of the court of appeals'
decision: "Whether the dissipation of alcohol in the blood, without more, created an
exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless extraction of a blood sample from
respondent." Order dated October 18, 2004.
This Court should affirm the court of appeals' decision because the dissipation of
alcohol in the blood, without more, did not create an exigent circumstance justifying the
warrantless extraction of a blood sample from Rodriguez. See Section A. This Court
should then remand without addressing the court of appeals' application of the totality of
the circumstances test to the facts of Rodriguez's case because this question is not part of
the issue on certiorari review. See Section B. Regardless, if this Court reviews the court
of appeals' application of the totality of the circumstances test, it should affirm because
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the court of appeals applied the test correctly. See id Finally, this Court should
disregard the amicus brief filed in this case. See. Section C. Nevertheless, if this Court
considers the amicus brief, it should affirm because the amicus brief presents no
argument that justifies creating a per se rule of exigency in DUI cases. See id.
A.

This Court Should Affirm Because the Dissipation of Alcohol In the Blood,
Without More, Did Not Create an Exigent Circumstance Justifying the
Warrantless Extraction of a Blood Sample From Rodriguez,
Exigent circumstances are "'those "that would cause a reasonable person to

believe that [immediate] entry . . . was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers
or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some
other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts."'" Stuart,
2005 UT 13 at 1fl8 (quoting State v. Beavers. 859 P.2d 9, 18 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)); s_ee_
State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460, 469-70 (Utah 1990) ("Warrantless searches will be
permitted only where they satisfy their traditional justification, namely to protect the
safety of police or the public or to prevent the destruction of evidence."); Black's Law
Dictionary (7th Ed. 1999), 236, 595 ("Exigent circumstances are those "that demand[]
unusual or immediate action and that may allow people to circumvent usual procedures").
"There is . . . no absolute test for determining whether exigent circumstances are
present because such a determination ultimately depends on the unique facts of each
case.'" Stuart. 2005 UT 13 at^|52 (Durrant, J. concurring) (citations omitted). In other
words, "[ejxigency does not evolve from one individual fact. Instead, there is often a
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mosaic of evidence, no single part of which is itself sufficient.11 Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1258.
Thus, this Court has repeatedly said its task "is to review the totality of the facts and
circumstances of the particular case to determine if the finding of exigency was proper."
Id.; see Stuart, 2005 UT 13 at ^[37 ("Our task is to pass judgment on whether the
intrusion was reasonable taking into account all the circumstances." (citing Pennsylvania
v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977) (citing Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968))).
In Mimms, the United States Supreme Court explained that "[t]he touchstone of
our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is [and] always [has been] the reasonableness
in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal
security." Mimms, 434 U.S. at 108-09 (internal quotation omitted). In keeping with this
pronouncement, the Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to allow per se rules to
replace the totality of the circumstances test. For example, in Mincey, "the United States
Supreme Court struck down Arizona's murder scene exception-a per se rule permitting
warrantless searches whenever a homicide is committed." Stuart, 2005 UT 13 at Tf42
(citing Mincey, 437 U.S. at 395). The Supreme Court concluded that "a warrantless
search . . . [was] not constitutionally permissible simply because a homicide had recently
occurred." IdL Similarly, in Pavton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), the Supreme
Court reviewed the constitutionality of state statutes "that authorize police officers to
enter a private residence without a warrant and with force, if necessary, to make a routine
felony arrest." Pavton, 445 U.S. at 574. The Supreme Court declared these statutes
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unconstitutional because n[a]bsent exigent circumstances/' a home's "threshold may not
reasonably be crossed without a warrant." IcL at 590; see Stuart, 2005 UT 13 at ^[42.
In United States v. Banks. 540 U.S. 31 (2003), the Supreme Court explained its
refusal to create per se rules of exigency. Addressing reasonableness in the execution of
search warrants, the Supreme Court said it has "fleshed out" the Fourth Amendment
"case by case, largely avoiding categories and protocols for searches." IcL at 36.
Instead, we have treated reasonableness as a function of the
facts of cases so various that no template is likely to produce
sounder results than examining the totality of circumstances
in a given case; it is too hard to invent categories without
giving short shrift to details that turn out to be important in a
given instance, and without inflating marginal ones.
IcL (citing Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) ("[W]e have consistently eschewed
bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness
inquiry."); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963) (holding reasonableness not
susceptible to Procrustean application); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States , 282 U.S.
344, 357 (1931) (holding there is no formula for determining reasonableness; instead
review each case on its own facts and circumstances)).
Following the Supreme Court's lead, this Court has also refused to allow per se
rules of exigency to replace the totality of the circumstances test. See Stuart, 2005 UT 13
at ^[37-44; Larocco, 794 P.2d at 470 (noting "this court has consistently agreed with the
view taken by the United States Supreme Court . . . that '[warrantless searches and
seizures are per se unreasonable unless exigent circumstances require action before a
16

warrant can be obtained'" (citations omitted)). In Stuart, officers conducted a
warrantless home entry "after witnessing four adults attempt to restrain a juvenile, the
juvenile break a hand free and strike an adult in the face, and the adults struggle to regain
control of the juvenile." Stuart, 2005 UT 13 at ^[34. On certiorari, this Court declined to
"replace the reasonableness requirement" of exigency "with a per se rule concerning
domestic violence that disregards other factors in the totality of the circumstances." I(L_ at
TJ44. Although this Court acknowledged the "unquestioned evils of domestic violence,"
it refused to:
signal [its] approval for any categorical extension of the
exigent circumstances which would permit a warrantless
entry into a home, even where to do so may prove beneficial
in controlling the scourge of domestic violence, because a
categorical extension would unduly threaten the special
protection the Fourth Amendment bestows on people in their
homes.
Id. at 40. By rejecting "a rule that would grant a suspicion of domestic violence the
status of a per se exigent circumstance," this Court did "not render considerations of
domestic violence irrelevant." Id. at ^44. Rather, it merely recognized that permitting
domestic violence to "sweep aside other relevant considerations" would be "unwise." Id.
Thus, even in instances of domestic violence, police are
required to assess the situation and conform their actions to a
standard of reasonableness, entering only when an exigency
is present. See rState v. Comer, 2002 UT App 219,^27 n.l 1,
51 P.3d 55] (the police "can effectively address the volatility
of domestic disputes through the existing exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement"
(emphasis added)); see also United States v. Davis, 290 F.3d
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1239, 1244 (10th Cir. 2002) ("We hold an officer's
warrantless entry of a residence during a domestic call is not
exempt from the requirement of demonstrating exigent
circumstances."); State v. FrankeL 847 A.2d 561 (NJ. 2004)
(rejectingper se rule permitting warrantless entry on basis of
a 911 hang-up call); Commonwealth v. Kiser, 724 N.E.2d
348, 351 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (loud party is "not the sort of
riotous behavior that justified entry under the statute" which
was intended to permit entry for breach of peace).
Stuart, 2005 UT 13 at ftf.
Neither this Court nor the Supreme Court have directly addressed the issue of per
se rules of exigency in the area of DUI investigations. The Supreme Court's holding in
Schmerben however, especially in light of its universal rejection of per se rules of
exigency, indicates a per se rule of exigency in DUI cases would violate the Fourth
Amendment. See Schmerber. 384 U.S. at 770-72. In Schmerber. the defendant was in
an accident and transported to the hospital where his blood was drawn to determine his
blood alcohol level. Id. at 758-59. In reviewing the case for exigency, the Supreme
Court said, "We are told that the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish
shortly after drinking stops." IdL at 770. The Supreme Court, however, did not stop its
analysis there and conclude that the diminution of blood alcohol level alone constituted
exigent circumstances. Id Instead, the Supreme Court proceeded to review the totality
of the circumstances. Id at 770-72. It is important to note that the Supreme Court issued
Schmerber before federal law permitted telephonic warrants. See. United States v.
Turner, 558 F.2d 46, 51-52 (2d Cir. 1977) (explaining the amendment to rule 41(c) of the

18

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that authorized telephonic search warrants did not
become effective until August 1, 1977). Thus, the Supreme Court applied the totality of
the circumstances test with the understanding that the investigating officers would have
had to travel to the courthouse to obtain a warrant. Id. With this in mind, the Supreme
Court held exigent circumstances existed because the "special facts" of the case showed
the time "taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate the scene," left "no
time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant." Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-72. In
conclusion, because the "integrity of an individual's person is a cherished value of our
society," the Supreme Court held that Schmerber is "stringently limited" to the "facts of
the [Schmerber] record" and "in no way indicates that it permits more substantial
intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions." Id. at 772.
Courts interpreting Schmerber, when asked to rule on exigency directly, have
applied the traditional totality of the circumstances test. See. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466
U.S. 740, 753 (1984) (holding possible destruction of blood evidence did not create
exigency where "gravity of the underlying offense" was minimal); United States v. Berry,
866 F.2d 887, 891 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding exigent circumstances existed "in this case"
because there was "no time reasonably to expect the officer to obtain a warrant"); State v.
Flannigan, 978 P.2d 127, 131 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (distinguishing case from Schmerber
because "record does not suggest that the police reasonably believed that evidence of
[defendant's] drug consumption would disappear from his system before they could
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obtain a warrant"); People v. Milhollin. 751 P.2d 43, 49 (Colo. 1988) (holding exigency
existed because ongoing investigation involved "same facts and concerns" as
Schmerber); State v. Dolan. 940 P.2d 436, 440 (Mont. 1997) (holding exigency requires
officer to be "'confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a
warrant, under the circumstances, threaten[s] the destruction of evidence5" (citation
omitted)); Henne, 868 P.2d at 1393 (holding warrantless home entry to investigate DUI
was lawful because, among other reasons, officers "engaged in a continuous and ongoing
search for defendant" between accident and blood draw).
In this case, the court of appeals correctly declined to hold that the dissipation of
alcohol in the blood, without more, created an exigent circumstance justifying the
warrantless blood draw. Although the court of appeals issued Rodriguez before this
Court issued its strong rejection of per se rules of exigency in Stuart, the court of appeals
declined to adopt a per se rule of exigency in DUI cases for reasoning similar to Stuart's.
First, the court of appeals acknowledged Utah's long tradition of applying the totality of
the circumstances test to determine whether exigent circumstances existed. Rodriguez,
2004 UT App 198 at Tfl5 (citations omitted); see. Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1258 (holding
exigency evolves from "mosaic of evidence, no single part of which is itself sufficient").
Second, it explained that a per se rule of exigency would be improper because "exigency
is the opposite of routine." Id. at ^20; see Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (noting presumption
against warrantless searches is "subject only to a few specifically established and well-
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delineated exceptions11); Larocco. 794 P.2d at 470 ("Warrantless searches are per se
unreasonable."). Rather, the totality of the circumstances test is necessary because a
"reasonable belief that an emergency is at hand is always required if warrantless action is
to be justified on the basis of exigent circumstances." Id_; see Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1258
("Our task is to review the totality of the facts and circumstances of the particular case to
determine if the finding of exigency was proper.").
Third, the court of appeals looked to the Supreme Court and concluded that the
"plain language of Schmerber demands: a totality of the circumstances approach with the
understanding that blood-alcohol evidence is evanescent." Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198
at TJ13 n.2. The court of appeals reached this conclusion by noting the Supreme Court
acknowledged "'the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after
drinking stops,5" but only found exigency after looking at the remaining circumstances
and concluding: "'Particularly in a case such as this, where time had to be taken to bring
the accused to a hospital and to investigate the scene of the accident, there was no time to
seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant.'" IcL at ^[12 (alteration omitted) (quoting
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71). "Moreover, the Court's language—highlighting the
potential difficulties California police officers faced in contacting a magistrate at that
time—suggests that other factors important to the analysis are magistrate availability and
local warrant procedures." IcL at f 13 (citing Flannigan, 978 P.2d at 131 (concluding that
under Schmerber "the evanescent quality of alcohol and drugs in a person's body creates
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an exigency only if the evidence might disappear before the police can obtain a
warrant")). Thus Just as the Supreme Court carefully looked at the circumstances of
Schmerber and limited its holding to those circumstances, the court of appeals carefully
looked at the circumstances of Rodriguez's case to determine exigency. Id^
In interpreting Schmerber, the court of appeals acknowledged that "later
statements by the United States Supreme Court concerning Schmerber [], suggest that the
evanescent nature of blood-alcohol may be sufficient, in and of itself, to justify a
warrantless blood draw." Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 at ^13 n.2 (citing Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n. 489 U.S. 602, 623 (1989); South Dakota v. Neville.
459 U.S. 553 (1983)). As noted by the court of appeals, however, these cases are
irrelevant because they "do not directly address the question" in Rodriguez. Id. First, in
Skinner, the Supreme Court considered whether civil "regulations that mandate blood
and urine tests of [railroad] employees" violate the Fourth Amendment. Skinner, 489
U.S. at 606. In holding the Government was not required to obtain a warrant before
these tests, the Supreme Court noted that "alcohol and other drugs are eliminated from
the blood stream at a constant rate." Id. at 623. The Supreme Court, however, also
considered the fact that the Government's interest was in "ensuring the safety of the
traveling public and of the employees" rather than in "prosecution"; this nonprosecutorial
interest presented "'special needs' beyond normal law enforcement"; a warrant would be
useless "in light of the standardized nature of the tests and the minimal discretion vested
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in those charged with administering the program"; and "[ijmposing unwieldy warrant
procedures . . . upon supervisors, who would otherwise have no reason to be familiar
with such procedures, is simply unreasonable." Id. at 620-24. Second, in Neville, the
Supreme Court held that admitting a defendant's refusal to take a blood test did not
violate his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. See. Neville, 459 U.S. at
559-64. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court did not directly address
exigency or the evanescence of blood alcohol evidence. See. id.
Thus, as this Court concluded in Stuart, the court of appeals concluded:
exigent circumstances will be found, where the situation
involves blood-alcohol evidence, only when the "totality of
the circumstances," [Henrie, 868 P.2d at 1388], supports a
finding that the officer "was confronted with an emergency,
in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the
circumstances, threatened 'the destruction of evidence.9"
Schmerber. 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S. Ct. at 1835 (citation
omitted).
Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 at f 14.
Contrary to the State's argument, this conclusion did not mean the court of
appeals disregarded the evanescence of blood-alcohol evidence as a factor for
determining exigency. Pet. Br. at 16. Rather, as this Court did in Stuart, the court of
appeals treated the "fact that blood-alcohol evidence is evanescent" as "important to the
equation," but concluded it was "insufficient to create exigent circumstances by itself."
Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at fl4; see Stuart, 2005 UT 13 at TTJ37-44. To hold
otherwise would have "unduly threatened] the special protection the Fourth Amendment
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bestows on people." IcL at ^{40. As admitted by the State, n[i]mpaired driving
investigations occur on a daily basis in Utah." Pet. Br. at 8. A per se rule of exigency
would remove Fourth Amendment protection in every investigation where officers could
establish probable cause to suspect impairment. See Stuart. 2005 UT 13 at ^[40.
Despite the strong precedent against per se rules of exigency set by this Court and
the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court's and other jurisdictions' repeated use of the
totality of the circumstances test to decide exigency in DUI cases, the State argues the
court of appeals erred by declining to abandon the totality of the circumstances test and
adopt a per se rule of exigency in DUI cases. Pet. Br. at 7-9. To support this argument,
the State cites several cases without any analysis. Id at 11-12; see State v. Jaeger, 1999
UT l , p 1, 973 P.2d 404 (noting adequate briefing "'requires not just bald citation to
authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based upon that
authority'" (citation omitted)). Even if these cases specifically adopted a per se rule of
exigency in DUI cases, they are not binding on this Court and should not be followed
because, as explained above and by the court of appeals, this Court and the Supreme
Court have already spoken strongly against per se rules of exigency. See Minims. 434
U.S. at 108-09; Stuart. 2005 UT 13 at ^[42 (citing Mincev. 437 U.S. at 395; Pavton. 445
U.S. at 574, 590; Banks. 540 U.S. at 36); Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 at ^[10.
Besides, the cases cited by the State do not adopt a per se rule of exigency in DUI
cases. In most of the cases cited by the State, the defendants did not challenge exigency
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and the ongoing and continuous nature of the investigations combined with the
evanescence of the evidence sought made exigency obvious. See United States v. Reid.
929 F.2d 990, 993 (4th Cir. 1991) (investigation continuous and defendant did not argue
officers had time to obtain warrant); Nelson v. City of Irvine. 143 F.3d 1196, 1204-05
(9th Cir. 1998) (noting n[n]either side disputes" exigency existed); State v. Cocio. 709
P.2d 1336, 1345 (Ariz. 1985) (investigation continuous and defendant did not argue
officers had time to obtain warrant); People v. Clark, 857 P.2d 1099, 1125 (Cal. 1993)
(same); People v. Sugarman, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 689, 691-93 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (same);
State v. Tavlon 531 A.2d 157, 160-61 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987) (same); State v. McGarrv .
477 So.2d 1030, 1031-32 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1985) (same); State v. Entrekin , 47 P.3d
336, 348 (Haw. 2002) (same); State v. Cooper. 39 P.3d 637, 640-41 (Idaho Ct. App.
2002) (same); State v. Murrv. 21 P.3d 528, 534-35 (Kan. 2001) (same); State v. Baker,
502 A.2d 489, 490, 493 (Me. 1985) (same); People v. Morse. 242 N.W.2d 47, 48-50
(Mich. Ct. App. 1976) (not discussing exigency because "sole question before us is
whether or not the results of a blood alcohol test taken from an unconscious person
without his consent and prior to arrest are admissible"); State v. LeRette, 858 S.W.2d
816, 818-19 (Mo. App. Ct. 1993) (investigation continuous and defendant did not argue
officers had time to obtain warrant); Galvan v. State. 655 P.2d 155, 157 (Nev. 1982)
(noting there was "no dispute" that exigency existed); State v. Ravotto. 777 A.2d 301,
315 (N.J. 2001) (investigation continuous and defendant did not argue officers had time
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to obtain warrant); Wilhelmi v. Dir. of Pep't of Transp.. 498 N.W.2d 150, 155 (N.D.
1993) (not discussing exigency); State v. Milligan. 748 P.2d 130, 134 (Or. 1988) (same);
Miff v. State. 627 S.W.2d 166, 169-70 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (investigation continuous
and defendant did not argue officers had time to obtain warrant); Tipton v.
Commonwealth. 444 S.E. 2d 1, 3 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (same); State v. Baldwin. 37 P.3d
1220, 1224-25 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (same); State v. Faust. 682 N.W.2d 371, 376-82
(Wis. 2004) (same), cert, denied. 125 S. Ct. 964 (2005); State v. Bohling. 494 N.W.2d
399,402-07 (Wis. 1993) (same).
Specifically, as explained above, the Arizona Supreme Court had no opportunity
to analyze exigency in DUI cases in Cocio because, in that case, the investigation was
continuous and the defendant did not argue the officers had time to obtain warrant. See
Cocio. 709 P.2d at 1345. In a later case, however, the Arizona Court of Appeals had an
opportunity to analyze exigency in DUI cases and reached a conclusion similar to our
court of appeals' decision. See Flannigan. 978 P.2d 127. In that case, the defendant was
in a serious car accident, appeared to officers to be impaired, consented to field sobriety
tests, was transported to the police station and read the Miranda warnings, was arrested,
and finally had his blood drawn. Id. at 128. The appellate court determined that
"Schmerber does not provide a blanket exception to the warrant requirement whenever a
suspect is believed to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs." IdL_ at 131. "Rather,
the evanescent quality of alcohol and drugs in a person's body creates an exigency only if
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the evidence might disappear before the police can obtain a warrant." IdL_ Proceeding to
the totality of the circumstances test, the appellate court noted:
The record does not suggest that the police reasonably
believed that evidence of [defendant's] drug consumption
would disappear from his system before they could obtain a
warrant. Rather, as the officers readily admitted, they did not
seek a warrant because they had been instructed that exigent
circumstances always exist in vehicular manslaughter or
aggravated assault cases in which a person is suspected of
driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
Id. Thus, exigency did not exist because the record did not reveal "how long the delay
would have been" to obtain a warrant since "the police made no effort whatsoever to
obtain a warrant. The mere possibility of delay does not give rise to an exigency." Id.
The remainder of the cases cited by the State, while not analyzing exigency in
great detail, recognize circumstances beyond the evanescence of blood alcohol, such as
the amount of time officers had to seek a warrant, are relevant to determining exigent
circumstances. See Berry, 866 F.2d at 891 (holding exigency existed "in this case"
because there was "no time reasonably to expect the officer to obtain a warrant"); People
v. Schall 59 P.3d 848, 851-53 (Colo. 2002) (focusing on probable cause argument, but
noting exigent circumstances existed because time elapsed while defendant was "airlifted
to a hospital" and "investigating officer [was] detained at the accident scene"); Justice v.
State. 552 N.E.2d 844, 847-48 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (interpreting Schmerber to say "the
fact that Schmerber was involved in an accident requiring treatment and police
investigation is what rendered the dissipation of alcohol in the blood an exigent
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circumstance" and holding blood draw was unlawful); State v. Oevering, 268 N.W.2d
68, 74 (Minn. 1978) (holding exigency existed because investigation continuous and
"over 4 hours had expired since the collision" when defendant's blood was drawn);
Holloman v. State. 820 So.2d 52, 55 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (holding exigent
circumstances included "limited number of investigating officers," "major vehicle
accident," "serious injuries to the two drivers," "fatality to one passenger," and "fact that
drug and alcohol content in a person's system can dissipate"); State v. Stern, 846 A.2d
64, 69 (N.H. 2004) (holding exigency "is judged by the totality of the circumstances" and
upholding trial court's finding of exigency based on "nature of blood alcohol evidence
and the delay inherent in obtaining a search warrant at night"); State v. Trover. 2003
Ohio App. LEXIS 529, *1, * 15-16 (Ohio Ct. App. February 5, 2003) (citing Schmerber
and holding exigency existed because accident occurred in "late evening and blood test
was finally conducted "more than two hours" after accident) (Addendum D); State v.
Shepherd. 840 P.2d 644, 646-47 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992) (holding exigency existed "where
time had been taken to bring the accused to a hospital and investigate the scene of the
accident" because "there was not sufficient time to seek out a magistrate to secure a
warrant"); State v. Engesser, 661 N.W.2d 739, 748 (S.D. 2003) (noting exigency existed
because investigation continuous and "[t]hree hours had already elapsed since the
accident when [defendant's] blood was drawn").
Thus, following this Court's and the Supreme Court's strong precedent against per
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se rules of exigency, this Court should affirm the court of appeals' decision because the
dissipation of alcohol in the blood, without more, did not create an exigent circumstance
justifying the warrantless extraction of a blood sample from Rodriguez.
R

This Court Should Not Review the Court of Appeals5 Application of the
Totality of the Circumstances Test and. Even If It Does, This Court Should
Affirm Because the Court of Appeals Applied the Test Correctly.
Rule 49 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure says n[o]nly the questions set

forth in the petition or fairly included therein will be considered by the Supreme Court."
Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4). In this case, this Court granted a writ of certiorari to decide
one issue: "Whether the dissipation of alcohol in the blood, without more, created an
exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless extraction of a blood sample from
respondent." Order dated October 18, 2004. This statement of the issue encompasses
the entire issue the State asked this Court to review on certiorari. See Cert. Pet. at 1
(asking Court to grant writ of certiorari to decide whether court of appeals erred by
refusing to hold "evanescence of blood alcohol evidence alone creates an exigency that,
coupled with probable cause, justifies a warrantless blood draw"). In its opening brief on
certiorari, the State now asks this Court, if it holds the dissipation of alcohol in the blood
alone does not automatically create exigent circumstances, to review an additional issue:
whether the court of appeals applied the totality of the circumstances test correctly in this
case. See Pet. Br. at 13-26. This Court should decline to address this separate issue
because the State did not ask for review of this issue in its petition for a writ of certiorari
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and this issue is not included within this Court's statement of the issue on certiorari
review. See Order date October 18, 2004; Cert. Pet. at 5-10.
Regardless, this Court should affirm because the court of appeals correctly applied
the totality of the circumstances test to this case. The totality of the circumstances test is
a "flexible, common sense" test. State v. Saddler, 2004 UT 105,1(27, 104 P.3d 1265.
When applying the totality of the circumstances test, a court's "task is to review the
totality of the facts and circumstances of a particular case to determine if the finding of
exigency was proper." Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1258. In this case, the court of appeals
correctly applied the totality of the circumstances test. See Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198
at IHf 15-21. First, it named the "dissipation rate of alcohol in the blood" as "important to
the equation," but concluded that the trial court erred by finding exigency based on this
factor alone. Id atffi[14,17. Second, the court of appeals explained that the trial court
completely ignored other circumstances relevant to exigency. IdL. at 1fl7. Specifically, it
noted that the trial court "left open the question of time." IcL Whether an officer
reasonably believed he did not have time to seek a warrant is the central question to
determining exigency. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71 (holding exigency existed to
justify warrantless blood draw because "there was no time to seek out a magistrate and
secure a warrant"); Larocco, 794 P.2d at 470 ("The amount of time necessary to obtain a
warrant by traditional means has always been considered in determining whether
circumstances are exigent."); Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1266 (holding courts should consider

30

"time available for the officers to have obtained a search warrant once [events] triggered
the existence of probable cause and immediate exigency"). Regardless, the trial court did
not even consider such things as:
the proximity of the nearest magistrate; the alternatives
explored and discarded by the officers; the estimated delay
the officers faced in seeking a warrant; the impact that the
delay could have had on obtaining viable evidence; and the
point of time in the accident investigation when the decision
was made to extract Rodriguez's blood.
Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 at ^[17; see Flannigan, 978 P.2d at 131 (concluding that
under Schmerber "evanescent quality of alcohol and drugs in a person's body creates an
exigency only if the evidence might disappear before the police can obtain a warrant");
Henrie, 868 P.2d at 1392 (analyzing similar circumstances to determine whether
evanescence of blood alcohol evidence created exigency to search home).
Third, the court of appeals concluded that exigent circumstances did not exist
under the totality of the circumstances as presented by the State. The record shows two
officers were in a position to seek a warrant and neither "made any efforts to procure a
warrant, or even inquire about the availability of a magistrate." Rodriguez, 2004 UT
App 198 at ^[20; see Flannigan, 978 P.2d at 131 (holding no exigency in blood draw case
because police did not even try to obtain warrant and "mere possibility of delay does not
give rise to an exigency"). The supervising officer decided to have Rodriguez's blood
drawn "soon after the accident occurred, at a time 'when the courts [were] open and
search warrants [could] be readily requested' either in person or by telephone."
31

Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at ^[19 (citation omitted). "Yet the supervising officer
testified that he made no effort to obtain a warrant." Id. Similarly, Officer Swensen
testified that upon completing his investigation, he "just st[ood] there waiting" for
"twenty to twenty-five minutes" for the blood technician to arrive. R. 560:53; Rodriguez,
2004 UT App 198 at ^[18. During this break in the investigation, Officer Swensen was
not guarding or questioning Rodriguez and could have sought a warrant by driving the
short distance to the courthouse himself, requesting that another officer drive to the
courthouse, or using his cell phone or a hospital telephone to request a telephonic
warrant pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-4(2) (1990). R. 286; 560:3, 21, 50-53, 57.
Yet he did not even consider seeking a warrant during this break in the investigation.
Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at 1fi[l9-20; see Ashe. 745 P.2d at 1268 (suggesting
warrant not required because officers could not have "waited even an additional twenty
to thirty minutes to obtain a telephone search warrant"); State v. Lopez, 676 P.2d 393,
397 (Utah 1984) (noting that obtaining telephonic warrant in that case "took 24
minutes"); United States v. Patino. 830 F.2d 1413, 1416 (7 th Cir. 1987) (holding fact that
officer waited for backup agents who were thirty minutes away but did not seek warrant
"alone demonstrate^] the lack of exigent circumstances"); United States v. Diaz, 814
F.2d 454, 456-59 (7 th Cir. 1987) (holding no exigency where defendant drug dealer
indicated he would wait thirty minutes for undercover agent to return). Rather, both
officers overlooked the warrant requirement in favor of the Salt Lake City Police
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Department policy that blood draws are "a matter of routine1' and do not require warrants.
Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 at H19-20; s_ee Flannigan. 978 P.2d at 132 ("The officers'
rote application of the department's untenable policy that exigent circumstances always
exist in vehicular manslaughter and aggravated assault cases violated [defendant's] right
to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.").
In its brief, the State concedes that the timing factors considered by the court of
appeals "are helpful in some exigent circumstance determinations." Pet. Br. at 16. It
argues, however, the court of appeals incorrectly applied the totality of the circumstances
test in this case because the court failed to adequately consider two circumstances: (1) the
"State's need to obtain defendant's blood without first seeking a warrant," and (2) the
"minimal intrusion on the individual's privacy and personal integrity" created by blood
draws. IcL at 16, 19, 21-25. Neither of these proposed circumstances create exigency.
First, the State argues that if the court of appeals had adequately considered the
State's "need" to perform warrantless blood draws, then it would have held the totality of
the circumstances established exigency in "the instant case, and in every impaired driving
case." IcL at 13-14, 16, 21-25. This argument is simply a restatement of the State's
proposed per se rule of exigency, and, if accepted, would eviscerate the Fourth
Amendment's guarantee that "warrantless searches '"are per se unreasonable."'" Stuart,
2005 UT 13 at 1fl[l5, 40-44 (citations omitted) (declining to create per se rule of exigency
in domestic violence cases even though they are "one of the most common and volatile
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setting for serious injury or death"). The State always has a "need" to search without first
seeking a warrant. Pet. Br. at 16. In fact, it is this universal "need" that the Fourth
Amendment was created to curtail. See State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Utah
1986) ("We note that the warrant requirement is an important check upon the power of
the State to subject individuals to unreasonable searches and seizures and is not to be
lightly disregarded."). Thus, the State cannot satisfy the exigent circumstances exception
to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement simply by referencing this "need." See
Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1258 (noting exceptions to warrant requirement are "'"jealously and
carefully drawn"'" (citation omitted)). Rather, it must show through the totality of the
circumstances that a particular warrantless search was justified because officers had no
time to seek a warrant. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71 (holding exigency existed
because "there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant"); Ashe, 745
P.2d at 1266 (holding courts should consider "time available for the officers to have
obtained a search warrant once [events] triggered the existence of probable cause and
immediate exigency"). In this case, the State failed to show it lacked time to seek a
warrant. See Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at ^[18-20. Instead, it showed the searching
officers had time to seek a warrant, including a twenty to twenty-five minute break in the
investigation, but chose not to. IcL_
Second, the State argues exigent circumstances exist in every DUI case because
blood draws are a "minimal intrusion on the individual's privacy and personal integrity."
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Pet. Br. at 19. As discussed above, however, blood draws "plainly involve[] the broadly
conceived reach of a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment." Schmerber, 384
U.S. at 767. Thus, regardless of the invasiveness of the blood draw, it must be
accompanied by a warrant or justified by exigent circumstances under the totality of the
circumstances. See kL at 770 ("Search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of
dwellings, and absent an emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into the
human body are concerned."). The question of how invasive the blood draw is goes to
whether "the method chosen is a reasonable one, performed in a reasonable manner."
See Palmer, 803 P.2d at 1252 (holding warrantless body search is lawful if, in addition to
probable cause and exigent circumstances, "method chosen is a reasonable one,
performed in a reasonable manner" (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768-72)).
C.

This Court Should Not Consider the Amicus Brief. Regardless, this Court
Should Affirm Because, Even Considering Amiri's Information, the
Dissipation of Alcohol in the Blood, Without More, Did Not Create Exigent
Circumstances Justifying the Warrantless Extraction of Rodriguez's Blood.
An amicus brief "may be filed only by leave of court granted on motion or at the

request of the court." Utah R. App. P. 25. Amicus briefs "should be allowed only
sparingly/' News and Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Cox, 700 F.Supp. 30, 32 (S.D. Fla. 1988); and
should be used to provide the court with "unique information or perspective that can help
the court beyond the help that the lawyers for the parties are able to provide." Ryan v.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n. 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7 th Cir. 1997). This Court
should not consider the amicus brief filed in this case because it inappropriately enlarges
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the issue before this Court and relies on factual information that is not in the record.1
First, this Court should disregard the amicus brief because it enlarges the issue on
certiorari review. "It is a 'well-settled rule that an amicus brief cannot extend or enlarge
the issues on appeal' and [this Court] will consider only 'those portions of the amicus
brief that bear on the issues pursued by the parties to [the] appeal.'" State v. Green. 2004
UT 76,f35, 99 P.3d 820 (citation omitted); McCleskev v. Zant. 499 U.S. 467, 523 n. 10
(1991) (same). For example, in Green, this Court declined to "address amici's arguments
because [the defendant] neither preserved nor properly raised or argued" the amici's
arguments in his own briefs. Green, 2004 UT 76 at f35. Thus, "Green failed to
adequately present the issues on which amici rely." Id. at^[36.
In this case, amici use scientific articles to argue alcohol dissipates from blood and
dissipation is affected by factors such as food, gender, age, health, the type of beverage
consumed, the circumstances under which the beverage consumed, and blood alcohol
concentration. Amicus Brief at 4-6; id. at Addenda B-K ("scientific articles"). The fact
that alcohol dissipates and that various factors affect dissipation, however, is not an issue

1

On January 31 and February 7, 2005, Rodriguez filed memoranda in opposition
to amici's motion for leave to appear as amicus curiae pursuant to rule 25 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rodriguez argued this Court should not grant amici leave
to file an amicus brief because the information amici proposed to present expanded the
issue on certiorari and was factual information that should have been presented to the
trial court. See Utah R. App. P. 25. This Court granted amici leave to file an amicus
brief. See Order dated February 22, 2005. Rodriguez now renews her opposition to
amici's motion for leave to appear as amicus curiae.
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on certiorari review. See Order dated October 18, 2004. This Court granted a writ of
certiorari to decide one narrow issue: "Whether the dissipation of alcohol in the blood,
without more, created an exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless extraction of a
blood sample from respondent." Id_ The facts relevant to this issue are simple.
Following Rodriguez's car accident, the supervising officer dispatched Officer Swensen
to witness the blood draw but did not seek a warrant. R. 560:14-17, 19, 50. At the
hospital, Officer Swensen witnessed the blood draw without seeking a warrant even
though he "just st[ood] there waiting" for twenty to twenty-five minutes before the blood
technician arrived. Id at 53-54. Thus, the only issue before this Court is whether the
fact that alcohol dissipates from blood justified the warrantless extraction of Rodriguez's
blood even though the totality of the circumstances showed the officers had time to seek
a warrant but chose not to. See Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at ^[17-20; Schmerber.,
384 U.S. at 770-72 (noting "percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly
after drinking stops," but deciding exigency based on "special facts" of particular case).
Accordingly, the amicus brief and its scientific articles are outside the issue on certiorari
review and should not be considered by this Court.
Amici also argue this Court should expand the certiorari issue to include drug
impairment cases. Amicus Brief at 13. As acknowledged by amici, however, this case
does not involve drug impairment and the court of appeals' decision "does not address
drug impaired drivers." IdL Further, as acknowledged by amici, drug detection is
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different than alcohol detection because it Mvar[ies] widely/' "[l]ittle is known about the
metabolism of many drugs," and different drugs "pass out of the blood" at different rates.
Id. at 14. Thus, because the issue of drug impairment is not before this Court and has not
been briefed, this Court should decline to expand the issue on certiorari to include drug
impairment cases. See Green, 2004 UT 76 at ^[35.
Second, this Court should disregard the amicus brief because it relies on factual
information that is not in the record. Amici's scientific articles say alcohol dissipates
over time and various factors affect dissipation. See. Amicus Brief at Addenda B-K. The
majority of amici's argument summarizes these articles. See id at 3-15. As explained
above, however, whether alcohol dissipates and what factors affect dissipation are not at
issue in this case. See Order dated October 18, 2004. Thus, the scientific articles are not
"pertinent... scientific commentaries" that this Court should review in order to establish
whether the dissipation of alcohol from the blood is a "generally accepted" scientific
finding. State v. ButterfiekL 2001 UT 59,1|33 n.5, 27 P.3d 1133 (holding this Court
"may consider and rely upon legal and scientific commentaries when reviewing the trial
court's determinations regarding the admissibility of DNA evidence, even if the
commentaries were not originally before the trial court").
Instead, the scientific articles introduce factual circumstances that, if pertinent to
the case, should have been presented to the trial court. See. Brookside Mobile Home
Park. Ltd v.Peebles. 2002 UT 48,ffl[12-16, 48 P.3d 968 (declining to review issue on
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certiorari unless properly preserved). Such a presentation would have ensured the
scientific articles were subjected to cross-examination, countered by expert testimony or
other evidence, and considered only if reliable and relevant. See Utah R. Evid. 803(18)
(excluding from hearsay rule scientific materials "relied upon by the expert witness" and
"established as a reliable authority"); State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994)
(concluding trial court is free to accord whatever weight it deems appropriate to
testimony "because it is before that court that witnesses . . . appear and the evidence is
adduced"); State v. Webb. 779 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1989) (holding "'essence of the
confrontation right is the opportunity to have the accusing witness in court and subject to
cross-examination, so that bias and credibility can be evaluated by the finder of fact'"
(citations omitted)); State v. Hollen. 2002 UT 35,^69, 44 P.3d 794 (holding expert
testimony must be "'"helpful to the finder of fact"5" (citations omitted)).
Factual review of the scientific articles was especially important in this case
because amici's scientific articles are not the only scientific articles discussing alcohol
dissipation, and, in fact, are contradicted by other scientific articles not presented by
amici. See, e.g., Labianca, Dominick A., Uncertainty in the Results of Breath-Alcohol
Analyses, 76 J. Chemical Educ. 4, 508-09 (Apr. 1999) (criticizing techniques and
conclusions reached by scientific article relied on by amici and included in amici's
Addendum G); Lands, W.E.M., A Review of Alcohol Clearance In Humans , 15 Alcohol
2, 147-57 (1998) (reviewing literature of past 50 years and finding that it, unlike amici's
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Addendum B, consistently applied zero-order kinetics); Stowell, A. R., Stowell, L. I.,
Estimation of Blood Alcohol Concentrations After Social Drinking. 43 J. Forensic Sci. 1,
14-21 (Jan. 1998) (concluding, contrary to amici's Addendum B, that back extrapolations
of blood alcohol content are possible); U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Nat'l Highway
Traffic Safety Admin., Computing a BAC Estimate (Oct. 1994),
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/alcoho^acreport.html (same as Stowell article);
Montgomery, M., Reasor, M , Retrograde Extrapolation of Blood Alcohol Data: An
Applied Approach. 36 J. Toxicology and Envt'l. Health 4, 281-92 (1992) (same as
Stowell article); Jones, A.W., Neri, A., Evaluation of Blood-Ethanol Profiles After
Consumption of Alcohol Together With a Large Meal. 24 Canadian Soc'y Forensic Sci.
J. 3, 167-70 (1991) (concluding, contrary to amici's Addendum H, that eating a meal
while drinking did not prolong time to reach peak blood alcohol level and did not reduce
length of peak time); Winek, C.L., Murphy, K.L., The Rate and Kinetic Order of Ethanol
Elimination, 25 Forensic Sci. Int'l 3, 159-66 (July 1984) (concluding, contrary to amici's
Addendum B, that alcohol elimination is a zero-order process). See Addendum E.
Thus, the scientific articles, if pertinent, should have been subjected to the trial
court's fact-finding process. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,Tfl 1, 10 P.3d 346
(holding preservation exists because "trial court ought to be given an opportunity to
address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it"). But the State chose not to present
the scientific articles to the trial court despite its burden of showing the warrantless

40

search was lawful. See Larocco, 794 P.2d at 471 ("The State carries the burden of
showing that a warrantless search was lawful."). Accordingly, the scientific articles are
not part of the record and should not now be made part of the record through use of an
amicus brief. See State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30,1(11, 76 P.3d 1159 (rejecting State's
argument that it, "after having had one opportunity to establish the admissibility of
evidence in the face of a Fourth Amendment challenge, is entitled to a remand to put on
new evidence," and holding that "when the State has the burden of proof and the record
on appeal fails to sustain any theory of admissibility, the State 'is not entitled to a remand
to put on new evidence'" (citations omitted)).
The remainder of the amicus brief relies on the anecdotal experiences of amici's
attorney ("counsel"). See Amicus Brief at 6-14. To support amici's assertions that
warrants take "more than two hours" to obtain, "[m]ost impaired driving cases do not
take place during standard working hours," the "signs of drug impairment vary widely,"
and it "is unlikely that driving with a measurable amount of metabolite can be
successfully prosecuted without a test result," amici do not cite any case law or other
recognized authority. See Amicus Brief at 12-14; Coleman v. Stevens. 2000 UT 98,1f7,
17 P.3d 1122 ("Failure to provide any analysis or legal authority constitutes inadequate
briefing." (citations omitted)); State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998)
(declaring issue inadequately briefed when "overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as
to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court"). Instead, amici cite
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counsel's personal observations as a prosecutor. See. Amicus Brief at 6-14. If counsel's
factual observations were pertinent to the case, then the State should have called counsel
as an expert in the trial court. See Utah R. Evid. 702 ("If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact... a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto."). This would
have ensured that counsel was qualified to make her assertions, counsel's assertions were
relevant and reliable, counsel was subjected to cross-examination and adverse expert
testimony, and counsel's assertions and demeanor were judged by the finder-of-fact. See
id.; Pena, 869 P.2d at 936 (concluding trial court is free to accord whatever weight it
deems appropriate to testimony "because it is before that court that witnesses . . . appear
and the evidence is adduced"). But the State chose not to call counsel despite its burden
of showing the warrantless search was lawful. See Larocco, 794 P.2d at 471. Thus,
counsel's factual assertions are not part of the record and should not now be made part of
the record through use of an amicus brief. See_ Topanotes, 2003 UT 30 at ^[11; Brookside
Mobile Home Park. Ltd., 2002 UT 48 at 11112-16. This is especially true in this case
because amici and counsel are employees of the State and the amicus brief supports the
State's argument. See United States v. Smith. 686 F.Supp. 847, 853 n. 9 (D. Colo. 1988)
(denying permission to file amicus brief because amicus was "by definition an arm of the
United States," who was already a party); United States v. Alimed, 788 F.Supp. 196, 198
n. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (denying leave for National Association of Criminal Defense
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Lawyers to appear as amicus because defendant's interests were adequately represented
by defense counsel); Ryan, 125 F.3d at 1063 ("The term 'amicus curiae' meansfriendof
the court, not friend of a party." (citations omitted)).
Regardless, this Court should affirm because amici present no argument that
justifies retreatingfromthis Court's and the Supreme Court's clear stance against per se
rules of exigency. See supra at Section A. First, amici argue a per se rule of exigency in
DUI cases is appropriate because "[a]ll impaired driving investigations involve some
delay." Amicus Brief at 6. The existence of delay, however, does not create exigency
unless the delay leaves "no time" to secure a warrant. Schmerber. 384 U.S. at 770-72;
see Larocco, 794 P.2d at 470 ("The amount of time necessary to obtain a warrant by
traditional means has always been considered in determining whether circumstances are
exigent."); Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1266 (holding courts should consider "time available for
the officers to have obtained a search warrant"). Thus, per se rules are inappropriate
because only the totality of the circumstances can reveal whether the searching officer
had time to seek a warrant. See supra at Sections A, B.
Second, amici argue this Court should reverse because the court of appeals held
that an officer must determine exigency by estimating "how long she may wait before she
risks losing the evidence" and "how long it would take her to obtain a warrant." Amicus
Brief at 6, 9-11. This strict rule, however, was not adopted by the court of appeals. See
Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 at ^[14-21. In fact, the court of appeals rejected the strict
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per se rule proposed by the State in favor of the flexible totality of the circumstances test
traditionally required by this Court and the Supreme Court. IdL; see supra at Section A.
Under the court of appeals' decision, as in all exigency cases, officers must look at
the circumstances of the case before conducting the warrantless search. See Rodriguez,
2004 UT App 198 at 1ffll7-20; Schmerber. 384 U.S. at 770 (holding exigency exists
where officers "reasonably believed that they were 'confronted with an emergency, in
which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened "the
destruction of evidence"'" (citation omitted)); Skinner. 498 U.S. at 623-24
(distinguishing administrative searches from criminal investigations because
administrative supervisors, unlike police officers, "have little occasion to become
familiar" with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). If the investigation is ongoing and
continuous and the officer has a reasonable belief that he does not have time to seek a
warrant, then he may rely on exigency. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71 (holding
exigency existed because continuous investigation and evanescence of blood-alcohol
evidence left "no time" to secure warrant). But, if the investigation is not ongoing and
continuous or if the officer foresees that the length of the investigation and the
manpower available will allow him time to seek a warrant, then the officer should start
the warrant process. See Ashe. 745 P.2d at 1268 (suggesting warrant not required
because officers could not have "waited even an additional twenty to thirty minutes to
obtain a telephone search warrant"); Patino. 830 F.2d at 1416 (holding fact that officer
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waited for backup agents who were thirty minutes away but did not seek warrant "alone
demonstrate [d] the lack of exigent circumstances"); Diaz, 814 F.2d at 456-59 (holding no
exigency where defendant drug dealer indicated he would wait thirty minutes for
undercover agent to return). Then, if the warrant ultimately takes more time than the
officer can spare, exigency attaches and the officer may conduct a warrantless blood
draw. See Flannigan. 978 P.2d at 131 (reversing because did "not know how long the
delay would have been because the police made no effort whatsoever to obtain a
warrant," but noting exigency may have existed "if the police had attempted to obtain a
warrant but had encountered difficulties in reaching a magistrate").
Third, amici argue this Court should reverse because the court of appeals held a
blood draw "cannot be exigent" because it is "routine procedure." Amicus Brief at 6, 911. The court of appeals, however, did not hold that a blood draw can never be exigent
or that a blood draw is a matter of routine. See. Rodriguez. 2004 UT App 198 at ffl|20-21.
Rather, the court of appeals held that the existence of exigency to draw blood depends on
the totality of the circumstances, and criticized the Salt Lake City Police Department for
its policy of conducting warrantless blood draws as "a matter of routine." Id.
Fourth, amici argue this Court should adopt a per se rule of exigency in DUI cases
because warrants are hard to get. See Amicus Brief at 11-12. Difficulty obtaining a
warrant, however, is not an issue before this Court and, regardless, is not justification to
abandon the Fourth Amendment. See. Order dated October 18, 2004.
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[T]he mere fact that law enforcement may be made more
efficient can never by itselfjustify disregard of the Fourth
Amendment. The investigation of crime would always be
simplified if warrants were unnecessary. But the Fourth
Amendment reflects the view of those who wrote the Bill of
Rights that the privacy of a person's home and property may
not be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity
in enforcement of the criminal law.
Mincey, 437 U.S. at 394 (internal citations omitted).
Instead, difficulty obtaining a warrant, if such a difficulty exists, is a problem to
be brought before the Utah Legislature. See Board of Educ. v. Salt Lake County. 659
P.2d 1030, 1037 (Utah, 1983) (noting courts have "authority to interpret the law" and
legislature has "task of writing it"). In fact, the Legislature has already addressed the
difficulties claimed by the amicus brief. See Amicus Brief at 12. For example, to speed
the warrant process, the Legislature has enacted legislation allowing officers to obtain
search warrants over the telephone. See. Utah Code Ann. 77-23-204(2) (1999); Larocco.
794 P.2d at 470 ("Recognizing the delay that is often incurred in procuring a warrant,
Utah has adopted a procedure whereby warrants may be issued over the telephone.");
Palmer, 803 P.2d at 1253 ("'In light of the comparative ease with which a warrant can be
obtained under Utah's telephonic warrant statute, little or no impediment is presented to
police investigations.'" (citations omitted)). The telephonic search warrant option has
become even more convenient with the "increasing availability of cellular and other
portable telephones to law enforcement personnel." Larocco, 794 P.2d at 470 n.2.
Fifth, the amicus brief argues this Court should reverse because a per se rule of
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exigency could assist defendants. Amicus Brief at 10. The Fourth Amendment,
however, was enacted to ensure the "right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const,
amend. IV. Thus, a warrantless search is "per se unreasonable," Stuart, 2005 UT 13 at
TJ15, unless it falls under one of the "few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions." Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. The remote possibility that a defendant will benefit
from a constitutional violation is not a recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment.
See Stuart, 2005 UT 13 at ^{16 (holding exceptions to warrant requirement entail
"exceptional circumstances where 'the needs of law enforcement [are] so compelling that
the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.'").
CONCLUSION
Rodriguez requests this Court to affirm the court of appeals' decision in State v.
Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198.
SUBMITTED this Jitf"- day of June, 2005.

LOkrt SEPfl
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

State of Utah,
Petitioner,
Case No. 20040566-SC

v.
Heather Jo Rodriguez,
Respondent.

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, filed on July 7, 2004.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 4 5 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is
granted as to the following issue:
Whether the dissipation of alcohol in the blood, without
more, created an exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless
extraction of a blood sample from respondent.
FOR THE COURT:

<&m—Or MM /IT. zoftj (JL^*7y}i..QMrf<
Date

/

Christine M. Durham
Chief Justice

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 6TH FL
PO BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854
SHANNON N. ROMERO
LORI SEPPI
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
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and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand
delivered to a personal representative of the courts listed
below:
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
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COURT OF APPEALS
450 S STATE ST
PO BOX 140230
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0230

Deputy Clerk
Case No. 20040566-SC
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE, 011907005
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of $100,000 define the outer extent of exposure to [Allstate] on a claim for underinsured motorist benefits
The Arbitration Agreement did not operate to open or
modify the terms of the insurance contract
The court finds that the insurance policy limits of $100,000 constitute a
contractual determination of the parties,
which are not modified or altered by virtue
of the arbitration agreements.
We agree. There is no evidence th'at the
parties intended the prior contractual relationship to be modified by either the Arbitration Agreement or the Binding Arbitration
Agreement. In fact, correspondence between the parties just prior to the arbitration
evidences the opposite intent. Therefore,
while the trial court should have modified the
arbitration agreement to reflect the matter
submitted to the arbitrator, the trial court
correctly found that the arbitration did not
modify the original contractual obligations of
the parties and ordered that Allstate pay
Wong $100,000 pursuant to his insurance policy.6 Accordingly, we affirm.7
1116 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T.
GREENWOOD and NORMAN H. JACKSON, Judges.

2004UTApp 198

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Heather Jo RODRIGUEZ aka Heather
Holdman, Defendant and
Appellant.
No. 20030006-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 10, 2004.
Background: Defendant pleaded guilty in
the Third District Court, Salt Lake De6. However, a better way to reach the same correct result would have been for Allstate to file a
declaratory action asking the court to determine
the effect of the arbitrator's award on Allstate's
obligation to pay Wong, its insured under the
policy.

partment, Dennis M. Fuchs. J., to automobile homicide. She appealed.
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Thome,
Jr., J., held that exigent circumstances did
not exist to justify warrantless blood draw
from defendant.
Reversed and remanded with direction.

1. Criminal Law c=>1134(3), 1158(2)
When reviewing a trial court's determination that exigent circumstances justified a
warrantless intrusion, appellate court defers
to the trial court's factual findings, but examines its ultimate legal conclusion for correctness. U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 4.
2. Automobiles §=»419
Searches and Seizures <§=>78
To justify a police officer's decision to
extract blood without the benefit of a search
warrant, the state bears the burden of showing that (1) the officer had probable cause to
believe that the defendant was involved in an
alcohol-related offense, (2) the officer had
reason to believe the blood sample would
produce evidence of the defendant's level of
intoxication when the crime was committed,
(3) the officer reasonably believed that they
were confronted with an emergency, in which
the delay necessary to obtain a warrant,
under the circumstances, threatened the destruction of the evidence, and (4) the method
used by the officer to obtain the blood sample was performed in a reasonable manner.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
3. Searches and Seizures <3=s78
Where a situation involves blood-alcohol
evidence, exigent circumstances will be found
to justify a warrantless blood draw only
when the totality of the circumstances sjip"
ports a finding that the law enforcement
officer was confronted with an emergency^
which the delay necessary to obtain a w|£
7. Wong also seeks attorney fees pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated section 78-3la-16 (2003). ?*
cause Ave affirm, attorney fees are not warranted.
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rant, under the circumstances, threatened
the destruction of evidence. U.S.C.A. Const,
Amend. 4.

stances, a warrant must be obtained before
drawing blood. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.

4. Searches and Seizures <2>78
Mere fact that blood-alcohol evidence is
evanescent is insufficient in itself to create
exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless blood draw. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.

Lori J. Seppi and Shannon N. Romero,
Salt Lake City, for Appellant.

5. Criminal Law <s>1158(2)
In reviewing a trial court's finding that
exigent circumstances existed to justify a
warrantless intrusion, appellate court's task
is to review the totality of the facts and
circumstances of the particular case to determine if the finding of exigency was proper;
however, although appellate court reviews
the facts and circumstances of the case as a
whole, should the trial court's findings fail to
address any important factor, appellate court
is in no position to supplement the findings.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
6. Automobiles <s=>419
Exigent circumstances did not exist to
justify warrantless blood draw from defendant who was driver in automobile collision,
even though supervising officer was informed
that alcohol could have contributed to collision and that passenger in defendant's vehicle would likely die; second officer was told
by supervising officer no more than 25 minutes after collision to obtain blood sample
from defendant, second officer waited additional 20 to 25 minutes for blood technician to
arrive, courts were open at time and search
warrant could have been readily requested,
and neither officer made any efforts before
blood draw to procure warrant or inquire
about availability of magistrate. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 4.
7. Searches and Seizures <3=>42.1
Reasonable belief that an emergency is
at hand is always required if warrantless
action is to be justified on the basis of exigent circumstances. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend.
4.
8. Searches and Seizures &=>7%
Without some reasonable belief that the
steady dissipation of blood-alcohol constitutes
an emergency under the particular circum-

Mark L. Shurtleff, atty. gen., and Matthew
D. Bates, asst atty. gen., Salt Lake City, for
Appellee.
Before Judges DAVIS, JACKSON, and
THORNE, Jr.
OPINION
THORNE, Jr., Judge:
111 Heather Jo Rodriguez appeals from the
trial court's denial of her motion to suppress
evidence and her subsequent conviction
through a conditional guilty plea. We reverse.
BACKGROUND
112 On the afternoon of May 9, 2001.
Heather Jo Rodriguez was driving southbound on Main Street, in Salt Lake City,
accompanied by her friend, Terry Stewart.
Between 4:45 and 4:50 pm, soon after she
passed through the controlled intersection of
17th South and Main Street, Rodriguez
abruptly turned left into oncoming traffic,
directly in front of a school bus. Rodriguez's
sudden turn gave the bus driver no time to
evade the car, and the bus struck the passenger side of Rodriguez's car, throwing the car
off of the road and onto a nearby yard. The
bus driver immediately reported the accident Paramedics arrived on the scene at
4:50 pm. After removing Rodriguez from
the vehicle, the paramedics determined that
she was in critical condition and quickly
moved her to an ambulance, which transported her to LDS Hospital. The paramedics
then noted that Stewart had severe head
injuries and determined that she was near
death and likely to die. They moved her to
an ambulance for transport to the University
Hospital. At about that point, the first of the
responding Salt Lake City police officers arrived on the scene.
113 As the officers began to examine the
scene and look for possible witnesses they
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were approached by someone who appeared
to be a paramedic. That person told the
officers that the occupants of Rodriguez's car
smelled of alcohol. When the officers looked
in Rodriguez's car, they found a purse, which
turned out to be Stewart's. In the purse the
officers found an open, partially empty bottle
of vodka. Soon thereafter, the supervising
officer arrived. He was informed of the circumstances surrounding the accident, the apparent paramedic's observations, and the
partially empty bottle of vodka found in the
car. He immediately requested that dispatch send an officer to obtain a blood sample from Rodriguez.

labeled, stored, and the blood was eventually
tested. The test revealed that, at the time of
the blood draw, Rodriguez's blood-alcohol
level was .39.

H5 Upon locating Rodriguez, Swensen
asked her some questions, but found her to
be uncooperative. He then waited between
twenty and twenty-five minutes for the blood
draw technician to arrive. When the technician arrived, Swensen informed Rodriguez
that they "were going to draw blood from her
just as we do in accidents." The technician
drew blood from an IV line that had been
inserted into Rodriguez's arm upon her arrival. The vials containing the blood were then

H 8 Rodriguez argues that the State's decision to obtain forcibly a blood sample from
her was unsupported by either probable
cause or exigent circumstances. "Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under
both the state and federal constitutions."
State v. Morck, 821 P.2d 1190,1192-93 (Utah
Ct.App.1991). "However, the presumption
against warrantless searches is not without
its exceptions, which are ' "jealously and
carefully drawn." ' " City of Orem v. Henrie,

1. The trial court made no findings concerning
the timing of these events; consequently, we rely
on the only lehable time reference m the record:

that of the responding officer. The supervising
officer testified that he did not remember the
exact time he had called dispatch.

116 StewTart died and Rodriguez was
charged with one count of automobile homicide. Rodriguez filed a motion to suppress
any evidence derived from the warrantless
blood draw, which the trial court initially
granted. However, after the State petitioned
for relief from the judgment, the trial court
reconsidered and denied the motion. Rodriguez subsequently entered into an agreement
with the State, pleading guilty to the charge,
but reserving her right to appeal the trial
H 4 At 5:10 pm—no more than twenty-five court's denial of her motion to suppress.
minutes after the accident occurred—dis- She now appeals.
patch instructed officer Nate Swensen to locate the driver and "witness a blood draw." l
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPEAL
Swensen first drove to the University Hospi[1] 117 Rodriguez argues that the trial
tal. There, he learned that the driver had
been taken to LDS Hospital and that Stew- court erred in refusing to suppress all eviart, the passenger, was expected to die. He dence that resulted from the warrantless
then drove to LDS Hospital. Although he blood draw performed after her automobile
did not know Rodriguez's name at the time, accident, because the State failed (1) to demwhen Swensen entered the emergency room onstrate that the officer had probable cause
he asked the staff to direct him to the "pa- to believe she had committed an alcohol retient that was brought in from the traffic lated offense, and (2) to show that the extracaccident." The staff directed him to the CT tion was justified by exigent circumstances.
room where Swensen found Rodriguez lying When reviewing a trial court's determination
on a CT table, waiting for a CT scan. He that exigent circumstances justified a warnoticed that she was being very uncoopera- rantless intrusion, we defer to the court's
tive with the medical staff and that her factual findings, but examine its ultimate lebreath had a heavy odor of alcohol. He also gal conclusion for correctness. See City of
noticed that her eyes were red and that her Orem v. Henrie, SOS P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah
speech was slurred. In general, Swensen Ct.App.1994).
described Rodriguez as "uncooperative,"
"very angry," and "belligerent."
ANALYSIS
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868 P.2d 1384, 1387-88 (Utah Ct.App.1994)
(quoting State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258
(Utah 1987) (additional citation omitted)).
"One such exception to the warrant requirement recognized by both the United States
Supreme Court and Utah's appellate courts
is exigent circumstances." Salt Lake City v.
Davidson, 2000 UT App 12,119, 994 P.2d
1283.

709 P.2d 1336, 1345 (1985) (concluding that
"because of the destructibility of the [bloodalcohol] evidence, exigent circumstances existed"); People v. Milhollin, 751 P.2d 43, 49
(Colo.1988) (stating "[t]he inherent nature of
a blood alcohol test justifies the conclusion
. . . that exigent circumstances existed");
State v. Cooper, 136 Idaho 697, 39 P.3d 637,
640-41 (Ct.App.2001) (recognizing the propri[2] H 9 To justify a police officer's deci- ety of the warrantless extraction of blood
sion to extract blood without the benefit of a "since blood alcohol concentration begins to
search warrant, the State bears the burden dissipate due to the body's natural metaboof showing that (1) the officer had probable lism of alcohol shortly after a person stops
cause to believe that the defendant was in- drinking"); State v. BoMing, 173 Wis.2d 529,
volved in an alcohol-related offense; (2) the 494 N.W.2d 399, 402 (1993) ("A logical analyofficer had reason to believe the blood sam- sis of the Schmerber decision indicates that
ple would produce evidence of the defen- the exigency of the situation presented was
dant's level of intoxication when the crime caused solely by the fact that the amount of
was committed; (3) the officer reasonably alcohol in a person's blood stream diminishes
believed that they were "confronted with an over time."); cf. United States v. Reid^ 929
emergency, in which the delay necessary to F.2d 990, 994 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that
obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, exigent circumstances justify a warrantless
threatened 'the destruction of the evi- administration of a breathalyzer test because
dence/ "; and (4) the method used by the "[t]ime is of the essence when testing for
officer to obtain the blood sample was "per- alcohol in the bloodstream," and because of
formed in a reasonable manner." Schmerber society's interest in "protecting its citizens
u California, 384 U.S. 757, 771-72, 86 S.Ct. from drunk drivers"). Although we recog1826,1836-37,16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (citation nize that several jurisdictions have interpretomitted); see also Henrie, 868 P.2d at 1388 ed Schmerber as creating what is, in effect, a
(stating "the [State] bears the burden of per se rule, we conclude that the Schmerber
showing both probable cause and exigent language comports with accepted exigent circircumstances"). Because we find the exi- cumstances doctrine and decline to adopt the
gency question to be dispositive, we do not per se interpretation urged by the State.
address the issue of probable cause.
1111 In Schmerber, the United States Su1110 Rodriguez argues that the trial court
erred in failing to examine the totality of the
circumstances of this case before deciding
that the drawing of her blood was justified
by exigent circumstances. The State counters that "[t]he U.S. Supreme Court and a
majority of jurisdictions that have considered
the issue have held that the evanescence of
blood-alcohol evidence coupled with delays
inherent in investigating an alcohol-related
traffic accident constitutes exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment." See,
&£., United States v. Berry, 866 F.2d 887,
891 (6th Cir.1989) ("Because evidence of intoxication begins to dissipate promptly, it is
evidence in this case that there were exigent
circumstances indicating the need to take
such action."); State v. Cocio, 147 Ariz. 277,

preme Court recognized that in certain situations police officers may be presented with
exigent circumstances that justify the officer's failure to comply with the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement. See
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-72, 86 S.Ct. at
1835-36. After an automobile accident in
which the defendant and his passenger were
injured, the defendant was taken to a hospital where he was placed under arrest. See
id. at 758 & n. 2, 86 S.Ct. at 1829 & n. 2.
Following the arrest, "[a]t the direction of a
police officer, a blood sample was then withdrawn from [the defendant's] body by a physician." Id. at 758, 86 S.Ct. at 1829. Over
the defendant's objection, the state's analysis
of the involuntary warrantless blood sample
was then used to convict him of driving un-
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der the influence of alcohol. See id. at 75859, 86 S.Ct. at 1829.
1112 On appeal, the Supreme Court began
by noting that the blood draw violated neither the defendant's constitutional Due Process rights, nor his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See id. at
759-61, 86 S.Ct. at 1830-51. The Court then
highlighted that the extraction of blood for
evidentiary reasons clearly implicates the
Fourth Amendment, but that "the Fourth
Amendment's proper function is to constrain,
not against all intrusions as such, but against
intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner." Id. at 768, 86 S.Ct. at 1834.
After quickly disposing of the probable cause
issue, the Court addressed the warrant requirement, stating that "[sjearch warrants
are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, and, absent an emergency, no less could
be required where intrusions into the human
body are concerned." Id. at 770, 86 S.Ct. at
1835. "The importance of informed, detached and deliberate determinations of the
issue of whether or not to invade another's
body in search of evidence of guilt is indisputable and great." Id. However, the Court
concluded that under certain circumstances,
warrantless searches do not violate the
Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the Court
determined that when a trial court is able to
find that a police officer's warrantless search
was premised upon a reasonable belief that
"he was confronted with an emergency," and
"the delay necessary to obtain a warrant,
under the circumstances, threatened 'the destruction of evidence,' " the warrantless extraction of blood is justified. 7c?. (citation
omitted). After acknowledging that "the
percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to
diminish shortly after drinking stops" the
Court concluded: "Particularly in a case such
as this, where time had to be taken to bring
the accused to a hospital and to investigate
the scene of the accident, [encompassing ap-

proximately two hours time,] there was no
time to seek out a magistrate and secure a
warrant." Id. at 770-71, 86 S.Ct. at 1836.

2. We acknowledge that later statements by the
United States Supreme Court concerning
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct.
1826, 16 LEd.2d 908 (1966), suggest that the
evanescent nature of blood-alcohol may be sufficient, in and of itself, to justify a warrantless
blood draw. See Skinner v. Railwav Labor Exec-

wives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 623, 109 S.Ct. 1402,
1416, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (addressing blood
tests and railway employees); South Dakota v.
Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 103 S Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2<J
748 (1983) (concluding that a defendant's refusal
to take a blood test is admissible evidence not
violative of the Fifth Amendment). However,

1f 13 Consequently, the Court determined
that the police officers involved in Schmerber
did not violate the Fourth Amendment because they were faced with exigent circumstances. See id. However, the Court did
not conclude that exigent circumstances existed solely because the evidence involved
was blood-alcohol. Instead, the Court focused on the evanescent nature of bloodalcohol evidence coupled with the time that
had elapsed between the occurrence of the
accident and the opportunity to draw the
defendant's blood. Moreover, the Court's
language—highlighting the potential difficulties California police officers faced in contacting a magistrate at that time—suggests that
other factors important to the analysis are
magistrate availability and local warrant procedures. See State v. Flannigan, 194 Ariz.
150, 978 P.2d 127, 131 (CtApp.1998) (concluding that under Schmerber "the evanescent quality of alcohol and drugs in a person's body creates an exigency only if the
evidence might disappear before the police
can obtain a warrant"). Finally, the language in Schmerber itself supports a conclusion that the court did not adopt a per se
approach. The language states:
It bears repeating, however, that, we reach
this judgment only on the facts of the
present record. The integrity of an individual's person is a cherished value of our
society. That we today hold that the Constitution does not forbid the State's minor
intrusion into an individual's body under
stringently limited conditions in no way
indicates that it permits more substantial
intrusions, or intrusions under other condi;
tions.
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772, 86 S.Ct. at 1836.2
[3,4] 1114 Relying upon the language of
Schmerber, we conclude that exigent circum-
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stances will be found, where the situation
involves blood-alcohol evidence, only when
the "totality of the circumstances," City of
Orem v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384, 1388 (Utah
Ct.App.1994), supports a finding that the officer "was confronted with an emergency, in
which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened
'the destruction of evidence/ " Sckmerber,
384 U.S. at 770, 86 S.Ct. at 1835 (citation
omitted). Moreover, the mere fact that
blood-alcohol evidence is evanescent, although important to the equation, is insufficient to create exigent circumstances by itself.

cient to overcome the need for a search
warrant.
Relevant facts may include the distance to
the nearest magistrate, the availability of a
telephonic warrant, the feasibility of a
stake-out or other form of surveillance
while a warrant is being obtained, the seriousness of the underlying alcohol-related
offense, the commission of another offense
such as fleeing the scene, the ongoing and
continuing nature of an investigation, the
extent of probable cause, and the conduct
of the investigating officers.
Henrie, 868 P.2d at 1392.
f 17 In this case, the trial court ruled that
the
dissipation rate of alcohol in the blood
[5] 1f 15 Therefore, we must examine the
instant case to determine whether or not the created an exigency that justified the wartotality of the circumstances supports a con- rantless extraction of Rodriguez's blood.
clusion that the officer was faced with exi- The court also ruled that the alcohol-related
gent circumstances when he extracted Rodri- accident was quite serious and that the police
guez's blood without a warrant. " 'Exigency officers had probable causs to believe that
does not evolve from one individual fact. In- Rodriguez was driving while intoxicated.
stead, there is often a mosaic of evidence, no However, the trial court left open the quessingle part of which is itself sufficient. Our tion of time; the proximity of the nearest
task is to review the totality of the facts and magistrate; the alternatives explored and
circumstances of the particular case to deter- discarded by the officers; the estimated demine if the finding of exigency was proper/ " lay the officers faced in seeking a warrant;
Henrie, 868 P.2d at 1388 (alteration omitted) the impact that the delay could have had on
(quoting State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 obtaining viable evidence; and the point of
(Utah 1987)).3 However, although we review time in the accident investigation when the
"the facts and circumstances of the case" as a decision was made to extract Rodriguez's
whole, State v. White, 856 P.2d 656, 659 blood. The court's failure to address these
(Utah Ct.App.1993), should the tiial court's factors is fatal to its determination that exifindings fail to address any important factor, gent circumstances existed in this case.
we are in no position to supplement the
[6] 118 Our review of the record reveals
findings. See Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT
that the accident occurred between approxi58,UK 19-20, 52 P.3d 1158; Brigham City v.
mately 4:45 and 4:50 pm on Wednesday, May
Stuart, 2002 UT App 317,1110, 57 P.3d 1111,
9, 2001. After arriving on the scene and
eert. granted, 65 P.3d 1190 (Utah 2003).
being apprised of the seriousness of the acciH 16 We have, in the past, highlighted sev- dent, the condition of Rodriguez and her
eral factors for use in determining whether a passenger, and the possibility that alcohol
situation created exigent circumstances suffi- may have contributed to the accident, the
because these cases do not directly address the
question that we face today, and because the
Schmerber references found therein are best described as dicta, we adhere to what we believe
the plain language of Sckmerber demands: a
totality of the circumstances approach with the
understanding that blood-alcohol evidence is evanescent.
3. Although the thrust of City of Orem v. Henrie.
868 P.2d 1384 (Utah Ct.App.l994\ was focused
on the warrantless invasion of Henries home,

central to that issue was the importance of preserving blood-alcohol evidence. See id. at 1388
("[W]e consider only whether the possible destruction of evidence of defendant's alcohol content under the facts and circumstances presented
was an exigent circumstance justifying this warrantless home search."). Consequently, we conclude that the Henrie analysis is applicable to the
warrantless extraction of blood from a defendant.
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supervising officer, through dispatch, ordered Swensen to ensure that the State procured a sample of Rodriguez's blood. Swensen testified that he received the call at
5:10—no more that twenty-five minutes after
the accident occurred. Swensen further indicated that he first went to the University
Hospital—where Stewart had been taken—
and then to LDS Hospital, where he found
Rodriguez. There, he waited an additional
twenty to twenty-five minutes before the department's authorized blood technician arrived. Only then did Swensen inform Rodriguez that he was there to supervise the
extraction of her blood "as we do in accidents."

a matter of routine. However, exigency is
the opposite of routine, and a reasonable
belief that an emergency is at hand is always
required if warrantless action is to be justified on the basis of exigent circumstances.

[8] H 21 The evanescent nature of bloodalcohol evidence does not, per se, convert
every alcohol-related blood draw into an
emergency. Without some reasonable belief
that the steady dissipation of blood-alcohol
constitutes an emergency under the particular circumstances, a warrant must be obtained. The record does not reflect such a
reasonable belief in this case; consequently,
the evidence arising from the warrantless
U 19 It is clear from the record that the draw of Rodriguez's blood must be supdecision to extract Rodriguez's blood was pressed.
made soon after the accident occurred, at a
time "when courts are open and search warCONCLUSION
rants can be readily requested" either in
person or by telephone. State v. Northrup,
11 22 The trial court erred in admitting the
756 P.2d 1288,1292 (Utah Ct.App.1988). Yet evidence obtained through the warrantless
the supervising officer testified that he made extraction of Rodriguez's blood. The exigent
no effort to obtain a warrant. The record is circumstances doctrine requires the State to
also devoid of any indication that Swensen show that the situation amounted to an emerconsidered requesting a warrant. Moreover, gency. Here, however, the State has shown
the State presented no testimony that any- only that the warrantless blood draw ocone, at any time, had assessed the difficulty curred pursuant to routine procedure foland time required to obtain a proper search lowed by the Salt Lake City Police Departwarrant to obtain Rodriguez's blood. Rath- ment. Accordingly, we reverse Rodriguez's
er, both officers seemingly proceeded with conviction for driving under the influence of
the understanding that a warrant was not alcohol and remand, instructing the trial
necessary to extract Rodriguez's blood.
court to suppress all evidence derived from
4
[7] 1120 Under these circumstances, we the warrantless blood draw.
conclude that the State has failed to meet its
burden of proving exigency. Neither officer
made any efforts to procure a warrant, or
even inquire about the availability of a magistrate, prior to performing the blood draw on
Rodriguez. More troubling is Officer Swenson's statement that the blood draw was to
be done "as we do in accidents," which suggests that officers of the Salt Lake City
Police Department view such blood draws as
4. Having failed to present sufficient evidence to
support the trial court's conclusion, the State is
foreclosed any oppoi tunity to revisit this issue on
remand. See State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30,111, 76 P.3d 1159 (stating "we have previously
held that when the State has the burden of proof
and the record on appeal fails to sustain any
theory of admissibility, the State 'is not entitled

K 23 WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS
and NORMAN H. JACKSON, Judges.

to a remand to [possibly] put on new evidence'
(quoting State v Hodson, 907 P.2d 1155, 1159
(Utah 1995))). Because Topanotes also fore*
closes any possible remand for the trial court to
enter additional factual findings, we remand <»reeling the trial court to grant Rodriguez's mp{
tion to suppress.
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

]
]>

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1

-vs-

Case No. 011907005
Judge Dennis M. Fuchs

HEATHER RODRIGUEZ
Defendant.

Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence having come before this Court for
hearing in the above entitled manner on October 12, 2001, in which Defendant was
represented by counsel, Shannon Romero, and the State was represented by counsel,
Michael E. Postma, the Court having heard evidence and having considered oral
arguments of counsel, the Court now enters the following Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Clerk

On May 9, 2001, the defendant was driving an Isuzu Trooper southbound on
State Street and approximately 1700 South in Salt Lake County. Terry Lee
Stewart was a passenger in the Trooper.

2.

The defendant made a left hand turn into the path of an oncoming school bus.
The school bus struck the Trooper on the passenger side and critically injured
the passenger, Ms. Stewart.

3.

Salt Lake City Police Officers and emergency personnel responded to the
scene of the collision. Emergency personnel removed the defendant from the
driver's seat. Emergency personnel informed the officers on the scene that the
passenger of the vehicle was in critical condition. Emergency personnel also
informed the officers on the scene that the defendant smelled of alcohol.

4.

Defendant Rodriguez was transported by ambulance to L.D.S. Hospital. Terry
Lee Stewart was transported by ambulance to University Hospital.

5.

Officer Peterson located a partially consumed bottle of Rothchild's vodka in a
purse in the Trooper. The bottle of vodka was approximately three-quarters
full. Terry Lee Stewart's identification was located in the purse.

6.

Officer Swenson was dispatched to observe the defendant's blood being
drawn. Officer Swenson first went to University Hospital where Ms. -Stewart
was being treated and learned she was not expected to live.

7.

Officer Swenson then went to L.D.S. Hospital where the defendant was being
treated. Officer Swenson observed that the defendant smelled very heavily of
alcohol, and when she spoke her speech was very slow and slurry. The
defendant's eyes were red and bloodshot and she was uncooperative.

8.

Officer Swenson was unaware how long the defendant had been in the
hospital. He was also unaware of any medications that the defendant may
have received or her medical evaluations.

9.

Officer Swenson told the defendant that her blood was being drawn because
of the traffic accident. The defendant did not respond to Officer Swenson.
The defendant did not object to her blood being drawn.

10.

Officer Swenson observed Brian Davis, a blood technician, draw blood from
the defendant using an existing IV line, which had previously been inserted by
medical personnel to treat the defendant following the collision.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The admissibility of the blood draw is governed by Utah Code § 76-5-207(6).
2. Officers had probable cause to believe that a serious crime had been committed.
Officers were aware of the serious nature of the collision, and the fact that the
passenger of the vehicle was not expected to live. Officers also had probable
cause to believe that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the collision.
3. Exigent circumstances existed because the dissipation of alcohol in the blood is
sufficient to create an exigent circumstance.
4. Information known to the officers investigating the scene of the accident was
deemed to be known by Officer Swenson.
5. Because of the exigent circumstances and the probable cause that a serious
offense occurred, there was no need to get a warrant, telephonic or otherwise, to
draw the defendant's blood. Additionally, no arrest was necessary to draw the
defendant's blood.
6. Negligently operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, which
results in the death of another is a felony, and is a serious offense.

7. Drawing blood from an existing IV line was non-intrusive because it was already
in the defendant's body for medical purposes. The defendant's blood was drawn
in a manner that does not shock the conscience.
8. The police conduct was reasonable in light of all of the circumstances.
9. The admissibility of the blood evidence is not prohibited by the Rules of Evidence
or the constitution.

DATED this _ ^ day of>ferefC2002.
^V

BY THE COURT:
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ronorabte Kennis M. Fuchs- \

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
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hanfoon Romero

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of March, 2002, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was delivered to:
SHANNON ROMERO
Attorney for defendant, heather Rodriguez
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPRESS

-vs-

HEATHER RODRIGUEZ,
Case No. 011907005 FS
Defendant.
Judge Dennis M. Fuchs

Based upon the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
and for good cause, the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Blood Evidence is denied.

Dated this

V_ day o^MareTT, 2002.
BY THE COIJRX;.....

Honorable Dennis M. FuchsS
-•••-»

•

J.

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the 28 day of March, 2002, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS was
delivered to:
SHANNON ROMERO
Attorney for defendant, Heather Rodriguez
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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COUNTY
2003 Ohio 536; 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 529
February 5,2003, Decided
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Appeal denied by State v.
Troyer, 2003 Ohio LEXIS 1584 (Ohio, June 11, 2003)
PRIORHISTORY: [*1] APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF WAYNE, OHIO. CASE No. 01-CR-0192.
DISPOSITION: Judgment affirmed.
COUNSEL: JOHN E. JOHNSON, JR., Attorney at Law,
Orrville, Ohio, for Appellant.
MARTIN FRANTZ, Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney,
JOHN M. WILLIAMS, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney,
Wooster, Ohio, for Appellee.
JUDGES: WILLIAM G. BATCHELDER, Judge. BAIRD,
P. J., WHITMORE, J., CONCUR.
OPINIONBY: WILLIAM G. BATCHELDER
OPINION: DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: February 5, 2003
This cause was heard upon the record in the trial court.
Each error assigned has been reviewed and the following
disposition is made:
BATCHELDER, Judge.
Appellant, Steven A. Troyer, appeals from a judgment
of conviction in the Wayne County Court of Common
Pleas. We affirm.
I.
A two-car traffic accident occurred on Back Orrville
Road in Wayne County in the late evening of May 25,
2001. As a result of that accident, Appellant was charged
with three counts: (1) aggravated vehicular assault, (2)
driving while under the influence of alcohol, and (3)
driving with a prohibited blood-alcohol concentration.
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty to all counts and filed
a motion to suppress the [*2] results of a blood-alcohol
test. As grounds, he asserted that the blood was withdrawn

in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and also that it was not withdrawn within two
hours of his alleged operation of the vehicle. Following a
hearing, the trial judge overruled the Fourth Amendment
argument and dismissed the third court, pursuant to the
two-hour requirement of R.C. 4511.19(D)(1).
Appellant proceeded to trial on the remaining two
counts and a jury returned a verdict of guilty on both. The
trial judge sentenced Appellant to a term of five years on
the charge of aggravated vehicular assault and six months
on the charge of driving while under the influence of
alcohol, to be served concurrently. Appellant has appealed
to this court and has assigned two errors for review.
II.
Assignment of Error No. 1
"The trial court erred by overruling appellant's motion
to suppress the results of the blood alcohol test, which was
obtained as the result of blood drawn at the instruction of
the state patrol in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, when there was no probable
cause for the blood draw, [*3] no probable cause for an
arrest, no search warrant authorizing the blood draw, and
no consent by appellant."
In his first assignment of error, Appellant contends the
trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress the
results of a nonconsensual and warrantless blood-alcohol
test, taken while he was unconscious. He contends that this
procedure violated the Fourth Amendment.
The relevant facts, as presented at the hearing on the
motion to suppress, came from the testimony of two state
troopers. Shortly after 11:00 p.m., on May 25,2001, state
highway patrol officers were dispatched to the scene of a
two-car accident. Each vehicle had one occupant. By the
time the highway patrol arrived at the scene, Appellant had
already been taken to Orrville Dunlap Hospital by members
of the Orrville Fire Department and was subsequently lifeflighted to Aultman Hospital. Emergency workers were
still attempting to free the other driver from her severely
damaged automobile.
Trooper Mark Haines conducted an inventory of
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Appellant's vehicle and testified that he detected the odor
of alcohol in the vehicle. Trooper Haines determined that
a blood sample had not been taken from Appellant at
Orrville [*4] Dunlap Hospital. Thereupon, he contacted
the highway patrol post closest to Aultman Hospital and
requested that an officer go to the hospital to obtain a
blood sample from Appellant for purposes of conducting
a blood-alcohol test.
Shortly after 1:00 a.m., Trooper Steven Sherrod
received a dispatch to proceed to Aultman Hospital and
attempt to obtain a blood sample from Appellant. Trooper
Sherrod testified that he located Appellant in the trauma
room of the hospital, where several doctors and nurses
were attending him. Trooper Sherrod stated that he could
smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage while several feet
away from Appellant. When Trooper Sherrod asked to
speak to Appellant, the nurse explained that he was
incoherent and incapable of communicating. Appellant was
not responding to the doctors and nurses attending him. In
compliance with Trooper Sherrod's request, a medical
technician drew a sample of Appellant's blood at
approximately 1:30 a.m., which subsequently revealed a
blood-alcohol concentration of .176 grams of alcohol per
100 milliliters of blood.
The trial court denied Appellant's motion to suppress,
finding that the blood-draw was reasonable under the
circumstances [*5] and did not violate Appellant's Fourth
Amendment rights.
Appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress
presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Long
(1998), 127 Ohio AppJd 328, 332, 713 N.E.2d 1. '"In a
hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court
assumes the role of trier of facts and is in the best position
to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of
witnesses.'" State v. Hopfer (1996), 112 Ohio App. 3d 521,
548, 679N.E.2d321, appeal not allowed, (1996), 77 Ohio
St. 3d 1488, 673 N.K2d 146, quoting State v. Venham
(1994), 96 Ohio AppJd 649, 653, 645 N.K2d 831.
Accordingly, "an appellate court must review the trial
court's findings of historical fact only for clear error, giving
due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by the trial
court. The trial court's legal conclusions, however, are
afforded no deference, but are reviewed de novo" State v.
Russell (1998) 127 Ohio AppJd 414, 416, 713N.E.2d56,
citing Ornelas v. United States (1996), 517 U.S. 690, 699,
134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 116 S Ct. 1657.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution |*6] guarantees the "right of the people to be
secure in their persons *** against unreasonable searches
and seizures" and ensures that "no Warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause ***." The "overriding function of the

Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and
dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State."
Schmerberv. California (1966), 384 U.S. 757, 767, 16 L.
Ed. 2d 908, 86 S. Ct. 1826.
The withdrawal of a sample of blood from the body of
an individual in order to determine its blood-alcohol
content for the purpose of proving a criminal charge
constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767. See, also, State
v. Sisler (1996), 114 Ohio AppJd 337, 341, 683 N.E2d
106. Fourth Amendment analysis neither permits nor
forbids all such bodily intrusions; rather, "the Fourth
Amendment's proper function is to constrain, not against
all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not
justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an
improper manner." Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768.
In Schmerber, where there had been a prior arrest, the
Court set [*7] forth several criteria for the reasonableness
of an intrusive search, including the following: (1) the
government must have a clear indication, rather than a
mere chance, that incriminating evidence will be found; (2)
there must be a search warrant or exigent circumstances,
such as the imminent destruction of evidence, to excuse the
warrant requirement; and (3) the method used to extract the
evidence must be reasonable and must be performed in a
reasonable manner. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-72.
Appellant has not challenged the reasonableness of the
blood-draw procedure, and we, therefore, do not address
that factor.
In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court noted that the
reasonableness of an intrusive search depends on a caseby-case approach, in which the individual's interests in
privacy and security are weighed against society's interests
in obtaining the evidence. Winston v. Lee (1985), 470 U.S.
753, 760, 84 L. Ed. 2d 662, 105 S. Ct. 1611. See, also,
Whren v. United States (1996), 517 US 806, 818, 135 L.
Ed. 2d 89, 116S. Ct. 1769 (requiring a balancing analysis
in searches involving a physical penetration of the body).
"In [*8]
a given case, the question whether the
community's need for evidence outweighs the substantial
privacy interests at stake is a delicate one admitting of few
categorical answers." Winston, 470 U.S. at 760. The
Winston court also recognized that Schmerber provides the
appropriate framework for such cases. Id.
No prior arrest
We first consider Appellant's contention that the
extraction of blood from him violated the Fourth
Amendment because it was obtained in the absence of a
prior arrest. He contends that Schmerber supports his
position. The court in Schmerber admitted evidence of an
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unconsented blood test, where it followed an arrest. Since
Appellant was not under arrest at the time the blood was
drawn from him, he claims the evidence should have been
suppressed.
In the case at bar, the absence of an arrest, however, is
not determinative. While the Schmerber court concluded
that the police were justified in taking a blood sample in
that case because the circumstances indicated the blood test
results would be positive and because the defendant was
under arrest, the case did not require that an arrest take
place before every nonconsensual [*9] search. Rather, it
simply stated that "the attempt to secure evidence of bloodalcohol content in this case was an appropriate incident to
petitioner's arrest." Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771. Indeed,
Ohio has since held that the Fourth Amendment does not
require an arrest in all cases prior to administering a bloodalcohol test. See, e.g., State v. Woods (Sept. 9, 1991), 12th
Dist. No. CA90-07-125, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 4210.
Therefore, we do not find that distinction to be dispositive.
Unconscious Party
The more precise question before us is whether the
Fourth Amendment requires the arrest of an unconscious
or incapacitated driver before a blood sample may be
taken. Schmerber did not involve an unconscious or
incapacitated driver. Furthermore, no Ohio case
specifically addressing this question has been brought to
our attention by either party and there appears to be a split
of opinion among other jurisdictions upon it. nl See State
v. Campbell (1980), 189 Mont. 107, 116, 615 P.2d 190,
196; Annotation (1976), 72 A.L.RJd 325, Section 4; and
3 LaFave, Search and Seizure (1996), Section 5.4(b), fn.
21 and 22.

n 1 At least one Ohio court has determined that
R.C. 4511.191(B), Ohio's implied consent statute,
authorizes the withdrawal of blood from an
unconscious individual, notwithstanding the
presence or absence of a prior actual arrest, where
a police officer has reasonable grounds to believe
the person was driving while under the influence of
alcohol. See, e.g. State v. Taylor (1982), 2 Ohio
App.3d394, 395, 2 Ohio B. 468, 442 N.E.2d 491.
As noted by the State, however, Appellant does not
assign error in application of this statute. Instead,
his argument is based upon the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.
[*10]
For its part, the State cites Breithaupt v. Abram

(1957), 352 U.S. 432,1L. Ed. 2d448, 77 S. Ct. 408 for the
principle that an unconscious individual may have a blood
sample withdrawn consistent with constitutional principles.
In that case, a driver was injured in a serious two-car traffic
accident and was taken to a hospital for treatment. A nearly
empty bottle of whisky was found in the glove
compartment. While the driver was lying unconscious in
the emergency room, the smell of liquor was detected on
his breath. Believing him to be intoxicated, police officers
directed medical personnel to withdraw a sample of his
blood while he was unconscious.
On review, the Supreme Court first declined the
petitioner's invitation to extend the exclusionary rule to his
state court conviction. Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 434.
Instead, the Breithaupt majority followed Wolf v. Colorado
(1949), 338 U.S. 25, 93 L. Ed. 1782, 69 S. Ct. 1359 in
holding that the exclusionary rule was not applicable to the
states. Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 434. It was not until Mapp
v. Ohio (1961), 367 US. 643, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 81 S. Ct.
1684, 86 Ohio Law Abs. 513 [*11] was decided, that the
exclusionary rule was applied to state prosecutions for state
crimes. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767.
The Breithaupt Court proceeded to reject petitioner's
due process claim, finding that the withdrawal of blood
from an unconscious person by a trained technician in a
hospital was not brutal and offensive conduct that
"shocked the conscience" or offended a "sense of justice."
Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 435. Thus, Breithaupt was decided
under the Fourteenth Amendment due process "sense of
justice" test. See Sisler (1995), 114 Ohio App.3d at 343.
Breithaupt does not resolve the question in the present case
regarding suppression of evidence brought on Fourth
Amendment grounds.
Subsequently, in Cupp v. Murphy (1973), 412 US.
291, 36 L. Ed 2d 900, 93 S. Ct. 2000, the United States
Supreme Court permitted a nonconsensual, limited search
of fingernail samples without a search warrant and without
a formal arrest. The court found that the existence of
probable cause to believe the man had murdered his wife
justified a limited search in order to preserve the highly
evanescent evidence they found [*12]
under his
fingernails. Id. at 296.
In discussing Cupp, and the split of authority on the
question of whether an arrest is required before a blood
sample may be taken from an unconscious party in a traffic
accident, Professor LaFave has stated:
"Indeed, the case for permitting the taking of the blood
sample upon probable cause that the defendant is
intoxicated without first arresting him is, if anything,
stronger than the case for the searches conducted in Cupp
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and Franklin. In the blood sample case, as opposed to
those cases, there is no room whatsoever for the argument
that the lack of a formal arrest may decrease somewhat the
chances that the evidence will be destroyed, for the
'evanescent' character of the evidence is inherent in its
nature and does not depend upon any motive of the
defendant to destroy it. *** It is the height of formalism, to
say the least, to suggest that a warrantless search on
probable cause in order to meet this emergency is
reasonable only if the police first declare the hospitalized
defendant under arrest. In particular, it 'would be ridiculous
to require a police officer to perform some formal ritual of
arrest over the unconscious [*13] body of a critically
injured person who was a party to a fatal automobile
accident.' The claim that the contrary position 'provides
some measure of assurance that probable cause is based
upon considerations independent of the blood-alcohol test
results' is untenable, as the need for a court to determine
that probable cause existed prior to the test is present under
either rule." (Citations omitted.) 3 LaFave, Search and
Seizure (1996) 161-62, Section 5.4(b).
The Sixth Circuit has adopted the view that the Fourth
Amendment does not require an arrest prior to
administering a blood-alcohol test to an unconscious driver
believed to have been driving under the influence of
alcohol. United States v. Berry (CA.6, 1989), 866 F.2d
887, 888. See, also, State v. Oevering (Minn. 1978), 268
N.W.2d 68, 73 (requiring "arrest ritual" of unconscious
victims of alcohol-related accidents would be "absurd");
State v. Campbell (1980), 189 Mont 107, 115-116, 615
P.2dl90, 196;Statev. Hollingsworth(1985), 77N.C.App.
36, 43-44, 334 S.K2d 463; Wilhelmi v. Director of the
Dept. of Tramp. (N.D.I 993), 498 N.W.2d 150, 154 [*14]
(formal arrest of an unconscious driver would be an
"empty gesture"); State v. Milligan (1988), 304 Ore. 659,
671-72, 748P.2dl30; Alijfv. State (Tex.Crim.App.1982),
627 S. W.2d 166, 170; Van Order v. State (Wyo. 1979), 600
P.2d 1056, 1058. See, also, Annotation (1976), 72
A.L.R.3d325, Section 4. n2

n2 It also appears that a majority of states with
implied consent statutes that have addressed the
issue, have held that the arrest of an unconscious
person is not a prerequisite to the application of the
statute. SeeStatev. Wyrostek(1988),108NM 140,
142-43, 767P.2d379. This majority includes Ohio.
See, e.g., State v. Taylor (1982), 2 Ohio App.3d
394, 395, 2 Ohio B. 468, 442 N.E.2d491.
Other courts have required the formality of an arrest of
an unconscious person, e.g. Commonwealth v. Hlavsa

(1979), 266Pa.Super. 602, 405 A.2d 1270, 1271, or relied
upon the presence of probable cause to arrest, Galvan v.
State (1982), 98 Nev. 550, 655 P.2d 155. [*15]
In light of the serious consequences to the victims of
drunk drivers and the minimal intrusion to the suspected
violator, we are persuaded that the better rule is that the
Fourth Amendment does not require an arrest before a
blood sample may be taken from an unconscious driver
believed to have been driving under the influence of
alcohol.
Exigency
Before the results of a nonconsensual, warrantless
blood-alcohol test may be admitted into evidence, there
must be a demonstration that the circumstances come
within a specifically established and well-delineated
exception. See Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347,
357, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 88 S. Ct. 507. One of these
exceptions, excusing the obtaining of a warrant is the
existence of an exigent circumstance. The Schmerber court
concluded that because of the rapid rate at which alcohol
diminishes in the blood, and because it would take some
time for the officer to investigate and find facts
establishing probable cause, there would be no time
reasonably to expect the officer to obtain a warrant.
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71. Such facts demonstrate an
exigent circumstance, excusing the obtaining [*16] of a
warrant.
In the case at bar, it was 1:30 in the morning and more than
two hours had passed since the accident when Trooper
Sherrod requested the blood test. The officer could
reasonably have concluded that there was not sufficient
time to obtain a warrant.
Probable Cause - Clear Indication
Appellant contends that there was no probable cause
for the blood test in the case at bar. The particular language
in Schmerber required that there must be a clear indication
- as opposed to a mere chance - that incriminating evidence
would be found before an intrusive search may be
conducted. n3 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-70.

n3 In State v. Pearson (1996), 114 Ohio
App.3d 153, 158, 682 N.E.2d 1077, the Third
District concluded that the "clear indication" test
does not differ from the requirements of "probable
cause." The Fourth District has found that the
"clear indication" standard requires a greater
quantum of evidence than that required by probable
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cause. State v. Holmes (July 17, 1986), 4th Dist.
No. 1163, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 7615. Appellant
in the case at bar has argued no distinction on this
point. Our result is the same by either standard.
[*17]
A law officer's decision to conduct a warrantless
search is evaluated first by the trial court and is reviewed
by this court de novo. See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699,
(determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause
are generally reviewed de novo). Probable cause is
determined from the totality of the circumstances. Illinois
v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S. 213, 233, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 103
SCt. 2317.
Our inquiry is directed to the question of whether, at the
time the search took place, the totality of the circumstances
was sufficient to warrant a prudent person to believe that
Appellant had been driving under the influence of alcohol
and that a blood-alcohol test would provide evidence
thereof.
Facts presented at the suppression hearing established that
Appellant was involved in a serious two-car collision at
approximately 11:00 in the evening and was taken from the
scene of the accident for medical treatment. Trooper
Haines subsequently detected the odor of alcohol in the
rear of Appellant's vehicle. Trooper Sherrod reported to the
hospital and there found Appellant to be incoherent and
incapable of communication. Trooper Sherrod detected
[*18] the odor of alcohol on Appellant's person from a
distance of several feet, more than two hours after the
accident.
In balancing the individual's interests in privacy and
security against society's interests in obtaining the
evidence, we find the following. The need to obtain a
sample of Appellant's blood was high. This was a serious
accident, with both drivers requiring medical attention and
both automobiles seriously damaged. The smell of alcohol
was present in Appellant's automobile as well as on his
person more than two hours later. Appellant was
unconscious and it was not possible to conduct any lessintrusive, field sobriety tests. The invasion that the search
would entail, while clearly a search and a bodily invasion,
was commonplace and involved virtually no risk, trauma,
or pain to Appellant. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. at 761,
quoting Schmerber, 384 US. at 771. The test was
performed at a hospital by trained medical personnel.
Under these circumstances, the need to conduct the search
outweighed the invasion that the search would entail.
Schmerber's clear indication test was satisfied.
Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient.

[*19] First, he cites Trooper Haines' testimony that he
"had no proof that Appellant was driving under the
influence. Haines' actual testimony was that he had no
proof of intoxication beyond the odor of an alcoholic
beverage in the vehicle.
Next, Appellant contends that the discovery of an odor
of alcohol in Appellant's automobile does not necessarily
mean that Appellant had been drinking alcohol. Of course
this is true, but neither the law officers nor this Court view
each fact in isolation. Rather, such determinations are
based on facts and circumstances collectively and as they
comprise the totality of the circumstances.
Finally, Appellant argues that Trooper Sherrod was
not close enough to determine that the odor of alcohol,
which he detected on Appellant's person, was from
Appellant's breath. Again, while this claim may be true
enough, it is another fact that is not properly considered in
isolation.
Under Appellant's scenario, he would have the
troopers - and this Court in review - reason that another
person sat in Appellant's vehicle immediately before
Appellant's last excursion, spilled alcohol into the vehicle
as well as onto Appellant's clothing and then left; that
Appellant [*20] was shortly thereafter the innocent victim
of a serious two-car accident; and that Trooper Sherrod
smelled only the result of the alcohol spill onto Appellant's
person or clothing when he approached Appellant at the
hospital.
While such a scenario is not impossible, the question
before the trial court and this court on review is whether
the law officers acted reasonably in concluding that
unlawful activity probably occurred. State v. George
(1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 325, 329, 544 N.E.2d 640, quoting
Illinois v. Gates, 462 US. at 235. Probable cause does not
require certainty, but rather invokes a question of
probabilities - a probability that criminal activity has taken
place. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 235. In this case,
the probability that Appellant had been driving his
automobile while under the influence of alcohol was
sufficient to support the decision of the state troopers to
request a blood-alcohol test and to permit the results of
such test into evidence.
Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled.
Assignment of Error No. 2
"The trial court erred by sentencing appellant to the
maximum term of [*21 ] five years imprisonment when the
sentence was imposed for two offenses arising out of a
single incident, and the court imposed the maximum prison
term for the offense of the highest degree."
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In the second assignment of error, Appellant
challenges the imposition of the maximum term of
imprisonment by the trial court because the trial court
focused solely on the serious physical harm to the victim,
and failed to analyze and adequately address all of the
seriousness factors contained in R.C. 2929J2(B).
Appellant makes three arguments regarding his contention.
Appellant first cites to R.C. 2929.12(B)(2) and argues
that the fact that the victim suffered serious physical harm
cannot establish that the offender's conduct is more serious
than conduct normally constituting the offense. This is so,
he claims, because the causing of serious physical harm is
an essential element of the crime for which he was
convicted, aggravated vehicular assault. See R. C. 2903.08.
This argument is without merit. R.C. 2901.01(A)(5)
defines serious physical harm to persons as including
"any of the following:" (Emphasis added.) [*22]
"(a) Any mental illness or condition of such gravity as
would normally require hospitalization or prolonged
psychiatric treatment;
(b) Any physical harm that carries a substantial risk of
death;
(c) Any physical harm that involves some permanent
incapacity, whether partial or total, or that involves some
temporary, substantial incapacity;
(d) Any physical harm that involves some permanent
disfigurement or that involves some temporary, serious
disfigurement;
(e) Any physical harm that involves acute pain of such
duration as to result in substantial suffering or that involves
any degree of prolonged or intractable pain."
The trial judge indicated in his journal entry that the
injuries suffered by the victim in this case were "lifethreatening" and will cause her to be "permanently
impaired." The record demonstrates that the victim
suffered two broken femurs and had bars inserted into her
legs to replace them, a broken knee cap, cracked pubic
bone, cracked tail bone, broken nose, two broken wrists,
broken ribs, and two collapsed lungs. She takes medication
for pain, sleep, anxiety, depression and thyroid problems.
The injuries suffered by the victim in this case [*23] met
not only one of the statutory factors, but at least four. The
trial judge could reasonably conclude that such injuries
were more extensive and serious than what is minimally or
normally required to constitute the element of serious
physical harm for aggravated vehicular assault.
Next, while Appellant concedes that the trial court
entered findings that the minimum sentence would demean

the seriousness of Appellant's conduct and also that
Appellant had committed the worst form of the offense, he
argues that the trial court erred in failing to "adequately
articulate" its reasons for imposing the maximum sentence.
In a case such as this, Ohio requires that a trial court must
set forth its reasons for imposing the maximum prison
term. R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(d); State v. Edmonson (1999), 86
OhioSt.3d324, 328, 1999 Ohio 110, 715N.E.2dl3L The
record reveals that the trial court did so.
The trial judge stated at the sentencing hearing that he
considered the impact of this accident upon the victim and
found the injuries suffered by the victim to be "very
disturbing." She was trapped for an hour and a half in her
car and suffered serious injuries that will leave [*24] her
incapacitated for the rest of her life. The judge also
considered the fact that Appellant must have consumed a
large quantity of alcohol in order to have such a high blood
level and that he had a prior conviction for driving under
the influence of alcohol.
In addition, the trial judge indicated that he reviewed
a presentence investigation report and a statement from the
victim, which was read into the record at the sentencing
hearing. That statement addressed the physical, emotional,
and financial impact of this matter upon the victim and her
family. On the night of the accident, the victim was on her
way to work. She had not been able to work since the
accident. Her family was forced to depend upon the aid of
extended family. Following the accident, she faced nearly
a year of surgeries and rehabilitation before she could even
walk again. Her three young children, ages twelve, ten and
two, suffered from the results of the accident as well. The
victim still could not carry her small child. Thus, the trial
judge adequately set forth his reasons for imposing the
maximum sentence.
Finally, Appellant asserts error in the failure of the
trial court to address the seriousness factors [*25] of R.C.
2929.12(B). While the trial court is required to consider
these factors, the sentencing judge is not required to use
specific language or make specific findings on the record
in order to demonstrate consideration of the applicable
seriousness factors of AC. 2929.12. State v. Arnett (2000),
88 Ohio St.3d208, 215, 2000 Ohio 302, 724 N.K2d 793.
Instead, "a rote recitation" that the applicable factors were
considered has been held to suffice. Id.
The trial judge indicated in his sentencing entry that he
considered the record, oral statements, the purposes and
principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11, the need for
deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation and restitution and
"the seriousness and recidivism factors relevant to the
offense and offender pursuant to R.C. 2929.12[.]u
(Emphasis added.) Thus, the trial court complied with
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Arnett. Moreover, Appellant has proffered no reason why
any of the other factors in R.C. 2929.12 are specifically
relevant to a consideration of his sentence. Accordingly,
the record demonstrates that the [*26] trial court properly
considered the relevant sentencing factors set forth in R. C.
2929J 2(B).
Appellant's second assignment of error is overruled.
III.
Appellant's two assignments of error are overruled.
The judgment of the Wayne County Court of Common
Pleas is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.
WILLIAM G. BATCHELDER, Judge.
FOR THE COURT
BAIRD, P. J.
WHITMORE, J.
CONCUR
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EVALUATION OF BLOOD-ETHANOL PROFILES AFTER
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Sixteen healthy men drank 1.43 g ethanol per kg of body weight as Swedish aquavit,
export beer, and cognac during 90 min together with a 3-course meal. Capillary (fingertip) blood was drawn on 8 occasions starting at 0-10 min after the end of drinking and
blood alcohol concentration (BAC) was determined by an enzymatic method. The peak
BAG ranged from 0.97-1.41 mg/ml (mean 1.20 mg/ml) and this occurred 78 min after the
end of drinking (range 0-230 min). The mean rate of disappearance of alcohol from blood
(0) was 0.16 mg/ml/h (range 0.13-0.21) and the apparent volume of distribution of ethanol
was 0.795 l/kg (range 0.64-0.93). The mean rate of ethanol elimination from the body
was 128 mg/kg/h (range 99-160). The BAC increased on the average by 0.17 mg/ml (range
0.0-0.45 mg/ml) before reaching the maximum level. During the absorption phase, the
BAC had attained on the average 83%, 91 %, 95% and 98% of the final peak BAC within
5 min, 45 min, 109 min and 175 min, respectively, after ingestion. These results suggest
that part of the dose of alcohol is rapidly absorbed into the blood despite the presence
of undigested food in the stomach. However, the absorption of the remaining dose of
alcohol might proceed for several hours.

R£SUM£
Seize hommes en bonne sante ont bu de I'ethanol dans une proportion de 1.43 g pour
chaque kg de poids corporel durant une periode de 90 minutes tout en consommant
un repas a trois services. L'ethanol provenait ou bien d'aquavit suddois, ou de bldre
Imports ou encore du cognac. Une 6chantillon de sang capillaire (obtenu du bout du
dolgt) a ete prgleve a 8 reprises en commengant 0 2 10 minutes aprds la fin de la consommatlon d'alcool. Une m^thode enzymatlque a ete utilisSe pour mesurer ia concentration sanguine d'alcool. La concentration maximale d'alcool dans le sang variait de
0.97 d 1.41 mg/mL (moyenne de 1.20 mg/mL) et cette concentration a ete observ6e en
moyenne 78 min apr6s la fin de la consommation d'alcool (ecart de 0 a 230 min). La
Vitesse moyenne de disparition d'alcool dans le sang (jS) 6talt 0.16 mg/mL/h (ecart de
0.13 d 0.21) et le volume apparent de distribution de i'6thanol 6tait 0.795 L/kg (6cart
de 0.64 a 0.93). La vitesse moyenne d'elimination de l'6thanol du corps humaln etait
128 mg/kg/h (ecart de 99 a 160). La concentration sanguine d'alcool a augmente en
moyenne de 0.17 mg/mL (6cart de 0.0 a 0.45 mg/mL) avant d'atteindre son maximum.
Durant la phase d'absorption, la concentration sanguine d'alcool a atteint en moyenne
83%, 91 %, 95% et 98% de la vaieur maximale finale et ce dans un d<§lai de 5 min, 45 min,
109 min et 175 min, respectlvement, aprfcs la fin de la consommation d'alcool. Ces
rgsultats demontrent qu'une partie de la dose d'alcool est rapidement absorb6e dans
le sang m&me en presence de nourriture non digeree dans I'estomac. Cependant, I'absorption du restant de la dose d'alcool peut se poursuivre pour plusieurs heures.
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INTRODUCTION
The absorption, distribution and elimination of ethanol1 depend on a multitude of
genetic and environmental factors (1). The magnitude of inter- and intra-individual variations
in the pharmacokinetic profile of ethanol is important when the BAC at the time of sampling
is used to estimate the BAC at some earlier time, such as, at the time of driving. This
procedure, called retrograde extrapolation, is a controversial practice because of the many
unknown factors involved (2-4). Although much work has been done to establish the BAC
time course in healthy volunteers after ingestion of a bolus dose on an empty stomach
(5-10), the pharmacokinetics of ethanol under real-world drinking conditions has not been
extensively studied (11-14). It is widely known that ingestion of food together with alcohol
delays the emptying time of the stomach and slows the rate of absorption of alcohol into
the portal blood (15,16). The resulting BAC profile follows a lower course with a smaller
area under the curve, a lower peak BAC (C,mx) and the time of its occurrence (Tnuix) is
also influenced compared with the same dose taken on an empty stomach (17).
This paper deals with the absorption, distribution and metabolism of alcohol in healthy
men after they ingested a moderate dose together with a large meal lasting for 90 min.
Particular attention was given to the rate of increase in BAC after the end of drinking
and before the maximum level was reached.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects and conditions
Sixteen policemen volunteered for this experiment. Their ages ranged from 31 to 54 y
(mean 42), their body weights from 73 to 98 kg (mean 84) and their heights from 176
to 198 cm (mean 183). All the subjects were accustomed to moderate drinking and in this
study received 1.43 g/kg body weight. Three different alcoholic beverages were available
and served in the following order; Swedish aquavit (31.8% w/v ethanol), atadoseof 150 ml/
70 kg; export beer containing 4.5% w/v ethanol (450 ml/70 kg) and cognac containing
31.6% w/v ethanol (100 ml/70 kg).
The experiment began at 5.00 p.m. and continued until the following day. The principal
aim of the investigation was to record the signs and symptoms of hangover. The results
of this study of hangover were reported in detail elsewhere (18). The present article focuses
on inter-individual differences in the blood-ethanol profiles obtained. Four subjects took
part in each experimental session and alcohol was served together with food. The conditions were made as pleasant as possible in an attempt to reproduce an evening together with
friends. The meal consisted of raw herrings, meatballs and potatoes, bread, butter and cheese
followed with cold roast beef, potatoes, lettuce and tomatoes and finally ice cream, coffee,
cream and sugar. The total caloric value of the meal was about 1900 kcal made up of 120 g
carbohydrates, 90 g protein and 120 g fat. Twelve of the subjects smoked several cigarettes
during the experiment. After finishing the meal, various tests of performance decrement
were conducted or otherwise the subjects relaxed reading magazines. A meal of bread, cheese,
cold meat, and coffee was served 5 hours after the experiment started.
Blood sampling and determination of ethanol
Specimens of capillary blood were obtained at approximately 5,45, 110, 170,225, 405,
650 and 775 min after the end of drinking. For practical reasons, the times of sampling
l.

The words ethanol and alcohol arc used interchangeably in this article.
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blood were not exactly the same for all subjects. Triplicate samples of capillary (fingertip)
blood were taken at each time point and aliquots for determination of ethanol were measured
with the aid of 100 /*! glass capillaries. The blood was diluted with 900 \x\ of saponinfluoride in autoanalyzer cups. The concentration of ethanol was determined by an enzymatic
oxidation procedure as described in detail elsewhere (19,20).
Evaluation of blood-ethanol profiles
Blood-ethanol profiles were plotted for each subject. The peak BAC (Cmx) and the time
of its occurrence (Tm;lx) were recorded directly from the curves. The pharmacokinetics
of ethanol were calculated as described by Widmark (21). In brief, a vStraight line was
fitted to the rectilinear portion of the BAC time profile after the post-absorptive phase
was well established. The slope of the disappearance phase corresponds to Widmark's
/3-slopc. The y-intercept of the regression line represents the theoretical BAC obtained
if the dose administered was absorbed and distributed in the body immediately at the start
of drinking (C0). The x-intercept of the regression line (h0) is an estimate of the time
needed for complete removal of ethanol from the body neglecting the curvilinear portion
of the curve that begins at a BAC below about 0.1 mg/ml. The ratio of dose (g/kg) to
C,> is the apparent volume of distribution of ethanol known also as Widmark's r-factor,
or the ratio of alcohol in the body to alcohol in the blood at zero time.
The rise in BAC after taking the first sample of blood (0-10 min post-drinking) until
reaching the peak BAC was noted for each subject. The BAC at various times during the
absorption phase (C,) was expressed as a percentage of the observed peak BAC (Cnux)
for each of the subjects. Note that those subjects that had already reached their peak BAC
were not included when average values of (Ct/Cmilx) were computed at later time points.
The quantity of alcohol (g) absorbed and distributed in the body at the time the first sample
of blood was taken between 0 and 10 min after the meal, was calculated as follows:
Alcohol (g) « [(BAC/0.84) x TBW] + [(dosc/hj X t]
In the above equation, BAC (mg/ml) is the concentration of alcohol in capillary bloi
at the time of interest (t) measured from the start of drinking* 0.84 is the fraction of wate
in whole blood in mass/volume units (22), TBW is the volume of total body water (liters)
for each individual subject. The dose of alcohol administered is given by (1.43 x body
weight) and h0 is the estimated time to zero BAC, Note that the ratio dose/hu is the rate
of ethanol metabolism from the whole body. TBW was derived from a multiple regression
equation with age (y), body weight (kg) and height (cm) of each subject as the independent variables (23);
TBW (1) = 2.447 - 0.09516 Age + 0.1074 height + 0.3362 weight
RESULTS
Figs I and 2 show the concentration-time profiles of ethanol for each of the 16 subjects.
The absorption/distribution phases differ widely despite the standardized drinking conditions
and similar intake of food. Subjects 6 and 16 had already reached their peak BAC by the
time the first sample of blood was taken between 0-10 min after drinking. By contrast,
subject 15 did not reach a peak BAC until 230 min after the end of drinking. Subjects
1, 3 and 5 showed an alcohol concentration plateau and the BAC remained more or less
unchanged for 2-3 hours. Subject 12 vomited 150 min after the start of drinking or 60 min
after end of drinking.
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Figure I. Concentration-time profiles of ethanol in capillary blood of healthy men (1-8) after they consumed
1.43 g/kg ethanol as mixed drinks together with a meal lasting 90 min.
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Figure 2. ConccMralion-time profiles ol'cthunol in capillary blood of healthy men (9-16) after they consumed
1.43 g/kg cthanol as mixed diinks together with n meal lasting 90 min.
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TABLE 1
AMOUNT OF ALCOHOL ABSORBED AND DISTRIBUTED INTO THE BODY AT THE TIME T H E FIRST
SAMPLE OF BLOOD WAS TAKEN AT 0-10 MIN POST-DRINKING. HEALTHY MEN DRANK 1.43 G/KG
ETHANOL TOGETHER WITH A SUBSTANTIAL MEAL LASTING FOR 90 MIN.

PARAMETER

MEAN

SD

CV%

Alcohol ingested (g)
TBW (liters)*
Ethnnol turnover (g/h)
BAC (mg/ml)#
Alcohol absorbed (g)
Per cent absorbed

118
46.2
10.6
1.03
73.4
61.6

14.4
3.46
1.77
0.19
11.4
8.7

12.2
7.4
16.6
18.4
15.5
14. t

RANGE
104
42
8.4 0.7651
48
-

151
54
14.6
1.41
96
74

* Total body water was derived from a nomogram based on age, weight and height, ti Blood-alcohol concentration 0-10 min
post-drinking.
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Figure 3 . Percent of peak B A C reached at various time points during the absorption phase, N = 16 subjects
drank 1.43 g/kg ethanol together with food. N = the number of subjects included in calculating m e a n values.
At various times during absorption, 2 , 10, 14 and 15 subjects respectively had already reached their peak BAC.

Despite the presence of food in the stomach, an initial rapid absorption of alcohol occurred
in all subjects. The mean BAC was 1.03 mg/ml (range 0.76-1.41) when the first blood sample
was drawn 0-10 min post-drinking. Table 1 shows that on the average 61.6% (range 48-74)
of the dose of alcohol consumed has already become absorbed and distributed in t h e blood
within 0 4 0 min of finishing the meal. T h e remaining part of the alcohol consumed is then
absorbed much more slowly and without necessarily increasing the BAC. Figure 3 s h o w s the

170

TABLE 2
BLOOD-ALCOHOL PARAMETERS DERIVED FROM THE BAC PROFILES SHOWN IN FIGS. 1 AND 2
SD = STANDARD DEVIATION, CV = COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION, N « 16 SUBJECTS

PARAMETER

MEAN

SD

CV

RANGE

Peak BAC (mg/ml)
Time to peaktf
BAC rise <mg/ml)t
C0 (mg/ml)
Widmark's /3-slope (mg/ml/h)
Distribution volume (1/kg)
Time to reach zero BAC (h)
Rate of alcohol turnover (mg/kg/h)

1.20
78
0.17
1.80
0.16
0.795
11.38
128

0.136

11.3

0.97- 1.41
0 -230
0 - 0.45
1.54 -. 2.22
0.13- 0.21
0.64 - 0.93
8.9 - 14.4
99 - 160

*
*

0.160
0.025
0.069
1.56
17.3

*
*

8.9
15.4
8.7
13.6
13.5

ti Time (ruin) lo peak is not normally distributed and can take only fixed values, t Measured from the lime of obtaining
the first blood sample.

rate of rise in BAC in relation to the observed peak BAC at various times after the end
of drinking. Evidently, about 80% of the final peak BAC was reached between 0-10 min
after the end of drinking. The blood-alcohol parameters when alcohol was taken together
with food are shown in Table 2. These values were derived from linear regression analysis
of the concentration-time profiles in Figs, 1 and 2. The broken diagonal lines were used
in this analysis and the correlation coefficients were greater than 0.99.
DISCUSSION
The blood-alcohol concentration at the lime of offence cannot be reported with certainty
unless a specimen of blood is available for quantitative determination of ethanol. Nevertheless, based on information about the drinking scenario, such as the duration of intake,
the quantity and kind of alcoholic beverages consumed, whether the individual ate any
food during the drinking, and the time of last drink in relation to the time of driving, scientists
can assist the court in reaching a decision about whether or not the BAC was above or
below the legal limit at the time of offence.
In the present work, the concentration-time profiles of ethanol showed appreciable inte:
subject variation. The peak BAC ranged from 0.97-1.41 mg/ml and the time of iu
occurrence ranged from 0-230 min after the end of the meal. The faster the absorption,
as reflected in an early occurring peak, the higher the concentration of alcohol in the blood.
The average rate of disappearance of alcohol from blood was 0.16 mg/ml/h (range
0,13-0.21) and this agrees well with the values normally cited in forensic case work of
0.15 mg/ml/h (range 0.10-0.20) (24). However, if the 0-slope is computed using the
concentration-time data immediately after reaching Cmax, abnormally low results are
obtained. This underscores the need to construct the complete BAC time-profile in order
to make a reliable pharmacokinetic analysis. Calculation of 0-slopes without knowledge
about the shape of the entire BAC time-profile can lead to erroneous results. This might
explain, at least in part, the wide range of j3 values reported in the literature (25,26). The
broken diagonal lines in Figs. 1 and 2 show the segments of the post-peak phase used
in the calculation of 0-values.
The present work suggests that when ethanol is ingested together with food the absorption
occurs in two phases. This supports the conclusions of Schultz et al (27) who advanced
a two-pool hypothesis based on extensive experiments with fed and fasted rats. One part
of the dose of alcohol becomes trapped by food particles and is not immediately available
for absorption through the stomach wall. Another part of the dose, corresponding to the
171

*'unbound pool", is rapidly absorbed just as if the stomach was empty. This explains the
initial rapid rise in BAC reaching about 80% of the final peak concentration within 0-10 min
after the end of eating and drinking. However, the bound-pool of alcohol is absorbed slowly
and the BAC either increases gradually over the next few hours, remains unchanged, or
even decreases slowly. Direct support for this hypothesis was obtained by monitoring the
rate of absorption of alcohol from the stomach and the duodenum at fixed intervals after
ingestion of an experimental test meal of alcohol (0.8 g/kg) and nutrients (28).
Note that a decreasing BAC does not necessarily signify the existence of the postabsorptive state. Instead this indicates that the rate of absorption of alcohol into the systemic
circulation is equal to or less than the rate of distribution and elimination of alcohol from
the circulating blood. The wide inter-individual differences in the rate of absorption of
alcohol might depend on differences in the size and shape of the stomach or the physiology
of gastric emptying (1). Uptake of alcohol into the portal blood occurs at a much faster
rate if the pylorus valve opens to release stomach contents into the large surface area of
the duodenum. Food in the stomach delays gastric emptying and will accordingly retard
the rate of absorption of alcohol into the portal blood (29). The Cmax and Tnwx parameters
might also depend to some extent on the composition of the food in the stomach (fat, protein,
carbohydrate) and even the particular alcohol formulation, such as, intake of beer, wines,
spirits, or cocktails (30-33). Although subject 12 vomited 60 min post-drinking this event
had no appreciable effect on the BAC time profile compared with the other subjects. This
might suggest that most of the alcohol had already been absorbed from the gut at the time
of vomiting. Smoking seems to delay gastric emptying and this might have contributed
to the prolonged absorption phase for some subjects in this study (34).
The results presented in this paper emphasise the need for caution when engaging in
retrograde extrapolation of BAC for legal purposes. In some individuals, the absorption
of alcohol might proceed for several hours after the end of drinking. However, despite
this prolonged absorption phase, about 80% of the final peak BAC seems to be reached
within 0-10 minutes after the end of eating and drinking. This is an important observation.
The problems and uncertainties associated with back estimation of BAC could be avoided
if drinking and driving statutes were defined as the BAC existing at the time of sampling
as the relevant figure for prosecution. Until the necessary legislation is formulated, forensic
scientists are obliged to provide the court with expert opinions on the BAC at the time
of offence. The problems and pitfalls associated with retrograde extrapolation arc not new.
More experiments are needed to establish the concentration-time profiles of ethanol under
real-world drinking.
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Uncertainty in the Results of Breath-Alcohol Analyses
Dominick A. Labianca
Department of Chemistry, Brooklyn College of The City University of New York, Brooklyn, NY 11210

I would like to address some of the points made by Robert
Q. Thompson in his article "The Thermodynamics of Drunk
Driving" (J). It is no trivial task to calculate from first
principles the in vivo postabsorptive blood- to breath-alcohol
ratio (hereinafter termed "blood/breath ratio", and denoting
the ratio of blood-alcohol concentration [BAC] to breathalcohol concentration [BrAC]) and its associated uncertainty for
motor vehicle operators arrested for driving under the influence
(DUI) of alcohol. Thompson is to be commended for his
elegant analysis and development of this theoretical model. I
do, however, have reservations concerning the limited scope
and basis of some of Thompson's conclusions, and offer
arguments in support of a broader perspective. These arguments
address the impact of the state of alcohol absorption of DUI
arrestees on the results of their breath-alcohol tests and
statistical analysis of experimental blood/breath ratio data.
Also considered is questionable scientific methodology
characterizing some of the work cited by Thompson.
Blood/Breath Ratios and the State of Alcohol
Absorption
Thompson's theoretical model assumes complete equilibration between BAC and BrAC. Therefore, the assumption
of postabsorption necessarily applies to his model, and his
comparisons between calculated and experimental blood/
breath ratios are restricted to the postabsorptive state. Given
this condition, Thompson initially states that a blood/breath
ratio of 1880:1 should be employed by breath-alcohol analyzers instead of the standard 2100:1 currently utilized in the
USA and elsewhere. His selection of 1880:1—which is the
difference between his calculated mean blood/breath ratio of
2350:1 and 2.33 SD, where SD (standard deviation) is 200—is
derived from normal, one-tailederror analysis involving 99% of
the postabsorptive DUI population. He subsequently points
out that normal, one-tailed error analysis of Dubowskis
experimental postabsorptive blood/breath ratio data (number

of blood/breath pairs: 393; mean: 2280:1; SD: 241.5) {2)
"suggests" a lower limit blood/breath ratio of 1720:1, which,
compared to 1880:1 and, more significantly, to 2100:1,
would result in fewer DUI convictions stemming from overestimates of RkC
One-Tailed vs Two-Tailed Normal Error Analysis
O n e of several points I would make concerning
Thompsons position is that the lower limit blood/breath ratio
he cited for Dubowskis postabsorptive data (2) should be
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about 3.5% lower, or 1660:1, based on a two-tailed normal
error analysis. (A similar reduction can be considered in connection with Thompsons calculated lower limit ratio of
1880:1.) A ratio of 1660:1 is the minimum ratio derived from
Dubowski s data that would characterize the central 99% of
the postabsorptive DUI population. This level of confidence
is consistent with the statistical approach and recommendation
of Rainey for meeting the "beyond-a-reasonable doubt"
requirement for convictions in criminal proceedings, and
reflects standard clinical laboratory practice as well (3). It is
also somewhat more conservative than the 99.9% level of
confidence cited by Jones for direct BAC analyses in Sweden
(4), which he also recommends for breath-alcohol analyses
in all jurisdictions (5)
The following hypothetical scenarios reflect the significance of a two-tailed analysis of postabsorptive blood/breath
ratios. In the first, a DUI arrestee has a BAC of 0.10%, based
on a breath test administered in a jurisdiction whose "legal
limit" is 0.08%. At 1720:1, this individual's adjusted, truncatedBAC is an inculpatory 0.08%, whereas at 1660:1, it is
an exculpatory 0.07%. (It should be noted that truncation,
or deletion of the third decimal place, is the standard practice
in law enforcement for reporting BACs [6].) In the second
scenario, the test subject has an actual, inculpatory BAC of
0.11% in a jurisdiction with a legal limit of 0.10%. However, at a blood/breath ratio of 2900:1, which is the upper
limit of the 99% level of confidence derived from Dubowski's
postabsorptive data {2j, the adjusted BAC would be an
exculpatory 0.07%.
The Absorptive and Postabsorptive States
Thompsons model is predicated on postabsorption,
but, in fact, any particular DUI arrestee is not necessarily
postabsorptive at the time of the breath test. Therefore,
Thompson's suggestion that DUI arrestees should be evaluated
on the basis of the "lower fixed [blood/breath ratio] value of
1720"—which, as noted above, is derived from Dubowskis
data (2)—can be discriminatory. In this regard, Labianca and
Simpson (7) have emphasized that the magnitude of the
blood/breath ratio is dependent on the time elapsed after the
end of drinking (2, 8-10) and the absorptive state, which is
characterized by significant deviations from Dubowskis
postabsorptive mean blood/breath ratio (2), is distinguished
by a widely varying time frame. For fasting subjects, for
example, the time-to-peak BAC typically ranges from 0.5 to
2.0 h, with an average of 0.75 to 1.35 h, depending on dose
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and time of last meal—whereas for nonfasting subjects, the
range is 1.0 to 6.0 h, and the average is 1.06 to 2.12 h (Jfj.
Based on lognormal statistical analysis of the data of
Giguiere and Simpson (12), Labianca and Simpson (7) determined a mean absorptive state blood/breath ratio of
1836:1, with a statistical range of 1128:1 to 2989:1 for 99%
of the population. These data, coupled with the results of
Heifer (10), which are also consistent with the conclusions
of Normann et ai. (13), demonstrate unequivocally that DUI
arrestees in the absorptive state are at a significantly greater
disadvantage than postabsorptive arrestees when undergoing
breath-alcohol analysis. Furthermore, this conclusion reinforces similar arguments put forth by Dubowski (2) and
Simpson (14-16).
An additional point for consideration involving
Thompsons assumption of postabsorption for DUI arrestees
is his determination that, based on the calculated postabsorptive blood/breath ratio of 2350:1 (SD: 200) cited above,
11% of the drinking/driving population undergoing breathalcohol analysis would be characterized by overestimated
BACs. Thompson appropriately based this determination on
a one-tailed, normal error analysis because, in this case, those
DUI arrestees whose blood/breath ratios are below 2100:1
constitute the sole consideration. They would comprise that
portion of the postabsorptive drinking/driving population
whose BACs would be overestimated by breath testing.
Thompson's 11% estimate, however, is in contrast to the percentage arrived at by Simpson (15, 17), who, using the same
straightforward statistical approach employed by Thompson,
showed that 23% of postabsorptive subjects would have actual
BACs overestimated by breath testing, based on Dubowski's
postabsorptive blood/breath ratio data (2).
It is interesting in this regard that, at the time Simpson
documented his conclusions, members of the forensic science
community were critical of his mathematical approach to
calculating the percentage of overestimates for test subjects
in the postabsorptive state (18, 19). I would hasten to add,
however, that it is particularly noteworthy that, in addition
to Simpson's sound scientific rebuttals of these criticisms (20,
21), Thompson independently applied the same mathematical
approach in his work. This situation suggests that published
work focusing on forensic alcohol analysis must be carefully
scrutinized to ensure that proper scientific methodology was
used to arrive at the documented conclusions. Some examples
in this regard are addressed below within the context of
Thompson's work.
Questionable Scientific Methodology
Apparently, Thompson was unaware of instances of
inappropriate scientific methodology involving certain of the
peer-reviewed literature he cited. One instance involves the
work of Jones and Andersson (22), who reported a mean
time-adjusted blood/breath ratio ± SD of 2407 ±213, based
on a study of 799 DUI arrestees assumed to be postabsorptive.
A fundamental flaw of this work is that the single evidential
breath test for each subject was aborted for unexplained reasons.
The possibility cannot be ruled out, therefore, that the
aborted breath tests generated artificially low data, so that
the reported blood/breath ratios are falsely high.
In addition, Jones and Andersson's claim that the use of
modern breath-alcohol analyzers may account, in part, for post-

absorptive blood/breath ratio data differing from corresponding data obtained with older instruments, is unsupportable
because instrumental and calibration errors are insignificant
compared to blood/breath ratio variability and other sources
of error (16, 17, 23).
The single evidential breath test characterizing Jones
and Andersson's work (22) is also problematic because it is
inconsistent with Jones' own recommendation for duplicate
sampling (5, 24) and with the recognized quality assurance
practice of duplicate sampling endorsed by the National
Safety Council Committee on Alcohol and Other Drugs (6).
Timing of Blood and Breath Sampling
Another questionable aspect of the experimental protocol
of Jones and Andersson (22) is that venous blood was sampled
an average of 30 min (range: 6 to 60 min) after the single
exhalation breath test in each case. Given that BAC «= BrAC
and that the proportionality constant at any given time is
the blood/breath ratio, denoted by BBR, then in order for
the equation BAC = BBR X BrAC to accurately reflect the
relationship between BrAC and coexisting BAC, the latter
two concentrations must be measured essentially simultaneously (8, 10, 12, 25).
Rates of Alcohol Elimination and Absorption
Jones and Andersson's use of a mean rate of alcohol elimination of 0.019%/h (22) to correct for the time difference
between breath and blood sampling is also questionable. This
mean (SD: 0.0049%/h) is based on the analyses of two blood
samples taken from more than 1000 individuals (26). Samples
were taken an average of 68 min apart (range: 30 to 120 min),
with 75% of the double samples taken between 47 and 84 min
apart. Such protocol is in contrast to the pioneering work of
Widmark with alcohol elimination rates, which involved both
the analysis of at least nine blood samples taken over a 230min postabsorptive period and the application of the method
of least squares to the data (27). Moreover, broader elimination rate ranges and greater SDs than those of Jones and
Andersson (26) were cited by Dubowski (2) for studies also
involving the testing of two samples. One of these studies, for
example, reported a range of elimination rates of 0.001%/h
to 0.08%/h for 1512 subjects, with a mean and SD of nearly
0.02%/h and 0.01%/h, respectively.
The assumption of postabsorption by Jones and
Andersson (22) for the DUI suspects they evaluated is another
of the problems they failed to address (22, 26). If a DUI
suspect is in the absorptive phase of alcohol metabolism, then
the hourly rate of elimination used by Jones and Andersson
(26) fails to take into account substantial changes in BAC
that can occur during active alcohol absorption. On an empty
stomach, for example, Jones et al. (28) found the rise in BAC
to average 0.10%/h (range: 0.03%/h to 0.30%/h). Moreover,
analysis of data reported by Dubowski (2) shows a range of
absorption rates of about 0.05%/h to as high as 0.60%/h and
an average of about 0.15%/h, the latter having also been
determined by Simpson (29).
Rates of alcohol absorption on a full stomach, on the
other hand, tend to be lower but are, nevertheless, significant.
Analysis of the data of Jones and Neri (30), derived from their
study of subjects who ingested mixed drinks with a meal,
reveals absorption rates ranging from approximately 0.02%/h
to 0.08%/h, with a mean of about 0.05%/h.
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Conclusion
It must be emphasized that Thompsons work is a step
in the right direction. Of particular significance, however, is
that any discussion of error in breath-alcohol tests cannot be
restricted solely to a consideration of postabsorptive error;
all sources of error must be considered. Certainly, with
regard to a key source of error addressed in this article (the
variability of the blood/breath ratio), it is typically not known
in a D U I case if equilibrium, and therefore postabsorption,
exists at the time of the breath test. Unless the existence of
equilibrium can be established by objective means for each
test subject, it can only be assumed that the subject is still
absorbing alcohol. That assumption is required if strict adherence to a fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence
is to be maintained, namely, that defendants must be afforded
the benefit of the doubt in criminal proceedings. This means
that the correction factor for 9 9 % confidence limits is 46% (7)
rather than the 18% consistent with the use of the lower limit
blood/breath ratio of 1720:1 stemming from Dubowski s
postabsorptive data (2) and cited by Thompson (7), or the
2 1 % associated with the corresponding adjusted blood/breath
ratio of 1660:1 stemming from the two-tailed analysis described previously.
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LANDS W E M A review of alcohol clearance in humans ALCOHOL 15(2) 147-160,1998 —The level ot blood or brain
alcohol is considered to influence alcohol ingestion by causing subjective perceptions or neural activations that are reinforcing or rewarding Alcohol-dependent people may try to maintain some desired tissue level drinking to replace the millimolar
levels that were cleared from the blood by metabolism rhe biomedical literature describes many approaches to understand
ing the role of blood alcohol levels in human physiology and behavior, and this review examines some of the published results rhev include the general kinetics of intake and removal of beverage alcohol as well as the characteristics of many differ
ent catalysts that can interact with alcohol Because ingested alcohol creates blood levels that are a 1000 fold greater than
those normall) experienced during abstinence, ethanol may impose itself as an alternate substrate for the many oxidoreductascs that act physiologically on other endogenous alcohols Many enzymes that can act on millimolar ethanol have been isolated and their structural genes are sequenced Unfortunately the genetic sequence does not indicate thcphysiological material upon which the translated gene product may act In a sense the set of enzymes with catalytic sites occupied bv millimolar
ethanol during alcohol drinking might constructively be regarded as 'orphan gene products" whose physiological role remains to be clarified This review is designed to indicate some of what is known, what is not known, and what needs to be
known to impro\e the interpretations regarding adaptations to beverage alcohol and the ability of millimolar levels of alcohol
to dimmish dysphoria The dysphoria may be influenced by ethanol, by ethanol metabolites, or by altered metabolism of cur
rentlv unspecified endogenous substrates A major challenge is to evaluate the multiple alternative variables within a context
that stimulates curiosity and encourages quantitative tests of the relative contribution of each variable to the overall physiolog\ of an individual Published by Elsevier Science Inc
Acetate
Adenosine
Alcohol clearance
Alcohol dehydrogenase
Alcohol dependence
Blood alcohol level
Catalytic site
Enzyme kinetics
Millimolar alcohol
Orphan genes

THIS review ot alcohol metabolism was stimulated by a puzzling comment in the literature In evaluating a report by
Craft et al (19) on the successful use of intravenous ethanol
during alcohol detoxification, McMilIen (83) asked "why
would trivial blood levels of alcohol rapidly eliminate the
signs and symptoms of alcohol withdrawal 7 " Clearly, a conundrum evolved from the authors' description of the desired
goal for blood alcohol levels (BAL) during treatment as "nondetectable " and a paradox evolved from the reported clinical
efficacy of a B A L below the range commonly regarded to aftect recognized neurotransmitter-receptor systems, such as
glutamatergic receptors (74) What receptor(s) could have de
tected and mediated the reported clinically beneficial action
of alcohol in this situation 9 At what B A L do people with
physical dependency upon alcohol begin to sense (and exhibit

Binding site
Withdrawal

to their physicians) forms of dysphoria during abstinence, and
what BAL do they attain when they dimmish that dysphona
by drinking m the morning 9 In moderate drinkers who do not
develop dependency, does some threshold BAL initiate a "satiety" signal 9 In approaching this area of uncertainty about
the effects of low BAL, several aspects of alcohol pharmacokinetics need to be assembled to validate the apparent evidence for effective low BAL values
This review examines whether the BAL predicted from
current pharmacokinetic concepts and data fits the limited de
scnption provided by Craft et al (19) What were the probable ("nondelegable") B A L values in that study, and what
metabolic factors maintain them 9 Do B A L kinetics for infused alcohol differ from those for ingested alcohol 9 The m
fused 50 ml/h of 10% (v/v) ethanol in a 24-h penod compares
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with eight drinks, but the BAL was very much lower than expected when eight drinks were consumed orally. Why was it
necessary for the treatment duration to average more than 3
days? Is the presence of ethanol or of ethano! metabolites
more important in peoples' perception of alcohol effects? In
preparing to examine eventually the pharmacodynamics of infused millimolar alcohol, the following review summarizes
some of what we currently know about the the cellular and
molecular mediators of ethanol clearance. Hopefully, readers
can begin to evaluate the quantitative evidence needed to develop a consensus on the main cofactors and enzymes involved in alcohol clearance.
ETHANOL CLEARANCE: THE KINETICS OF CHANGE

Infusing alcohol at rates of 40-80 mg per minute maintained steady-state BAL values in the range of 15-45 mg/1
(67). Those results indicate that the 10% (v/v) ethanol infusion
at 50 ml/h used by Craft et al. (19) (4 g/h or 67 mg/min) might
provide a steady BAL of approximately 30 mg per liter or 3 mg%
(0.65 mM) blood ethanol, a relatively low value compared to
the legal limit of 100 mg% (22 mM) set for automobile safety.
The level is also low compared to the 10-50 mM levels commonly used in studies of alcohol perturbation of neural receptor signaling [e.g., as noted by Lovinger et al. (74)]. On this
basis, McMillan may be justified in using the term "trivial."
Nevertheless, the reported success of intravenous intervention (19) argues for some physiological relevance of millimolar BAL and for pursuit of further understanding of its impact. In further interpreting the situation, consideration of the
dynamics of BAL values should include how the situation of
constant infusion and constant BAL differs from that of drinking alcoholic beverages, which creates rising and falling blood
alcohol levels. The ways in which the results of infusion differ
from the results of ingestion (with its derived measure of "firstpass" metabolism) represent a continuing area of uncertainty
and inquiry in alcohol research (1,27,40). Time-dependent
events that occur during customary alcohol drinking as well as
during the infusion process are discussed below so that readers can begin to assess the possible physiological impact of different BAL values and the factors influencing those levels.
INTAKE AND REMOVAL

Ingested alcohol distributes rapidly among the various tissues of the body, eventually approximating a uniform distribution in the total body water. Any large increase in BAL decreases first by a rapid dilution into tissue water and then by a
slower metabolic removal. The rapid initial distribution/dilution process appeared to be first order among men and was not
evident in women (for whom average total body water is near
two-thirds that of men) (101). The major metabolic removal
appeared to be a linear (pseudo-zero order) process in both
men and women, ranging from 0.05 to 0.08 mM/min for different individuals. This linear metabolic removal has been observed consistently, and it underlies the ability of long-established Widmark equations (A = rXpX C0; and C0 = Q + pf)
to predict changes in blood alcohol levels from information on
alcohol intake (127). In the Widmark equations, A = total alcohol ingested, p = the total body mass, r = fraction of body
mass in which alcohol could be present, 0 = the rate of decrease in blood alcohol level (C,), and C0 = the blood alcohol
level extrapolated to zero time. Widmark (127) assigned
mean values for r: 0.68 ± 0.085 for men and 0.55 ± 0.055 for
women. In general, total body water (TBW) tends to average
about 60 I for men and 40 1 for women. Using anthropomor-

phic data, Watson (126) circumvented using r and improved
the accuracy in determining C0. In this approach, C0 = 0.80 X
/4/TBW,andTBWis:
TBW = 20.03 + 0.3626 x weight (kg) - 0.1183 x age (yr) for men
TBW = 14.46 4 0.2549 x weight (kg) for women.
The literature of the past 50 years consistently described
time-dependent changes in BAL following ingestion or infusion. Generally, oral ingestion gives an initial rise in BAL that
represents absorption from the intestine, peaking usually
within 1 h. Then there follows an approximately linear decline
in BAL with time (zero order kinetics) equivalent to about
3 mmol per minute for people with about 501 of body water [see
Fig. 1, which is based on data from Jones et al. (53) and resembles results in other reports (27,124,128)]. The apparently linear
metabolic clearance rate (p) is about 0.015%/h or 15 mg%/h
(101,122), ranging from 13 to 21 mg%/h (i.e., 3 to 5 mM/h, 0.05
to 0.08 mM/min, or 2 to 4 mmol/min for people with about 501
of body water). Average clearance rate values were 0.06 ± 0.01
mM/min for control abstinent women, 0.078 ± 0.013 for women
misusers of alcohol, and 0.05 ± 0.016 mM/min for control and
alcoholic men (101,122). Thus, there is some evidence for an alcohol-induced increase in metabolic clearance with women, but
not men. This difference is discussed further below.
The decrease in BAL with time eventually curves (mixed
zero and first-order kinetics) as the half-maximal rate of alcohol removal (Vmax/2) is evident near an alcohol concentration
approaching 1 mM, the apparent Km value (i.e., Km is the ethanol concentration at Vmx/1)H a value that has been observed in
many different studies. The shifting patterns in alcohol clearance are approximated by the hyperbolic Michaelis-Menten
relationship:
rate of alcohol removal = V max /(1 + ATm/BAL).
In this simple relationship, a maximal rate of removal (Vmax)
is observed when BAL is much greater than the apparent Km,
making the denominator (1 + KmIBAL) have a value near 1
[i.e., rate = (3mmoles/min)/(l + ImM/lOmM)]. The results of
Larsen (67) also approximate this simple relationship, (138
mg/min)/(l+0.46mgL-l/BAL). Representation of alcohol removal with a single apparent Vmax and apparent Km is a useful
simplification of the overall process. However, ethanol removal
is actually catalyzed by a variety of enzymes that have different kinetic constants, and simple estimates may occasionally
lead to oversimplified interpretations. The subsequent discussion illustrates some aspects of alcohol clearance in humans
that need careful quantitative assessment to gain alternate insights and avoid misunderstandings.
Overall, a need remains for further inquiry into how the infused ethanol achieved the apparent benefits described by Craft
et al. (19). Could receptor systems detect and respond to 3 mg%
BAL values, as the diminished withdrawal symptoms suggest?
If so, what are the receptors and their resultant signals, and
what is their threshold BAL? Similarly, is there a BAL value
that triggers the phenomenon of morning drinking by individuals with physical dependence on alcohol? A useful recent
noninvasive monitoring method (106,107) provides detailed
information (almost minute by minute) on BAL. This sensitive transdermal detector may permit continuous monitoring
over days of BAL values and clearance rates (for BAL from
1 to 200 mg%) and give information useful in testing hypotheses about the relation between BAL and spontaneous drinking
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FIG. 1. Food and blood alcohol levels. The BAL profiles for apparently healthy volunteer men after drinking (in 30
mm) 0.80 g ethanol per kg body weight following an overnight fast (•) or immediately after breakfast (O). [Derived
from Jones and Jonsson (53) with permission of the authors.]

behavior. Questions about the possible pivotal role of a BAL
threshold might be approached in 5- to 14-day ethological
studies with such a noninvasive monitor. Most importantly, if
BAL becomes recognized as not a determining factor for dysphoria or for voluntary alcohol ingestion, researchers may
want to redirect efforts to identify and understand alternate
signals in the future. Some of those alternate signals may be
initiated by metabolites of ethanol ratheT than by ethanol per
se or by metabolites of alternate physiological substrates that
have adapted to the presence of beverage alcohol. Those alternate metabolites may change human physiology with slower
kinetics than seen for BAL clearance.
CONSEQUENCES OF METABOLISM

Metabolic Acetate
Nearly all of the alcohol metabolized by the liver appears
quickly as acetate in the blood (76,77) before it eventually becomes carbon dioxide (C0 2 ). During the pseudo-zero order

decrease of BAL noted in customary drinking episodes, acetate produced from hepatic ethanol metabolism appears in
the blood at a fairly constant level near 1 mM compared to a
customary level near 0.05 mM. Infusing 4 g ethanol/h would
produce about 5 g acetic acid per hour or 460 g in the 4-day infusion—equivalent to 9 1 of vinegar—a considerable amount
to be accommodated! The extended exposure of tissues to
such abnormal levels of acetate might cause important adaptive changes as various tissues convert the acetate to its coenzyme A ester with formation of appreciable amounts of cytosolic 5'AMP, subsequent release of extracellular adenosine,
and activation of important adenosine receptors. Chronic stimulation of adenosine A| receptors may mediate myocardial
adaptations that diminish risk of ischemic injury (84) and
might participate in the widely discussed possible benefit of
moderate drinking. Adenosine can influence motor coordination (13), and its strong vasodilator action on adenosine A2 receptors in splanchnic blood vessels (52,91) may alter a person's sense of well-being. In such a situation, the ambient value
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of BAL may not adequately reflect all of the alcohol-initiated
signals that influence human behavior and health Further research is needed to resolve the question of whether some subjective perceptions during intoxication are also mediated by
the indirect actions of acetate and adenosine rather than by a
direct action of ethanol (73)
Adenosine release is relevant to increased excretion of uric
acid observed in heavy drinkers (109) and also to alcohol's wellknown exacerbation of tendencies for gout Such effects of
ethanol ingestion upon adenosine metabolism represent "hidden" aspects that may occur even when BAL values from infusion seem to be "trivial" or "nondetectable " Nitrogen loss and
"tissue wasting" is a characteristic feature of chronic alcohol
ingestion [noted 90 years ago by Atwater and Benedict (4)
and reviewed recently by Lands (65)] This loss needs better
understanding as researchers consider the benefits and risks
of alcohol drinking and evaluate alcohol's contribution to body
mass maintenance and calorie balance [e g, (59,98)] Further
attention to protocols examining the actions of adenosine and
acetate may be productive in developing new interpretations
of human adaptations to beverage alcohol
Another clue to adaptive shifts in physiology due to some
en/yme induction or altered cofactor and metabolite abundances,
is that chronic alcoholics have a more rapid elevation of blood
acetate after drinking (42 89) After ingesting 0 8 g ethanol/kg
body weight in 25 min, the antecubital venous blood of alcoholics had 0 91 ± 0 08 mM acetate, whereas it was 0 52 ± 0 05
in controls (89) The fact that such adaptations occur has not
yet been integrated into explanations of metabolic changes that
subsequently occur during abstinence by a physically dependent alcoholic The experiment above did not collect data to
address whether some metabolic adaptation had occurred with
chronic alcohol oi whether the alcoholics were initially predisposed to faster alcohol metabolism However, such results may
reflect adaptations that occurred in the alcohol-dependent patients of Craft et al (19)
NADH Reoxidatwn and Binding
Adapting to ingested ethanol can give transient elevations
in the ratio of reduced to oxidized forms of NADH and
NADPH in tissues and increase the ratio of alcohol to carbonyl forms fot various metabolic intermediates For example,
the ratios of plasma lactate/pyruvate and 3-hydroxv butyrate/
3 keto butyrate rise in a way that reflects a shift m redox po
tential of the tissue metabolizing ethanol (64) Similarly the
ratio of 17-(3-hydroxy to 17 keto-steroids in plasma was 6-10
times greater during ethanol metabolism than in control plasma
samples (2) Also ethanol stimulated reduction of 17p hydroxy-5a androstane-3 one to the 3-hvdroxy form in isolated Leydig cells, decreasing the formation of testosterone
(2) Other adaptations include diminished retinoic acid formation and epithelial differentiation (28,132) and decreased
estiadiol clearance (37,38) A marker of alcohol ingestion
(with its increased NADH/NAD+ ratios) is urinary 5 hydroxytryptophol (117), which is formed by reduction of 5-hydroxyindole aldehyde The aldehyde is readily formed from serotonin
(5 hydroxytryptamme) by the action of monoamine oxidase
(MAO) Presumably, similar alcohol denvatives may be formed
from other biogenic amines after they are oxidized by MAO
to the aldehyde form [(26,81), see also the Aldehyde Dehydrogenase Activity below] Accumulation and excretion of
5 hydroxytryptophol may be due to greater reduction of the
aldehyde by increased NADH levels or to competitive interference with oxidation of the tryptophol by ingested ethanol
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(15) These adaptations in metabolite flux illustrate the impact of sharing either substrates or coenzymes among the different metabolic systems—all of which may then be influenced when ingested ethanol is metabolized Because the
various oxidoreductase systems may adapt through either
NADH or ethanol interactions, researchers need careful controls to distinguish between cofactor competitions and substrate competitions.
Competition by accumulated NADH at the NAD+ binding site of alcohol dehydrogenase (ADH) is a form of product
inhibition that can inhibit ethanol oxidation and slow clearance rates For example, NADH at 56 \xM causes 50% competitive inhibition ( l e , K, is about 56 \xM) of the rate of
NAD+ oxidation of ethanol by p,p r ADH2*3 (12), whereas
it has a fivefold higher Km value (260 u,M) for reduction of acetaldehyde The complexity of the NADH/NAD+ interactions
seems formidable to approach, but they might be handled in
part bv computerized simulations that approximate the integrated in vivo system (17) The alcohol dehydrogenase system
of rats was successfully fitted to ethanol clearance (16,17) with
a complex steady state ordered bi-bi kinetic expression that is
characteristic of ADH action (130) Computer modeling of alcohol oxidation in the liver showed that Class I and Class II
ADH isoenzymes may not function in vivo at their maximal
activities The human ADH forms can be limited by product
inhibition and equilibrium effects ot NADH and acetaldehyde
and by incomplete saturation with NAD+ (eg , P-, ADH) or
ethanol (e g, p^ and IT ADH) (17) Thus, the complex multi
vanant ADH system in human liver constitutes a remaining
unresolved challenge in understanding BAL clearance (27 92)
Extension of the successful modeling of alcohol clearance in
rats (16 17) to the kinetic system in humans (see Table 1) in a
physiologically based pharmacokinetic (PBPK) model would
be a valuable next step
Quantitative assessment of clearance rates in vivo needs to
account for the fact that increasing the NADH/NAD+ ratio
creates conditions favoring the reverse reaction (I e» reduction of acetaldehyde) (20-22) Cronholm (23) estimated for
humans that acetaldehyde exchange and reduction by the NADH
bound to ADH was about 4 5-fold greater than the net rate of
ethanol oxidation (and more rapid than transfer to aldehyde
dehydrogenase) Each variable has limits within which it influences overall clearanc e and careful quantitative treatment of
data is needed to indicate the degree of influence expected for
each interaction Metabolism of deuterated ethanol permitted
estimates of the degree of participation of various metabolites
interacting with the NADH derived from ethanol oxidation
and with the systems that shuttle electrons into mitochondria
(20,21) Kinetic aspects of the reverse reaction also were described in detail by Deetz (25), who noted that the p}p,«
isozyme catalyzes both directions at rates lower than those of
the other class I enzymes An additional aspect of the ability
of ADH action to both reduce and oxidize acetaldehyde (43)
may be a fundamental property of the dehydrogenase reaction
(see also the Aldehyde Dehydrogenase Activity section) That
property extends beyond previously expected roles of ADH
into new alternate interpretations not yet widely discussed
Transient shifts in redox potential after drinking alcohol
also help emphasize that the electrons (reduction potential)
from early steps in alcohol clearance move through one type
of path toward oxygen while the acetate formed in those early
steps moves separately to other tissues for eventual oxidation
to CO<> These separate routes involve many variables that may
affect the yield of useful energy for growth and work More
quantitative assignment of the effect of different BAL values
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TABLE 1
liNZYMES CATALYZING ETHANOL OXIDATION IN HUMAN LIVER
Form of Enzyme
Class 1 ADH
ADH1 (ma)

aP,
<*7i

«72

ADH2 0 1 3 1 )
Pi-Yt
P.7'
ADH2(p 2 p 2 )
ADH2 ( P £ , )
ADH3(«y l7 ,)
ADH3(-»iTfi)
Class 11 ADH
ADH4 (irir)
Class 111 ADH
ADH5(xx)
Class IV ADH
ADH6 (aa)
CYP2E1
CYP1A2
Catalase

^(n,M)
Ethanol

0.4
4.2
1
0.32
0.16
0.55
0.049/0.1
1.1
0.2
0.94
34
1
0.63
34
»2000
37

KM(nM)
NAD+

13

7.4

180
530/710
7.9
8.7
14

77

K«, (rev)
min'1 (U/mg)

Km(ixM)
NADH

Km(mM)
Acctal

K,0*M)

Content

NADII

jimol/kg

Reference

8
???

777

115
25,80
9
9,25,80
9,25,80
9,25,80
25,80
9
9,25,80
9.25,80
9
12
9,25
9
9
25,59
121

(mM"1 min""1)
1510

777

25,35

23
50
(mM -1 min' 1 )

2
2
777

3
3

11
27
39
11
10
9.1
9.2 (0.085)
30
14
400(8.6)
300(7.9)
87
35
20

350
11?
630
1100
890
380
6
860
1100
98
64

650

6.4

105
260
7.0?
16
2.5(pH10)

25 (pH 10)
180

16
24

Km(fwd)
mm"1 (U/mg)

upon the participation of the different metabolic paths will
permit a better assessment of the possible energy available from
ingested alcohol (65,66). Shifts in redox potential can also affect the phosphorylation potential, the availability of inorganic phosphate, and the amount of free magnesium ion in the
tissue (60,99) in ways that influence the metabolic flux and
that need more quantitative interpretation by the research
community.
To understand the degree of control that can be exerted by
a selected catalytic step, it may be necessary also to understand the integrated system as an assembly rather than to focus narrowly on one enzyme within the overall system. Can
we identify from the multiple enzymes present the major catalysts for ethanol clearance and allocate quantitatively their
proportional contribution? One approach to the question could
be by systematic assembly of data on enzyme abundance and
the known kinetic constants in a multivariant computerized
simulation system in ways that permit tests of the various hypotheses regarding which catalysts play a major role at various designated B AL values (many new user-friendly software
systems are available to help achieve this goal; e.g., ANALYTICA by Lumina Decision Systems, Inc. or STELLA by
High Performance Systems). The systematic use of mullivariant quantitative relationships facilitated by computer-assisted
models [e.g., (27,69)] may help move toward more precise future interpretations and more successful future predictions.
Such calculations involve identifying the catalysts whose active sites are occupied by ethanol during clearance.
Feast and Famine
A confounding feature of alcohol metabolism is the wide
variance in patterns of frequency and amount ingested by in-

2
4.3?
0.15
1.3
0.7
0.076
0.085
1.1
0.28
0.24
3.4
0.3?
30
8.3

?0.9?

777
777
???
977
777
???
777
777
777
777
777

dividuals. The question of "Why do some people drink so
much?" has an important corollary, "Why do most people drink
so little?" Describing "average" bouts of drinking by an "average" American can mislead when the median intake of 1 to
2 drinks per week is below the mean intake of 14 drinks per
week and far below the over 100 drinks per week that occur
among those in the upper 5% of the USA population. Actual
patterns of alcohol intake may be cyclical (100), with heavier
intake on weekends and frequent intermittent days of abstinence (87). Such patterns of drinking make it inevitable that
aggregate values of average intakes would greatly underestimate BAL values attained during actual drinking conditions,
and would lead to a greatly underestimated involvement of
enzymes with Km values over 10 mM. For example, portal
blood may carry 50 mM alcohol to the liver in individuals consuming several drinks in an hour, whereas there would be little exposure after 12 h of abstinence permitted metabolic removal of the circulating alcohol. This wide range of alcohol
concentrations entering the liver matches or exceeds the halfsaturation concentrations for nearly all of the liver enzymes
known to metabolize ethanol. As a result, any of them might
have their catalytic site occupied by ethanol at some time during this period. Supplementing the somewhat intrusive selfreporting method (87,100) with a hopefully less intrusive
transdermal monitor, as noted in Intake and Removal
(106,107), might provide valuable new insights into the actual
relationship of BAL to spontaneous alcohol drinking behavior. The data can give useful clues to which translated gene
products are occupied by alcohol when certain behaviors or
sensations occur.
Another often-discussed confounding feature of alcohol metabolism is the effect of meals on BAL values, clearance rates
(53,128), and first-pass metabolism (1,27,40,69). Meals may
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increase rates of reoxidation of NADH as the metabolism of
ingested food increases the intermediates participating in redox reactions (41), and systematic, quantitative measurements
are needed to assess carefully their importance in BAL clearance kinetics. For example, the curves in Fig. 1 indicate an apparent slower absorption and faster metabolism of ingested
alcohol immediately after a meal. To separate the two opposing processes, the clearance of intravenous infused alcohol
was measured (41). Food intake increased the apparent zeroorder clearance from 0.14 ± 0.03 to 0.15 ± 0.02 g/l/h (breakfast) or 0.13 ± 0.03 to 0.17 ± 0.03 g/l/h (lunch). Such rates are
equivalent to the often reported 3.0 mmol/min for individuals
with 50 1 of body water (i.e., 0.06 mM/min). The authors also
noted that ethanol clearance is not continually constant, and it
changes as a nonlinear function of BAL.
The more comprehensive management of multiple variables in a computerized simulation system like a physiologically based pharmacokinetic (PBPK) model (27,69) can permit more comprehensive evaluations and estimations of these
effects than is provided by simple rule-of-thumb estimates.
Such quantitative treatments (27) have indicated a significant
contribution by the 7-ADH variant and a relatively small contribution to clearance by gastric and hepatic first-pass metabolism. That treatment, allocating a minor status to first-pass
metabolism, was confirmed by a careful isotope experiment in
which gastric first-pass was only 6 ± 5% of the ethanol metabolism in men and women (1). Combining such a comprehensive quantitative pharmacokinetic approach with what we know
of the physiological actions of the enzymes that metabolize
millimolar alcohol will help include all important variables
during discussions of how humans adapt to beverage alcohol.
Such an approach may help avoid erroneous oversimplifications as occurred with [J-ADH isozymes (see discussion in Alcohol Dehydrogenase Activities below).
IDENTIFYING THE AGENTS OF CHANGE

Many different oxidoreductases share nucleotide cosubstrates,
and those that also interact with millimolar levels of ethanol are
noted in Table 1. Any of the latter enzymes may participate in
adapting to beverage alcohol. Quantitative information on the
relative abundances of the different catalysts could permit the
kinetic data to be useful in estimating relative contributions of
dehydrogenases (ADH, which are NADH and ATP generating), cytochromes P450 (CYP, which are NADPH consuming
and non-ATP generating), and catalase (non-ATP generating) to the overall BAL clearance. Assembling such quantitative information seems worthwhile. The shape of BAL curves
also gives clues to the major catalysts involved, and the observed curvature suggests a dominance of catalysts with apparent Km values near 1 mM. Each catalyst participating in
clearance presumably has its catalytic site occupied by ethanol
and therefore is unable to act at that moment on any alternate
physiological substrate (26). Designating the differing degrees
of occupancy of the many different catalytic sites during alcohol clearance may help indicate those most diverted. As a result, assembling more information on the specificities of these
enzymes may help the scientific community consider alternate
metabolites that may be perturbed by drinking alcohol, and
thereby expand awareness of possible physiological impacts
of ingesting alcohol.
Although kinetic reports often describe enzyme properties
at various pH values, information collected under conditions
near 7.5 is needed to give reliable estimates of physiological
importance. Kinetic reports also employ the convenient ratio

" of kcJKm (6) as a comparative index for selectivities that can
occur in a test tube with unlimited substrates or cofactors. The
rate constant,fccal,defines the maximal rate, Vmax, as the product of kat and enzyme abundance. The ratio of k^xIKm needs to
be employed with caution, and each constant needs independent interpretation in the context of physiological conditions.
Physiological limits of materials in vivo make the kcJKm ratio
of limited utility compared to the ratio of /ccal to the observed
flux of metabolite and the ratio of Km relative to the abundance
of substrate (5). Nature does not always provide in vivo what
kinelicists study in vitro, and the absolute speed of forming
nanomoles of product may not be a suitable index to physiological impact and survival when alternate substrates link to
alternate physiological mediators. Perhaps of major importance is a comparison of KJS for the different alternate substrates that compete with ethanol at the catalytic site.
Alcohol Dehydrogenase Activities
Alcohol dehydrogenase (ADH) activity in liver is widely
regarded to be the principal process by which ethanol is removed from circulation (16,72). Human liver has many different types or classes of ADH (119), some of which form random aUmeric associations of different gene products (95,96,102104). The overall liver metabolism that regulates alcohol clearance results from the sum of the individual fccat values times
the millimoles of each catalytic form as modified by appropriate terms for cofactor interactions. Considerable evidence shows
that human liver has abundant amounts of the different ADH *
forms with an overall activity of 0.05-0.10 u,mol/min/mg soluble protein (71). One report noted that over 200 mg mixed
ADH was isolated from 600 g of human liver (115), and the
mix of dehydrogenases may account for about 1% of liver
protein. Interestingly, all human livers with high specific activity for metabolizing ethanol contained a more anodic ADH
form (71), subsequently named ir-ADH. This early recognition of more than one class of ADH acting on ethanol provides a useful context for the following discussion. Early kinetic characterizations of the many individual dimers done at
pH 10.0-10.5 (71,115,120) were hard to interpret in terms of
physiological metabolism of ethanol, but more recent work
with the various isozymes gave values measured at pH 7.4-7.5
(9,10,80,81), which are noted in Table 1. Now a task remains
to relate the in vitro results to in vivo clearance data.
Many homodimer and heterodimer forms of ADH have Km
values near 1 mM for ethanol and average kCAi values near 20
min"1 (see Table 1). The abundance of these ADH subunits in
human liver (ca. 330 mg ADH/kg liver; 8 u,mol/kg) (115) appears to provide not enough activity for 1 kg liver to remove
10 mM ethanol at the well-recognized rate of 3 mmol/min
(53,127):
rate = (*cal)(enzymeamt.)/(l + Km/S) =
(20)(8)/(l + 1/10) = 160 umoles/min.
Also, the reverse reaction catalyzed by ADH isozymes
might proceed similarly, with Km values near 1 mM for acetaldehyde and ATca, values near 100 to 1000 min"1 (25):
rate = (*cal)(enzymeamt.)/(l +Km/S) =
(1000)(8)/( 1 + 1 /0.01) = 80umol/min.
In this regard, Cronholm et al. (23) reported that humans
(and also rats) (20-22) form alcohol from acetaldehyde in vivo
nearly as fast as they oxidize alcohol to acetaldehyde. Thus,
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the rate at which energy is made available from ethanol needs
careful evaluation. Quantitative data of the abundance of each
type of enzyme [e.g., quantitation of the many resolved bands
noted earlier (e.g., (71,115) by a broadly selective immunoblot
method] might improve estimates of the participation of the
different enzymes in alcohol clearance (27). Also, because the
abundance of each subunit per kilogram of human liver is influenced by the expression of the different genes for these enzymes (9,28,56,79), the regulatory sites involved in activating
transcription of these genes have importance in the ability of
each tissue to participate in ethanol clearance or to metabolize alternate substrates (see Upstream Regulators: Altering
the Flow).
The class I ADH (aa-isozyme; ADH1) occurs in human
liver, and it has a Km value (either 0.4 or 4 mM) that is near
that observed in clearance studies. Unfortunately, it is seldom
discussed in detail, and little information is available regarding its abundance or participation in BAL clearance in humans. The ct-subunit was cloned, and its protein structure was
described (118). Information regarding this subunit, its abundance, its characteristics, and its participation in clearance
needs to be assembled and put in the overall context of ethanoFs impact on humans.
The class I ADH (pp-isozyme; ADH2) has three known
alleles with strikingly different kinetic constants (see Table 1),
and the different frequencies of allele occurrence among different ethnic groups has attracted appreciable curiosity. Because the ADH2 isoenzymes differ widely, they were the subject of focussed effort (7,11,18). These isoforms are extensively
described (8-10,30,31), and recent reports indicated that they
might play only a minor role in alcohol clearance (9,110-112).
p ^ , (ADH2*1). The apparent overall Km value of 1 mM
that has been repeatedly reported for BAL clearance is much
greater than the 0.05 mM Km for the piPj isoform of liver
ADH (ADH2*1) in Caucasians (133). This 0.05 mM /Rvalue
for ADH2*1 would predict that the nearly linear pattern of
BAL kinetics would extend well below 1 mM for Caucasians
and would contrast with a predicted curvilinear pattern for
Africans (11,110) (see p3p3 below). Such results are not reported, and the evidence opens the suggestion that this isoform may not be the rate-limiting catalyst for clearance of
blood alcohol in Caucasians—even though overall ADH activity of liver is still regarded to be the major agent in alcohol
clearance. As noted by Bosron et al. (9) and Thomasson et al.
(110,111) and confirmed by the unique computer simulations
of Derr (27). ADH2 is only one of many ADH activities that
can act to remove ethanol. Its contribution to overall clearance might be appreciably overestimated relative to that of
ADH1, ADH4, and especially ADH3.
P2P2 (ADH2*2). The large reported differences among
kcM values for the Pjp, isoform (9 min"1)* the P2P2 isoform
(400 min ') found in Asians, and the p3p3 isoform (300 min'1)
found in Africans suggest that clearance rates might differ
greatly among different ethnic groups (11). Two studies of alcohol clearance rates for Chinese subjects in whom the p t and
p2 alleles were identified noted no statistical difference in
elimination rates (111,131) for subjects with the different
isozymes—even though p 2 has a 40-fold greater k^ than p,. A
part of the explanation for the lack of difference may be that
ADH2 accounts for only a small fraction of the overall rate of
alcohol elimination (133).
p ^ (ADH2*3). This allelic form has a Km 1600 times that
of the p,p r ADH2*l and a km 90 times that of the p t p r
ADH2*1 (12). Similar to results for individuals with the p2p2
genotype, clearance rates of 13.1 ± 0.6 seen for African-
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Americans with a p3p3 genotype compared to 11.3 ± 0.2 for
p!p! genotypes (110) hardly reflect the large differences in the
kat values for these genotypes or the fourfold different rates
predicted from the kinetic constants (9,11,12). Also, the apparently linear kinetics observed in African-Americans with
BAL values of 5-10 mM (110) suggests a saturated catalyst,
does not reflect the curvature predicted earlier (12), and
seems incompatible with the major catalyst having a /Cmvalue
of 34 mM. Again, the authors noted that ADH2 (as either p t ,
P2,or p3) constitutes only a fraction of the enzymes contributing to alcohol clearance (110), making clearance independent
of whatever allelic form of ADH2 is present in the mixture
along with the other ADH activities. A rigorous, quantitative
reconciliation of observed clearance rates with protein quantitation of the various ADH isozymes could be helpful in interpreting other clearance studies.
The class I ADH (77-isozyme; ADH3) has two known alleles (y} and y2) with relatively similar kinetic features, and its
occurrence in human liver has been noted with little recent discussion of its probable contribution to overall ethanol disposal
(7,8). Ironically, the reported Km values near 1 mM fit closely
to that so frequently reported for ethanol clearance in humans.
Homo- and heterodimers containing the 7-subunit exhibit negative cooperativity for ethanol oxidation (8) and can be allosterically regulated by testosterone (79). The Class I ADH
isozymes that contain -y-subunits can catalyze oxidation of 3phydroxy-5p-sterols with kal/Km ratios 4- to 10-fold greater than
the kcJKm value for ethanol (82). Isoflavones (at submicromolar levels) can inhibit ethanol oxidation by 72P2-ADH (62),
leading to further questions on physiological substrates and the
regulation of activity by dietary soy constituents. The cDNA
and peptide primary sequences for the two isozymes are
known (47), and possiblefiiturestudies of this isozyme may be
helpful in interpreting adaptation to ethanol. Further characterization of the subunit abundance, the endogenous substrates, and the contribution to ethanol removal seems very desirable since pharmacokinetic calculations (27) indicate that
this isozyme may significantly interact with beverage alcohol.
The class II ADH (irir-isozyme; ADH4) also occurs in
liver, and its action with a Km value of 34 mM could be expected to impart curvature to BAL clearance curves similar to
those predicted for p3-isoform- and cytochrome-catalyzed clearance. It was once estimated that an intoxicating level of ethanol (60 mM) might be 40% removed by ir-ADH. Although identified 20 years ago as significant in human liver samples that
had a high ability to metabolize ethanol (71), this form of ADH
has received comparatively limited recent attention. When
ethanol is present at levels produced by "social" drinking, the
endogenous substrate(s) of this enzyme (such as steroids, bile
acids, etc.) can be expected to have an altered metabolic fate,
and its selective action upon catecholamine derivatives may
have physiological significance (78,81). The structure of this form
of ADH was shown (46) to have 147 positions different from
ADH2, and these changes can be interpreted in terms of altered catalytic function that would include altered specificity
for various physiological substrates.
The class III ADH (xx-isozyme; ADH5) activity has diverse distribution in nearly all tissues that needs further quantitation to determine its role. Interestingly, xx-ADH appeared
to be the only ADH isozyme in brain (5), and its apparent
uniqueness in placenta and testis provokes a series of questions regarding its physiological role. Its catalytic activity in
handling ethanol has an apparent first-order rate constant
rather than the customary pseudo-zero order kal, and it cannot be saturated with ethanol (even at 2.5 M) (59). More in-
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formation on the first-order rate constant and the millimoles
of enzyme per kilogram liver would help estimate the possible
role of this catalyst, which can be particularly activated by
long-chain carboxylates (e.g., octanoate or deoxycholate) to
act on ethanol (86,121). Whether a pathophysiological abundance of nonesterified fatty acids or bile acids would enhance
ethanol oxidation by ADH5 in vivo merits consideration (sec
also Active Sites and "Pockets"). Is it possible that under
some conditions the high concentration of the isoforms of this
enzyme (xi plus X2) in human liver might be sufficient to permit some BAL clearance to be catalyzed by this enzyme? Alternatively, the x-ADH may have an important physiological
action in catalyzing the reduction of formaldehyde derivatives—an action not readily indicated by its name.
The class IV ADH (ac-isozyme; ADH7) is characteristically found to be most abundant in the mucosa of the upper
digestive tract and stomach (59,93). It has the highest kcJKm
value for retinoids of all human classes of ADH (132), and it
is very active with other long-chain alcohols and aldehydes
(34,35). Although not known to be appreciably expressed in
liver, it may aid in the removal of ethanol from the digestive
tract in accord with its abundance in the tissue, itsfccat,and its
Km value.
Finally, class V ADH (ADH6) is recognized at a genomic
level and as mRNA expressed in human liver, and class VI
ADH (ADH8) is known to occur in deermice and rats—and
may occur in humans. More kinetic information and information
on abundance is needed to help define a role for these activities.
Cytochrome P450 Activities
Two of the many enzymes of this type, cytochromes
P4502E1 (CYP2E1) and P4501A2 (CYP1A2), interact with
ethanol at levels encountered after drinking beverage alcohol.
In doing so, they provide an additional route for oxidation of
ethanol, which can operate without using nucleotide coenzymes in the manner that ADH does. Rather, these catalysts
transfer reducing equivalents from ethanol to oxygen with the
coordinated action of a reduced flavoprotein and a heme protein. Paradoxically, this pathway consumes reduced coenzymes. As a result, it causes a significant loss of available energy for each molecule of ethanol that moves along this
pathway (66). The Km values for these enzymes (16 and 24
mM) (3) fit a concept that energy wasting might occur when
portal BAL was 10 to 50 mM, and these enzymes participate
to a greater degree in alcohol removal. Participation of such
non-ADH systems remains uncertain in the face of estimates
that they may account for less than 10% of the total ethanol
oxidation by liver [reviewed by Cornell et al. (16)]. Such participation (like that of the high-/Cm class II, class III, and class
IV ADH) will depend on values of BAL as well as the nanomoles of each catalyst per gram of liver—values that need
more widespread discussion and quantitative evaluation.
The reported abundance of specific cytochrome P450
isozymes in human liver (3) (CYP2E1 and CYP1A2 each
about 10-30 pmol/mg microsomal protein; ca. 2 jxmol/kg
liver) predicts that these catalysts operating at 10 mM BAL
with published values of kCA, and Km could provide:

their combined contribution may be one fourth of that estimated for ADH. Such estimates help emphasize the importance of identifying credible data that clearly indicate how
much CYP2E1 activity is actually present in human liver. Improved data might also help evaluate the report that women
alcoholics have faster clearance than women nonalcoholics
[(101,122); see Intake and Removal). Because men did not
show such a difference, there may be gender differences in the
induction of CYP2E1. Quantitative tests of the contribution
of the cytochrome pathway in cycling of ethanol and acctaldehyde would be valuable also in resolving the uncertainty
about energy "wasting" during alcohol clearance. Recognizing that a highly variant daily intake of ethanol is the customary pattern (87,100) means that the aggregate epidemiological
information on alcohol calories and body mass [reviewed recently (65)] may need reevaluation in a new kinetic context
that includes careful pharmacokinetic calculations. A rigorous
reconciliation of immunoblot quantitation of the various CYP
and ADH isozymes with observed clearance rates and known
kinetic constants could be helpful in future interpretations of
clearance studies.
The consistently reported induction of increased CYP2E1
activity by ingested ethanol keeps attention on this enzyme in
adaptations by chronic drinkers. Immunoblot analysis of human liver microsomes showed fourfold higher CYP2E1 in recently drinking alcoholics than in nondrinkers (113), although
the absolute amount of CYP2E1 or its activity was not reported. Also, alcohol-fed baboons had 34% faster metabolism
of alcohol and 23% greater liver size (88). However, earlier
published clearance values indicated little difference in clearance for individuals with different alcohol exposure (39). This
result was confirmed in part by a recent report (114) describing clearance in patients vs. controls with cl/cl CYP2E1 genotypes (0.19 vs. 0.17 mg/ml/h) and cl/c2 genotypes (0.17 vs. 0.14
mg/ml/h). A 400% increase in CYP2E1 giving only a 10-20%
increase in ethanol removal might suggest that this path may
account for only 3-7% of ethanol removal in normal tissue.
This evidence on the net removal of ethanol might lead to a
suggestion that the energy wasting action of cytochrome P450
action has only a limited role. However, the possibility of
CYP2E1 oxidation being followed by reduction of acetaldehyde by ADH [see Cronholm results (20-23) noted in N ADH
Reoxidation and Binding) could dissipate considerable energy with little net loss of ethanol (66). When the rapid flux of
ethanol/acetaldehyde carbons does not equal a rapid clearance or disappearance of ethanol, interpretations of clearance
and energy balance need carefully controlled information.
Even though induction of CYP2E1 has little effect on ethanol
net clearance rates, it may have major importance in increasing the dissipation of energy and in increasing the toxicity of
some xenobiotics (e.g., acetaminophen). Interestingly, when
CYP2E1 knock-out mice were challenged with acetaminophen, considerably less liver injury was noted (68), illustrating a valuable experimental test for the role of this enzyme
(see also Knock-Out and Knock-In Effects: Searching for Relevance).
Catalase

CYP2E1 rate = (23)(2)/(I + 16/10) = 18 umol/min
CYPlA2rate = (50)(2)/(1 + 24/10) = 29 umol/min.
Such estimates illustrate that cytochromes might be minor
in an overall metabolism of 3 mmol ethanol/min. although

Catalase also can catalyze the oxidation of ethanol using
hydrogen peroxide as a cosubstrate. It is often listed as a third
pathway for ethanol removal, and it might act in brain where
no other enzyme is known to convert appreciable amounts of
ethanol to acetaldehyde. This review accepts that viewpoint
for the present, and will not burden the reader with further as-
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pects. If we successfully arrange quantitative estimates of the
contributions of the many other above-mentioned enzymes,
there will then be an appropriate context for later evaluation
of the contribution of catalase.
THE FINAL TRACES-AND OTHER BEGINNINGS

Everyone metabolizes ethanol, and elhanol levels of 5-15
\xM occur in blood and urine of alcohol abstainers (54). This
low ethanol concentration, possibly derived from fermentation by intestinal flora in the lower gul, could be regarded as
being "kept under control" by ADH2*1, which can effectively
act on very low concentrations of ethanol because of its very
low Km value (0.05 mM) for ethanol (9). Clearance of ingested
alcohol described in Intake and Removal fit the general approximation: rate = 3 mmol/min/(l + 1 mM/BAL). On this
basis, a steady-state level of 15 u,M ethanol in the plasma of
abstinent individuals might reflect an ethanol influx of about
0.05 mmol/min, or 2 mg/min. Further refinement of this estimate seems likely as the amounts of the various enzymes participating in clearance (sec Table 1) become better known.
The ADH2*1 isozyme in Caucasian populations has been
tclcologically regarded to prevent harmful accumulation of
blood alcohol and thereby provide a needed benefit. However, this optimistic rationale of a "fitness for survival" is not
derivable for other ethnic populations that have ADH2
isozymes with much higher Km values [Asians with ADH2*2
(Km = 1 mM) and Africans with ADH2*3 (Km « 34 mM)].
The ADH isozyme in those people would not be predicted to
keep blood alcohol as low. even though the traditional highfiber diets of these people might produce more gut ethanol
and provide an even more vigorous "selection pressure" than
seems evident for Caucasians. In the absence of any clear evidence of "superiority" for survival of Caucasians, the Pip, allele (ADH2*1) may not reliably indicate any evolutionary
"superior fitness" for ethanol-related survival of humans. Selection pressure can enrich the prevalence of genes whose
translated products control a step needed for survival, but there
is little evidence for selecting—or retaining—genes whose
products control a step that does not appreciably influence a
needed process. This topic leads to more curiosity regarding
what evidence indicates any toxicity for submillimolar levels of
alcohol. The reported success of a clinical "detoxification" by
use of millimolar BAL (19) merits careful reevaluation.
The name for a biological substance may indicate only one
of several physiological or metabolic aspects of that substance.
For example, the translated oxidoreduclase gene products
that interact with NAD+/NADH are called dehydrogenases
(55-58), and this review examines the subset of dehydrogenases that also interact with millimolar ethanol. Many investigators have noted the improbability of the many different ADH
genes being retained in humans for thousands of years solely
to protect against ethanol-related risks (75,122-124), and the
many different dehydrogenase activities that are called ADH
may have their major biological impact via other alcohols
(26). Many questions remain unanswered regarding the most
likely endogenous substrates for which evolutionary selection
pressures maintained the presence of enzymes. Were ethanolmetabolizing oxidoreductases retained through evolution
(55,57,58,115) for their interaction with ethanol or with other
endogenous substrates? If not ethanol, what are the customary endogenous substrates, and how does ingested ethanol affect their fate? Do the low levels of ethanol that moderated
dysphoria in the Craft study (19) influence neural mediators
by acting on the oxidoreductases described above? Do those

neural mediators also mediate dysphoria experienced by
some people during ingestion and metabolism of alcohol?
ENDOGENOUS SUBSTRATES: PATHS TO EXPLORE

The complexity of the many alcohol dehydrogenase forms
suggests that the system is involved in more specific physiological roles than removing ethanol (6). Because the translated
gene products may not normally handle ethanol, the intrusion
of ingested ethanol and its metabolites may divert those gene
products from reacting with their customary physiological substrates (6). Such diversions or perturbations could induce
important adaptations or maladaptations to alcohol that extend beyond the brief transient change in cellular redox potential. The earlier description of the dehydrogenases in Alcohol
Dehydrogenase Activities noted some results from testing
possible physiological substrates for these catalysts. Such testing is the most direct way to examine alternate substrates. Further characterization of possible endogenous substrates seems
desirable. For example, a number of sterols are substrates for
human liver ADH (95), and the -Y-subunits of ADH appear to
be essential in the metabolism of 3|3- and 170-hydroxy steroids
(61,82). In addition, ADH may have a physiological role in
degrading circulating epinephrine and norepinephrine (78).
Screening physiological materials for reactivity with the various ADH isozymes is a valuable direct approach to identifying
alternative endogenous systems that may be adapting to alcohol. In addition, several types of experimental design noted
below give results that may help indicate possible endogenous
substrates. These indirect approaches have potential, but may
not yet be characterized as heavily traveled paths to understanding how humans adapt to beverage alcohol.
Active Sites and "Pockets"
Spatial characteristics of possible endogenous substrates of
the various liver dehydrogenases that interact with ethanol
can be partially defined by conformational models (31,56,
118). Although a crystallographic analysis of all human alcohol dehydrogenases would permit the most thorough interpretations, X-ray data are obtained for the p , ^ form (49),
and model building using data from horse ADH crystals also
provides useful estimates (11,30,31,55,57,58). For example,
three different aspects of amino acid placement were identified (31): 1) changing the phenylalanine residue at position 93
alters coenzyme binding and restricts space at the inner part
of the substrate pocket; 2) alterations in positions 140 and 141
influence binding at the inner part of the cleft and may cause
the a-subunit to be more effective with secondary alcohols; 3)
exchanges at positions 48 and 51 may have important effects
on substrate and coenzyme binding as well as affecting the kCAi
value. Identifying the characteristics and understanding the
possible major endogenous substrates for the various ADH
enzymes may evolve from a better understanding of the three
dimensional structure at the active site of the different dehydrogenases in liver (30,31,49). For example, X-ray studies indicate the degree to which retinol and other hydrophobic alcohols can fit to the active site (24), and studies with bile acid
oxidation (90) point to other endogenous molecules that
might be substrates (132) for the different liver dehydrogenases. Also, site-directed mutagenesis studies provide valuable
insights (50,51) to the spatial dimensions of the substrate binding site and to dimensions of alternate endogenous substrates.
Further information on the specific peptide domain at
which ethanol binds with millimolar affinities may give valu-
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able insights to possible peptide domains in other targets for
alcohol action on physiology and behavior, such as neurotransmitter receptors or ion channels. Considerations of a
binding "pocket" or "barrel" within which ethanol might bind
have been expressed for NMDA receptors (94) and for the
XX-ADH (86). In the latter case, octanoate and deoxycholate
activated the oxidation of ethanol, presumably by Filling the
"barrer with sufficient hydrophobic carbon atoms not supplied by the 2-carbon substrate. In fact, the report emphasized
that probable endogenous substrates for the xx~ADH had an
anionic group at a distance equivalent to 8-10 carbons, and
that a 20-hydroxy-leukotriene is an excellent substrate (86).
Characterization of the substrate binding preferences of the
many enzymes able to metabolize ethanol and acetaldehyde is
an important future topic in developing a broader context for
assessing the roles of different ADH and ALDH activities in
adapting to beverage alcohol. Further attention to possible
endogenous substrates seems inevitable, and some additional
topics that will need quantitative examination in the future are
briefly noted below.
Aldehyde Dehydrogenase Activity
Two forms of aldehyde dehydrogenase (ALDH) activity
can catalyze oxidation of acetaldehyde; ALDH1 in cytosol
with a Km of 30 jxM and ALDH2 in mitochondria with a Km of
3 |iM. In liver cells metabolizing ethanol, various ADH activities employ NADH to catalyze rapidly the reduction of acetaldehyde to ethanol (20-23), keeping the steady-state level of
acetaldehyde rather low. As a result, the low-J^ ALDH2 that
is predominantly in mitochondria is regarded as principally
responsible for oxidation of ethanol-derived acetaldehyde to
acetate (133). It thereby is expected to be a dominant catalyst
in conversion of alcohol to acetate. This ALDH2 isozyme has
two allelic forms: the active ALDH2*1 and the relatively inactive ALDH2*2. People with the inactive ALDH2*2 form of
low-tfm mitochondrial ALDH2 had slightly lower alcohol
clearance rates than people with the active ALDH2*1 form
(0.24 vs. 0.27 mg/dl/min, 111; 0.13 vs. 0.14 mg/ml/h) (131).The
limited difference in clearance observed for these genotypes
(85,110-112) appears to indicate that ALDH2 activity may
have a limited influence on the pharmacokinetics of ethanol
clearance in humans. The recent awareness that acetaldehyde
can be dehydrogenated also by alcohol dehydrogenase (43) may
stimulate a needed reappraisal of the expected metabolic
roles of ADH and ALDH in different tissues. Perhaps a more
rigorous kinetic analysis or quantitative simulation will indicate which type of new, controlled data could lead to more definitive interpretations of how much acetaldehyde actually occurs during clearance of beverage alcohol in humans.
The frequency of the homozygous ALDH2*2 genotype
was very low in Japanese alcoholic patients compared to controls (0.06 vs. 0.30) (44,111), supporting a concept that this allele may act in some way that protects individuals against alcoholism. One proposal is that acetaldehyde may accumulate
and cause aversive sensations in people with the ALDH2*2
allele. In evaluating the analytical evidence for circulating acetaldehyde, Eriksson and Fukunaga (33) concluded that there
was no valid demonstration of released acetaldehyde in human venous blood before, during, or after normal ethanol intoxication. Also, Hunt (48) summarized that the formation of
acetaldehyde in the brain in vivo after ethanol ingestion has
not been clearly established. Recently, Higuchi et al. (45) reported a careful test of the hypothesis that more active ADH
isozymes cause accumulated acetaldehyde in persons with in-
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active ALDH2, finding that variations in ADH2, ADH3, and
CYP2E1 are not specific in alcoholics with inactive ALDH2.
More controlled studies will hopefully resolve whether hepatic-derived acetaldehyde moves to the brain to create the
proposed aversive events.
Alternatively, Zimatkin et al. (134) considered that the
most important physiological role for ALDH-2 may be to catalyze the oxidation of the biogenic aldehydes formed from
dopamine, norepinephrine, and other biogenic amines via the
mitochondrial monoamine oxidase (MAO) deamination {see
also Tank (108)]. Researchers might constructively consider
ALDH2 to be an "orphan gene product" for which endogenous substrates remain to be identified. An intriguing feature
of the histological distribution of the mitochondrial low-ATm
ALDH-2 is its presence in brain tissue (with intense staining
in cerebellum) (134), in addition to its presence in liver and
other tissues. Although liver contains many different ethanoloxidizing enzymes, brain does not. This finding opens the possibility that ALDH2 in brain may act on some endogenous
substrate other than acetaldehyde, such as aldehydes from
monoamine oxidation by mitochondrial MAO [see also (125)].
Future research may clarify whether the ALDH2 gene product can influence neural actions (such as by disposition of
dopamine in the nucleus accumbens) and whether such influence can aller the reinforcement associated with drinking ethanol. Such a paradigm might offer an alternative interpretation for the well-demonstrated low incidence of the ALDH2*2
genotype among Japanese alcoholics.
Recently, Keung et al. (63) showed that giving an ALDH2
inhibitor to hamsters caused a decrease in voluntary alcohol ingestion without accumulating appreciable levels of acetaldehyde. Also, a comprehensive review of the status of flushing
phenomenon (14) noted the inadequate documentation of
mechanisms whereby accumulated acetaldehyde may mediate
decreased ethanol intakes. In fact, a recent authoritative report
on ALDH (105) noted that the widely used prescription drug.
Antabuse or disulfiram, is a nonspecific alkylating agent that
can inhibit virtually any enzyme with an active site cysteine,
leading to undesirable side effects. Thus, unresolved aspects of
the ethanol-induced flushing phenomenon still include, along
with uncertain levels of plasma acetaldehyde, fluctuations in
autonomic tone (70) and a variety of alternate mediators that
may be producing the flushing and the decreased preference
for ethanol. Finding other phenotypes for an ALDH2 deficiency might give valuable new insights to possible mechanisms
for the lower alcohol intakes. Furthermore, human class I
ADH isozymes of liver can act on norepinephrine (80) and
dopamine (81) metabolites, and many possible new concepts
remain to be explored as alternate physiological substrates
(6,43) of the various ADH and ALDH enzymes are examined.
Knock-Out and Knock-In Effects: Searching for Relevance
Deleting or inhibiting a step in a metabolic pathway causes
precursor accumulation and/or pathway diversions that help
interpret complex flux interactions [reviewed by Kashiwaya et
al. (60)], One naturally occurring knock-out experiment is the
"inactive" form of ALDH2 noted above, and some evidence
indicates an altered ethanol flux. Perhaps more controlled
data on blood and tissue levels of other physiological metabolites in people with different genotypes can help identify physiologically relevant endogenous substrates for the ALDH2
gene product. Other examples for studying altered flow control were expected in individuals with p2p2 anc* p3?3 alleles of
ADH2. but a formal analysis of those results in terms of the
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control of the rate of flux by an individual step in a metabolic
pathway remains a continuing challenge. Similarly, the Adhdeficient deer mouse represents another naturally occurring
t4
knock-out" model in which further studies may give useful
insights. Boleda et al. (6) noted that the lack of obvious physiological abnormality in this strain of mouse lacking class I
ADH suggests that alternative systems in liver metabolize xenobiotics and endogenous alcohols, and there is evidence for
appreciable extrahepatic ADH activity in these animals (32).
These "natural experiments" illustrate the new opportunities that might follow the creation of a series of specific targeted mutants. For example, development of the CYP2E1
knock-out mouse noted in Cytochrome P450 Activities sets
the stage for a series of useful studies on alcohol clearance
and adaptations to beverage alcohol. The growing experience
with knock-out mutants includes many surprising examples in
which expected results did not occur and some very unexpected results did occur. Such results illustrate extensive
adaptive capacity in nature as alternate redundant pathways
are mobilized. Further studies that insert or delete genes participating in alcohol metabolism will probably give both expected and unexpected results, but they may help define the
limits of influence of the various dehydrogenases on elhanol
metabolism—and of ingested ethanol on the metabolism of
endogenous substrates.

mRNA of rat hybridoma cells, indicating a two- to fourfold
increase of this mRNA within 24 h of treatment with dexamethasone (29). The human ADH2 gene contains upstream
sequence motifs homologous with glucocorticoid response elements, encouraging further consideration of some physiological interaction of glucocorticoids and the human ADH2 gene
in adapting to beverage alcohol. This concept was supported
by the presence of three tandem glucocorticoid receptor binding sites in the 5'-flanking region of the human ADH2 gene,
which appear to serve as a functional glucocorticoid response
clement (129). (B) Recognizing that glucocorticoids, growth
hormone, and insulin-like growth factor-1 can activate transcription of the class I ADH gene, researchers searched for
other factors regulating that expression. One such factor is an
enhancer binding protein (97), which activates the promoter
region in the 5'-flanking region of the ADH gene. Other transcription factors act on different promoter elements in ways
that provide a developmentally dependent temporal expression of ADH1, ADH2, and ADH3 (116). The complexity of
this network of nuclear factors, DNA elements, and multiple
isozymes again prompts questions about whether the system
is involved in more specific physiological roles than removal
of micromolar levels of ethanol formed by colonic fermentation. Information on the adaptations in these systems following ingestion of alcohol might help interpret physiological
changes in the patients of Craft et al. (19).

Upstream Regulators: Altering the Flow
Although there is no certainty in the following hypothesis,
a useful heuristic concept is that the intracellular signaling
that influences the activation of upstream regulatory sites of
genes may have origins and consequences lelated to important physiological roles of the genes. From this viewpoint, the
naturally occurring activation of expression of specific genes
gives clues to physiologically important priorities and Ideologic rationales. Thus, the signals that influence selective expression and abundance of enzymes that metabolize millimolar ethanol (in addition to endogenous substrates) are important
topics for future research (28). Curiosity is provoked regarding whether or not the signals and the newly formed mRNA
from these genes do actually play an important role in adapting to beverage alcohol. For example, adrenals and liver had
the highest content of Adh-1 mRNA (36). Is there a convincing argument that ethanol removal is the raison d'etre for expression of this gene in adrenals? Also, testosterone induced
10-12-fold the transcription of Adh-1 mRNA in female mice.
Such specific hormone action stimulates curiosity about the
possible physiological importance of such an induction and
the possible alternate substrates for this androgen-induced
gene product. Clearly, hormonal steroids and many candidates other than colonic ethanol could be considered in evaluating how this ADH gene may have survival value for mice.
Additional clues to the possible "purpose" of the various
ethanol-metabolizing enzymes may open new insights into the
way that humans adapt to chronic beverage alcohol. Aspects
that could be examined further include: (a) A cDNA clone for
the 0-subunit of human ADH2 hybridized to class I ADH

CONCLUSIONS

Metabolism of ingested ethanol is catalyzed by a variety of
enzymes that may be diverted from acting on their normal
physiological substrates. The presence of those many different
enzymes in tissue-specific patterns and their activity in removing ingested ethanol is influenced by multiple factors and conditions that remain to be fully characterized and need to be
evaluated in an integrated manner. As the multiple catalysts
and factors participating in adapting to ethanol and its metabolites become quantitatively defined, more sophisticated computer modeling is needed to treat the assembled information
on each catalyst in a more complete overall context. Open
evaluation of the evidence about the actions of these translated gene products may help the research community develop
and pursue fresh curiosity about alternate measurements and
new interpretations that may lead away from entrenched or
authoritatively enforced positions. In one sense, the set of enzymes with catalytic sites occupied by millimolar ethanol during alcohol drinking might constructively be regarded as "orphan gene products'* whose physiological role remains to be
clarified. This review was designed to stimulate further evaluation of data from well-controlled experiments. It is important
to encourage constructive curiosity and to decrease the risk
that some alternate consideration may be suppressed in favor
of an authoritarian position. Hopefully, this review stimulates
considerations of alternate concepts about how human physiology and behavior can adapt to beverage alcohol and how alcohol levels once regarded as trivial or undetectable might be
interpreted more constructively.
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RETROGRADE EXTRAPOLATION
OF BLOOD ALCOHOL DATA: AN APPLIED APPROACH
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Retrograde extrapolation is a mathematical process, based on sound scientific
principles, that is used routinely in pharmacology, toxicology, and clinical medicine. This process may be applied to the situation of ethyl alcohol consumption
with reliability when reasonable assumptions are made concerning absorption
rates, elimination rates, and patterns of alcohol consumption, including drinking
duration and volume consumed. By utilizing an established range of values for the
elimination rate of alcohol of 0.015-0.020 g/dllh, a relatively narrow range of extrapolated blood alcohol concentrations (BACs) can be determined in situations where
the time frame in question is after peak alcohol absorption into the blood. A wider
range of elimination rates of 0.01-0.03 gldllh may be applied and will satisfy the
possibility of nonlinear kinetics within an individual; however, this wider range
will have little practical effect on the predicted BACs. When the time point in
question is prior to peak absorption, a wider range of predicted BAC values will
result. The extent of this range will be influenced by the amount of information
available concerning the temporal pattern of alcohol consumption. Reported
drinking volumes are notoriously inaccurate and, in fact, are of little practical use.
Given the parameters of body weight and time duration between initiation of
drinking and determination of the BAC, the number of "drinks" consumed may be
reliability calculated. Retrograde extrapolation is applicable in the forensic setting
with scientific reliability when reasonable and justifiable assumptions are utilized.

INTRODUCTION
Ethyl alcohol may well be the most thoroughly studied chemical in
the field of toxicology. From its simple molecular structure to its two-step
catabolism, this two-carbon alcohol represents a triumph in our ability to
investigate and understand toxicological actions. Even after more than a
century of inquiry, interest in alcohol continues as evidenced by the
weekly appearance of 5-10 new publications on this topic, ranging from
animal-based studies to forensic situations. Surprisingly, in the face of
this substantial literature, certain questions are difficult to answer when
Requests for reprints should be sent to Dr. Mark R. Montgomery, University of South Florida,
College of Public Health, 13201 Bruce B. Downs Boulevard, Tampa, FL 33612.
281
Journal of Toxicology and Environmental Health, 36:281-292, 1992
CODVricht © 1992 hv Hpmknhoro P.,ki:«k;~« / - « - « - - - * : —

282

M. R. MONTGOMERY AND M. J. REASOR

practical application of this information is needed. One explanation for
this difficulty may lie in the fact that most of our published conclusions
are obtained in the traditional scientific manner, that is, in a laboratory
setting with control of variables. However, in the "real world" of human
experiences with ethanol, many variables are uncontrolled, and therefore much of our painstakingly accumulated knowledge may be of limited value. When alcohol-related matters, such as driving under the influence (DUI) cases or civil matters related to possible alcohol-mediated
impairment, are at issue, the most common toxicological question posed
is: Given a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) at a specific time, can the
BAC at an earlier time be predicted reliably? Or stated simply: Is retrograde extrapolation valid? Given the situation of an individual drinking
multiple alcoholic beverages in an inconsistent temporal pattern over
several hours, the scientific community is divided on the question of
whether this pharmacokinetic calculation may be performed reliably.
This commentary examines the basis for those divergent opinions.
In extrapolation of any concentration-time data, the pharmacodynamics of absorption and distribution of the chemical (in this case, ethyl
alcohol) and its elimination from the blood are fundamental considerations. Most studies on human pharmacodynamics of alcohol utilize a
bolus design where individuals consume a single dose. Consideration is
normally given, and appropriate control measures taken, to variables
such as sex, age, body mass, form of alcohol consumed, food intake, and
activity level. Periodic blood, breath, and/or urine samples are obtained,
the data analyzed mathematically, and appropriate conclusions and formulas developed (Holford, 1987; Lewis, 1986; Pieters et al., 1990; Wagner
et al., 1990; Wedel et al., 1991). These elegant studies are certainly valuable in the context of experimental toxicology; however, they may have
little in common, and may provide little of practical application, when
predicting ethyl alcohol blood levels following normal human drinking
behavior. This commentary also provides a reasonable, realistic, and scientifically sound approach to addressing this important question.
DISCUSSION
No discussion of alcohol pharmacodynamics would be complete
without mention of the resultant central nervous system toxicity. This
broad topic is well covered in standard texts and need not be repeated
here. However, particularly of interest in human toxicology are effects of
alcohol on one aspect of central nervous system function, cognitivemotor behavior. This behavior is the relevant consideration for such complex activities as driving an automobile and flying an airplane. For automobile operation, a two-dimensional task, it is well established that
impairment begins for all individuals at blood levels in excess of 0.05 g/dl
(Committee on Medicolegal Problems, 1968; Ritchie, 1985). For operation
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of an airplane, a three-dimensional task, the Federal Aviation Administration has recognized blood levels of 0.04 g/dl and above as not permissible (Modell and Modell, 1990). Recent research with flight simulators has
indicated even a lower threshold for impairment of this complicated activity, with all subjects showing impairment at the lowest blood level
investigated, 0.025 g/dl (Billings et al., 1991). There is no doubt that, for
both types of cognitive-motor behaviors, as little as two to three drinks,
absorbed by an individual of average mass, will produce impairment of
judgment, decisionmaking, and execution. Therefore, because of the
practical importance of reliably predicting relatively low blood alcohol
levels, any extrapolation process must be well justified and grounded in
sound scientific principles.
It is appropriate to clarify from the outset that extrapolation from
concentration-time data is not an academic theory or a mathematical
process that is unique to the consideration of ethyl alcohol. The same
principles of pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics that relate blood
levels of alcohol to time are applied clinically every time drug dosages
are established for an individual. In these clinical situations, rate of absorption, rate of elimination, desired blood level, and body mass are
considered in the same manner for calculation of the required dosing
regimen, for example, once every 4 h or twice a day. Likewise, given the
needed parameters of rates, body mass, and drug blood levels, the time
at which a specific dose should be taken can be calculated.
Three quantities common to blood alcohol data require comment:
1. For ethyl alcohol, concentrations are expressed frequently in units of
grams of alcohol per 100 ml of whole blood or blood serum. For example, a "legal limit" of 0.10 may be expressed as 0.10 g alcohol per
deciliter (g/dl), 100 mg/dl, 0.10 g/100 ml, or 0.10 g%. This type of quantitation is in contrast with conventional scientific designation where
concentrations of chemicals are expressed in units of molarity, molality, or normality.
2. In the public sector, concentrations are usually determined on either
whole-blood samples or the isolated serum. The quantitative difference between the two may vary between 12 and 17% (serum > whole
blood) (Baselt and Danhof, 1988), due to membrane diffusion limitations for alcohol and protein osmotic pressure within the erythrocyte.
Thus reducing a serum value by 15% to yield a whole-blood equivalency is valid.
3. The nonquantitative term "drink" is usually defined as 1 fluid ounce
of 86-100 proof alcohol, that is, the alcohol content of a standard
"mixed drink" containing 1 oz distilled spirits, 4 oz table wine (approximately 12% alcohol), or 12 oz regular-strength beer (approximately 4.5% alcohol) (Hunt, 1990).
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With these explanations available, the procedure of retrograde extrapolation of alcohol may be examined. This process considers the timing of alcohol absorption into, and elimination of alcohol from, the
blood and the relationship of those kinetics to the time points of interest. Relevant considerations include the following.
Absorption of Alcohol from the Gastrointestinal Tract into the Bloodstream The effect of food consumption on the rate of alcohol absorption has been addressed repeatedly with divergent conclusions. There is
little doubt that stomach contents delay absorption following bolus alcohol consumption (Garriott, 1988). However, in the normal social environment with common drinking patterns, this delay may not occur
(Gullberg, 1982). It is certainly reasonable to conclude that on an empty
stomach, all alcohol is absorbed within 30-45 min after the last drink.
With a small amount of gastric contents, absorption may be delayed an
additional 30-45 min, making a conservative total time for complete absorption a maximum of 90 min after the last drink.
Effects of Beverage Volume and Alcohol Concentration on the Rate of
Alcohol Absorption Absorption rate is not linear; the rate decreases as
the volume of alcoholic beverages consumed increases. This is due to
volume effects on the stomach and the gradual inhibition of pyloric
sphincter peristalsis with increasing alcohol quantities. A delayed passage from the stomach decreases absorption rate, since the majority of
absorption occurs in the small intestine. The rate of absorption also is
nonlinear at high BACs, due to the decreased concentration gradient
between the gastric and intestinal alcohol contents and the alcohol concentration in the blood.
Potential Influence of the Physical Form of the Drink In rigidly limited
situations, such as consumption of a large volume in a short time span
("chugging"), distilled spirits (liquors) are absorbed slightly faster than
wine and in turn slightly faster than beer. However, in the normal drinking context of consuming multiple drinks during a period of several
hours, the form of the drink would have negligible influence upon the
BAC.
Rate of Alcohol Elimination from the Blood Metabolism in the liver
and elimination by the kidneys remove 0.015-0.020 g/dl per hour by a
zero-order process (Ritchie, 1985), which is constant within the range of
BACs normally encountered in forensic considerations. This hourly decrease in the BAC is roughly equivalent to the BAC produced in a 70-kg
individual by absorption of one drink. Hence, a practical "Rule of
T h u m b " provides that individuals of average mass eliminate one drink
per hour.
Possible Gender Differences Recent data have indicated a potential
influence of gender upon alcohol pharmacodynamics and suggest that
females may achieve higher peak BACs for a given alcohol consumption
compared with males, even when adjusted for body mass (Frezza et al.,
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1990). Several explanations are provided for this potential difference, the
discussion of which is beyond the scope of this commentary. However,
there is no evidence of a sex-linked difference in the rate of alcohol
elimination (Whitfield et al v 1990). Therefore, equal consideration of
males and females in the pharmacodynamics of alcohol will error, if at
all, by decreasing the predicted BACs for women.
Influence of Body Mass on Pharmacodynamics Body mass considerations are minimal, with the exception being individuals who are very
obese or extremely thin. These individuals are relatively difficult to evaluate not only because of the extremes of mass and body fat deposits, but
also because of concomitant aberrations in metabolic processes that may
accompany the extreme variances in physiognomy. However, body mass
does become relevant when part of the desired prediction is estimation
of the number of drinks consumed. Three parameters are interlinked: (1)
body mass, (2) number of drinks absorbed, and (3) blood alcohol level. If
any two are known, the third can be calculated based on standard pharmacokinetic principles, where
mass of alcohol consumed
volume of distribution x body mass
Alternatively, the desired parameter may be obtained from Table 1 based
on these calculations (Sunshine, 1975). These combined principles and
toxicological properties result in the absorption and elimination of alcohol from a hypothetical individual as shown in Figure 1. This curve,
which has been reported widely and is presented here schematically, has
been determined repeatedly following bolus consumption and illustrates
the characteristics of nonlinear absorption, peak concentration at 30-90
min following bolus consumption, and linear elimination at a rate of 0.02
g/dl/h.
TABLE 1 Approximate Ethanol Concentrations in Blood (mg Ethanol/100 ml Whole Blood)
Body
weight
(lb)

N u m b e r of drinks absorbed

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

100
120
140
150
160
180
200
220
240

38
31
27
25
23
21
19
17
16

75
63
54
51
47
42
38
34
31

113
94
80
75
70
63
56
51
47

150
125
107
101
94
83
75
68
63

188
156
134
126
117
104
94
85
78

225
188
161
151
141
125
113
102
94

263
219
188
176
164
146
131
119
109

300
250
214
201
188
167
150
136
125

338
281
241
226
211
188
169
153
141

375
313
268
251
234
208
188
170
156

Note Modified from Sunshine (1975) Reproduced with permission of CRC Press.

286

M. R. MONTGOMERY AND M. J. REASOR

0.20 r-

TIME (Hours)
FIGURE 1. Schematic representation of blood alcohol concentrations after bolus consumption.

These toxicological principles, as just presented, also may be used to
describe blood alcohol kinetics in realistic situations. A hypothetical set
of circumstances is presented for illustration: Ten drinks are consumed
by a normal individual on a relatively empty stomach during a 3-h period,
after which no additional alcohol is ingested. The expected BACs for
three reasonable, but widely different, consumption patterns in the same
individual are presented in Figure 2.
-*
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FIGURE 2. Schematic representation of blood alcohol concentrations after consumption of 10
drinks during a 3-h period. Case A five drinks are consumed during the first hour, three drinks
during the second hour, and two drinks during the third houn Case B. three drinks are consumed
during the first hour, four drinks during the second hour, and three drinks during the third hour.
Case C. two drinks are consumed during the first hour, three drinks during the second hour, and
five drinks during the third hour. Calculations of BACs assume an individual of average mass (70
kg)
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Case A—five drinks are consumed during the first hour, three drinks
during the second hour, and two drinks during the third hour.
Case B—three drinks are consumed during the first hour, four drinks
during the second hour, and three drinks during the third hour.
Case C—two drinks are consumed during the first hour, three drinks
during the second hour, and five drinks during the third hour.
Considering a constant rate of removal of one drink per hour, which
will occur simultaneously with absorption, all three situations will result
in seven drinks remaining in the individual's body, but not necessarily
absorbed into the blood, at the end of the 3-h drinking session. The
differences among the three cases in resultant BACs at h 3 will reflect the
number of those seven remaining drinks that have been absorbed.
Figure 2 illustrates the differences between this "real life" situation
and that situation resulting after bolus consumption (Fig. 1). The principal difference relevant to pharmacokinetics is that, in Figure 1, the peak
absorption occurs 30-90 min after bolus administration. In Figure 2 the
time of peak absorption varies, reflecting the differences in drinking patterns during this absorptive state. However, in all three cases, a similar
peak blood level is reached within 30-60 min after cessation of drinking
(after h 3), and in all three cases the BACs are virtually identical thereafter. These drinking patterns reflect more realistically what is encountered
in the normal social environment. In fact, allowing an additional 30-60
min to complete absorption after the last drink may be overly conservative. The peak blood level most likely is reached simultaneously, or even
before the last drink is consumed, in normal drinking situations
(Gullberg, 1982; Jones, 1990).
Figure 2 also illustrates the argument surrounding application of extrapolation procedures. If one is presented only with the fact that an
individual consumed 10 drinks within 3 h, then the range of resultant
blood concentrations may be either quite small or quite large depending
on the time frame in question. For example, if one is given a BAC at h 7
and extrapolates to h 5, a narrow range for the predicted BAC would
result. This is evident from the correct assumption that between h 5 and
7 the subject is in the postabsorptive state (Fig. 2). The differences among
curves A, B, and C during h 0-3 would be irrelevant. However, if one
were given the same BAC at h 7, and extrapolated to h 3 (extrapolation
from the postabsorptive to absorptive state), the range of values predicted must be relatively wide to reflect the differences among the possible consumption patterns.
As shown above, retrograde extrapolation within the postabsorptive
state is straightforward. However, critics will assert that extrapolation encompassing both the postabsorptive and absorptive states cannot be
performed with scientific reliability. This commentary contends that the
latter process can be accomplished when reasonable, realistic, and justi-
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fiable assumptions are made that are based on sound principles of pharmacology, toxicology, and physiology.
Three hypothetical cases of alcohol-related situations provide a
mechanism to examine the application of this mathematical technique.
The first two examples are designed to illustrate the wide differences in
information that may be available and the effect of that information base
on the range of extrapolated values that is predicted.
Case 1
A man, body weight 220 lb, is in a bar drinking beer from 7:30 P.M.
until 11:30 P.M. He leaves the bar at 11:30 P.M. and is involved in an automobile accident at 2:10 A.M. The man claims to have drunk four beers in
the bar and not to have consumed any additional alcohol after 11:30 P.M.
A sample of whole blood is drawn at 2:45 A.M. and yields a BAC of 0.18 g/
dl. The two questions considered are:
1. What was the BAC at the time of the accident? Since this individual
stopped drinking 2 h and 40 min prior to the accident, it is reasonable
to assume that all of the consumed alcohol was in his blood (i.e., he
was in the postabsorptive state). The BAC would be decreasing at the
rate of 0.015-0.020 g/dl/h during the 35 min between the accident (2:10
A.M.) and the time the blood was drawn (2:45 A.M.). Therefore, during
that 35 minutes, the BAC would have decreased approximately 0.0090.012 g/dl. When added to the value determined at 2:45 A.M. (0.18 g/
dl), this simple calculation indicates a BAC at 2:10 A.M. of 0.19 g/dl. If
one wishes to use a wider range of possible elimination rates (0.010.03 g/dl/h) to consider the possibility of a wider variance among individuals or the possibility of nonlinear kinetics within an individual
(Lewis, 1986), the extrapolated value would differ from the previous
calculation by yielding a range of 0.19-0.20 g/dl. Thus using a wider
range of possible elimination rates under this circumstance is of little
practical significance. This example illustrates the characteristically
narrow range of values predicted when extrapolating in the postabsorptive state.
2. Is the reported beer consumption accurate? By calculation or from
Table 1, a BAC of 0.18 g/dl in a 220-lb individual results from having
10-11 drinks in the blood (at 2:45 A.M.). This hypothetical individual
stopped drinking at 11:30 P.M., a duration in slight excess of 3 h prior
to 2:45 A.M. Based on a normal elimination rate, approximately three
drinks would have been removed during those 3 h; hence 13-14
drinks were in his body at 11:30 P.M. Since absorption and elimination
are occurring simultaneously, one must also add one additional drink
for each hour the individual was drinking, in this case four (7:30-11:30
P.M.).
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To summarize: There were 10-11 drinks absorbed at the time blood is
drawn plus 3 drinks eliminated between accident and blood drawing
plus 4 drinks eliminated while drinking. Therefore 17-18 drinks were
consumed by this individual between 7:30 and 11:30 P.M., resulting in a
BAC of 0.18 g/dl at 2:45 A.M. The number of drinks reportedly consumed
(four) is clearly inaccurate.
Case 2
A woman, body weight 145 lb, arrives at a party at 9:30 P.M. and leaves
at 1:45 A.M. She is involved in an accident at 1:55 A.M. No drinking history
is available. A BAC of 0.13 g/dl is determined at a local hospital on blood
drawn at 3:00 A.M.
The same two questions of extrapolated BAC and consumption can
be addressed simultaneously. The blood alcohol analysis was determined
on blood serum, 0.13 g/dl. Therefore, the whole-blood equivalency
would be 15% less or 0.11 g/dl. Since no information is available concerning when this hypothetical lady started or stopped drinking, a relatively
wide range of possible BACs at the time of the accident is calculated
based on the two extreme possibilities of either complete absorption or
very little absorption.
Possibility 1. She stopped drinking at a time adequate to allow complete
absorption (i.e., she was in the postabsorptive state) at the
time of the accident. The maximum BAC would be calculated, as in Case 1, using a maximum rate of disappearance
of 0.02 g/dl/h. Given approximately 1 h between the accident and the blood being drawn (1:55-3:00 A.M.), 0.02 g/dl is
added to the whole-blood value of 0.11 g/dl. Therefore, her
maximum BAC at the time of the accident (1:55 A.M.) was
0.13 g/dl.
Possibility 2. She did all of her drinking shortly before leaving the party
and therefore was in the absorptive state at the time of the
accident. To extrapolate from the postabsorptive value to
the absorptive state, several additional factors must be evaluated in order to predict a realistic minimum BAC. These
additional factors must be considered in a step-by-step
fashion. To make a physiologically realistic prediction of the
amount of alcohol absorbed, it is necessary at the outset to
calculate the volume of drinks consumed. A BAC of 0.11 g/
dl (at 3:00 A.M.) in an individual of 145 lb results from absorption of four drinks (Table 1). An additional one drink
was eliminated during the delay between the accident and
the blood being drawn (1:55-3:00 A.M.), making a total of at
least five drinks consumed at 1:55 A.M. Knowledge of the
form of the drinks consumed is very helpful in arriving at a
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reasonable estimation of the minimum time required to
consume five drinks; that is, it is reasonable that a 145-lb
individual would not drink five 12-oz beers in 5 mm. However, 5 min to consume a single mixed drink containing 5
oz of distilled spirits is arguably possible. If the latter is
assumed, then the BAC after 15 min of absorption (5 min to
consume the drink and 10 min between leaving the party
and the accident) would be quite low. Therefore, assumption of absorption of one fifth of the total consumed within
the 15-min period (complete absorption within 90 min) is a
conservative, minimum estimate. One fluid ounce of alcohol produces a BAC of 0.03 g/dl in a 145-lb individual (Table
1). Therefore, in this example with few details available, the
predicted BAC at the time of the accident would fall within
the relatively wide range of 0.03-0.13 g/dl.
Cases 1 and 2 represent extremes both in information available and
in ranges predicted. Case 3 is presented for analysis as a hypothetical,
but typical, example of information available in an alcohol-related matter.
Case 3
A male, body weight 160 lb, drinks an unknown volume of beer over
a 4-h period, 9:00 P.M. to 1:00 A.M. He leaves the bar and has an accident
at 1:30 A.M.; a whole-blood sample is drawn at 2:30 A.M.; BAC - 0.19 g/dl.
What is the predicted range for the BAC al 1:30 A.M.?
As in the previous two examples, the maximum predicted value is
calculated easily by assuming complete absorption at the time in question. Hence, with 1 h elapsing between the accident and blood drawing
(1:30-2:30 A.M.), and accepting the maximum elimination rate of 0.020 g/
dl/h, 0.020 g/dl is added to the determined value of 0.19 g/dl. Thus the
maximum predicted BAC is 0.21 g/dl.
As in Case 2, prediction of the minimum value assumes a relatively
large proportion of the drinking was done shortly before the accident,
placing the individual in the absorptive state at the time of the accident.
Also, as in Case 2, this calculation requires examination of the volume
consumed so that a physiologically realistic assumption can be made
concerning the amount of time that would be required for that volume
to be drunk. At 2:30 A.M., a BAC of 0.19 g/dl results from eight "drinks"
(beers in this case) absorbed into an individual of 160 lb (Table 1). One
additional beer was eliminated between the accident (1:30 A.M.) and the
blood drawing (2:30 A.M.), making the minimum in the body at 1:30 A.M.
of nine beers. The man drank over a 4-h period (9:00 P.M.-1:00 A.M.),
during which time 4 additional drinks would be eliminated, making the
minimum consumed be 13 beers.
An extreme and probably unrealistic drinking pattern may be as-
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sumed initially: The individual sat in the bar and drank 1 beer per hour
for 3 h and then drank 10 beers during the fourth hour. The first three
beers, consumed at the rate of one per hour, would be eliminated at the
rate of one per hour, thus making no contribution to the final BAC. The
predicted minimum value after 30 min of absorption (from the end of
drinking to the time of the accident) would be, conservatively, one third
of the total for the remaining 10 beers, that is, BAC - 0.07 g/dl (Table 1).
Hence, the extrapolated range would be very wide, 0.07-0.21 g/dl.
However, with assumption of a more realistic and more probable
drinking pattern, the predicted range narrows. If, for example, one assumes three beers were consumed per hour for the first 3 h and four
beers were consumed during the fourth hour, the minimum is calculated
as follows:
During the first 3 h nine beers are consumed and three are eliminated, leaving six that will be fully absorbed by 1:30 A.M. These six absorbed will contribute 0.14 g/dl (Table 1) to the predicted minimum. Of
the four remaining beers that are consumed during the last hour, one
will be eliminated, leaving three to consider. If only one of these three is
absorbed during the 30 min between leaving the bar and the accident,
that one beer will contribute 0.02 g/dl to the minimum (Table 1). Therefore the minimum predicted, using socially reasonable and physiologically realistic assumptions of the drinking pattern, will be 0.16 g/dl (0.14
g/dl plus 0.02 g/dl). Thus, under these assumptions, the predicted range
of BAC in this case is 0.16-0.21 g/dl. Other assumptions, arguments, or
information for different drinking patterns would be treated similarly.
As shown in these three hypothetical cases, the extent of an extrapolated BAC range will depend on the information base available and the
assumptions made. In most cases, it is clearly inappropriate to attempt
extrapolation to a single value. It is equally clear, however, that extrapolation within the postabsorptive state and extrapolation from the postabsorptive to the absorptive state can be accomplished in a straightforward
manner. Both procedures will yield a range of BACs that is firmly supported by scientifically sound tenets of pharmacology, toxicology, and
physiology.
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ABSTRACT: Requests for estimates of blood alcohol concentrations (BACs) are often made when blood samples are taken some
hours after the time of interest. Many believe that such estimates
are not reliable because the subject's alcohol clearance rate is never
known and often there is uncertainty as to whether the subject was
postabsorptive at the time in question.
In order to evaluate the potential errors associated with BAC
estimates under these non-ideal conditions, BAC estimates were
compared with empirical data obtained from 24 healthy males,
ranging in age from 22 to 56 years, who took part in a three hour
social drinking session. One blood sample for alcohol analysis was
taken from each subject approximately 1 hour after drinking stopped
and another was taken approximately 3.5 hours after drinking
stopped.
Estimations of BACs at the blood sampling time points were
made assuming each person had a constant blood alcohol clearance
rate in the range of 10 to 20 mg/dL/h (0.01 to 0.02 g/dL/h) over
the whole of the experimental period. A variety of methods were
used to estimate the volume of distribution for alcohol. All BAC
estimations were made assuming complete absorption and full
equilibration of the total alcohol dose.
The results showed that actual BACs were usually within or very
close to the range of ''forward" estimates based on the known
alcohol doses. Furthermore, most BACs measured about an hour
after cessation of drinking were within or very close to the predicted
range based on back extrapolation from the actual 3.5 hour BAC
result.
KEYWORDS: forensic science, blood alcohol, social drinking,
estimation
Alcohol analysis is often performed on blood samples taken
several hours after a person was involved in a motor vehicle
accident or in some form of crime. In this situation a forensic
scientist is sometimes asked to estimate the blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of the person at the time of the accident or crime.
Such estimates have been called "retrograde extrapolations" or
"back estimations'* because they work back in time from a known
to an unknown BAC (1).
In other situations the forensic scientist is asked to estimate a
BAC at the time of an accident or crime when no blood specimen
has been taken. In this case supposedly reliable information concerning the person's alcohol intake prior to the event in question
is usually available. We will call such estimates "forward estimations" because they work forward in time from a stated dose of
'Toxicology Group, Institute of Environmental Science and Research
Ltd., Lower Hutt, New Zealand.
Received 12 Feb. 1997; and in revised form 30 June 1997; accepted
30 June 1997.

alcohol (2). Back estimations will be accurate under the following
"ideal" conditions: (a) The person is postabsorptive with respect
to alcohol between the time of the accident/crime and the time of
blood sampling. Under these conditions any changes in the person's
BAC are caused only by metabolism and excretion of alcohol, (b)
The decrease in the person's BAC over the period in question is
a known function of time.
For practical purposes, the postabsorptive decay in BAC can
be assumed to be a linear function of time, especially when back
estimations are performed over just a few hours and the starting
point for the calculation is a BAC above about 10 mg/dL (3,4).
Therefore under the above conditions it is a simple matter to
multiply the blood alcohol clearance rate [Widmark's P^ (5)] by
the appropriate time period (t2 - tt) and add the known BAC at
the time of blood sampling (BAC2) to give the BAC at the time
in question (BAQ).
i.e., B A d = BAC 2 + £<*, X (t2 - t|)
Forward estimations will be accurate under the following "ideal"
conditions: (a) The person is post absorptive at the time of the
accident/crime; (b) The person's (post absorptive) blood alcohol
clearance rate is known; (c) The person's alcohol dose is known;
(d) The person's volume of distribution (VD) for alcohol is known;
and (e) From the time drinking starts, the person metabolizes
alcohol at a constant rate, reflected by the person's post absorptive
blood alcohol clearance rate.
Because alcohol is distributed almost exclusively in the water
phase of the body (2), the V D can be calculated if the total body
water (TBW) volume is known. However, as the V D is a purely
theoretical entity we prefer to use the TBW as the basis of our
calculations.
Therefore, under the above "ideal" conditions, the following
equation applies:
BAC = (D/TBW) X Blw X 100 - Pao X t
where:

BAC = Blood alcohol concentration in units of milligrams per 100 milliliters (mg/dL) at the time
in question
D = Dose of alcohol (grams)
TBW = Total body water volume (liters)
Blw = The fraction of water in the blood (v/v)
Peo = Blood alcohol clearance rate (mg/dL/h)
t = The time (hours) between the start of drinking
and the event in question.
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The above equation can be expressed in the following simpler way:
BAC, = BAC0 - Poo X t
where BAC( is the BAC at time "t" and BAC0 is the theoretical
BAC which would exist at time "zero" if the total alcohol dose
was distributed instantaneously throughout the total body water at
that time. It is equivalent to "C0" as defined by Widmark (5). In
this context, time "zero" is the time drinking starts.
Unfortunately, in forensic science practice, the ideal conditions
listed above are not likely to exist and back and forward estimations
of BAC can be subject to large errors for the following reasons:
(1) The person's fi^ is never known, p ^ values vary greatly from
person to person and values ranging from as low as 8 to more
than 30 mg/dL/hr have been reported (6). Furthermore, over a
period of many hours, it may be inappropriate to assume that p ^
is constant (4,7); (2) It is very difficult to predict when a drinker
will become postabsorptive with respect to alcohol. The rate of
absorption of alcohol into the blood is dependent on a number of
variables such as the amount and type of food consumption prior
to and during drinking, the type of beverage, and drinking history
(8-10); and (3) VD and TBW values are not known in most forensic
situations. VD and TBW can vary greatly between lean and obese
subjects (11,12).
For these reasons some forensic scientists refuse to perform
either back or forward estimations of BAC, regarding the potential
for serious error as far too high.
Our approach to this problem has been to make the estimates
but to clearly state all the major assumptions on which the
results depend.
For back estimations our assumptions have usually been listed
as follows: (1) At the time in question **X" had already absorbed,
into his/her bloodstream, all the alcohol (s)he had consumed prior
to the accident/alleged crime; (2) At the time in question "X"
cleared alcohol from his/her blood at a rate within the approximate
range of 10 to 20 mg per 100 mL per hour; and (3) "X" did not
consume any alcohol between the time of the accident/crime and
the time the blood sample was taken for alcohol analysis.
For forward estimations assumptions 1 and 2 are the same and
assumption 3 is unnecessary. However the subject's height, weight,
and age is stated because this information is used to estimate the
subject's TBW, using the equations developed by Watson et al.
(2). The alcohol dose is also stated, along with any assumptions
made in determining this dose, e.g., the alcohol content of a given
beverage said to have been consumed.
Our results are usually presented in the following way: "If the
listed information and assumptions are correct, "X" would have
had a blood alcohol concentration within the approximate range
of "x" to "y" mg per 100 mL at the time of the accident/alleged
crime." If we have good reasons to suspect that any of the assumptions could be wrong, the relevant consequences are explained.
There is a large amount of published data relating to rapid bolus
consumption of alcohol under controlled laboratory conditions
(6,13-16). This data strongly suggests that the most important
factor affecting the validity of both forward and back estimations
of BAC is the rate of absorption of alcohol into the bloodstream
immediately after drinking. If absorption is very slow, both forward
and back estimations of BAC will tend to be too high until the
total dose has been absorbed. If absorption is very rapid a BAC
"overshoot" can occur. Under these conditions, both forward and
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back estimations can be too low until the total dose has been
absorbed and equilibrated throughout the body water.
However the rapid bolus consumption of alcohol is uncommon
under normal social drinking conditions. It seems likely that most
people who develop BACs sufficiently high to be of forensic
relevance, attain them by drinking over a number of hours, possibly
a whole evening or afternoon. Drinking binges lasting for one or
more days may also occur. In these situations the amount of alcohol
consumed near the end of the drinking session is likely to be
only a small proportion of that already consumed, absorbed and
equilibrated over the preceding hours. Therefore any rapid or
delayed absorption of the last few drinks is not likely to have a
large influence on an already high BAC.
Although there are some published studies of social drinking
(17-20) there are very few dealing with drinking over a period of
several hours (20). Therefore in order to better understand the
errors associated with back and forward estimations of BAC under
these conditions, we carried out our own study in which the results
of BAC estimations were compared with accurate BAC data
obtained from healthy males who took part in a social drinking
session lasting approximately three hours.
Experimental
Subjects
Twenty four healthy male volunteers took part in a simulated
social drinking session in which they consumed alcoholic beverages of their choice. Immediately prior to drinking, the heights
and weights of the subjects were measured. A summary of anthropometric data for the subjects is given in Table 1.
Each volunteer recorded his daily alcohol consumption for a
total of 15 days prior to the simulated social drinking session. This
drinking "diary" was used to estimate each volunteer's mean daily
alcohol consumption. The estimates ranged from 1 to 112 g of
absolute alcohol per day (mean = 32, SD = 27).
In the discussion of the results of this study, the subjects have
been identified by 24 letters, "Z" through to "C."
Alcohol and Food Consumption
For each subject, drinking started between 13:20 and 14:41
hours. All subjects ate lunch at least an hour before drinking
started but no attempt was made to control the type or quantity
of food consumed.

TABLE I—Anthropometric data for experimental subjects.

Mean
SD
Min

Max

Height
(cm)

Wgt
(kg)

178
9
162
203

85
16
58
116

TBW*
Age
(Years)
(L)
41
10
22
56

46.3
6.1
35.8
56.9

TBW**
(L)

TBW§
(L)

TBW§§
(L)

46.6
6.0
34.8
57.5

52.0
7.5
38.5
66.7

46.7
8.8
31.8
63.6

Calculated using the equation of Watson et al. (2), using the height,
weight and age data.
* Calculated using the method of Forest (22), using the height and
weight data only.
§Calculated from the specific volume of distribution determined as
described by Lewis (12).
§§CalcuIated using a mean Widmark Factor of 0.68.
n = 24 for all variables.
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Alcoholic drinks were consumed by each volunteer for a penod
ranging from 2.33 to 3.92 hours (mean = 3.01, SD = 0.36), during
which they sat and talked, watched television and consumed (ad
lib) a variety of snack food (e.g., salted peanuts, potato crisps,
and pretzels).
In an attempt to mimic a normal social drinking situation, each
subject was allowed to drink at a rate they found comfortable and
no attempt was made to control the number or type of beverages
consumed. However the volume of liquor consumed by each subject
was accurately recorded in order to calculate his total alcohol dose.
Each separate beverage (beer, wine, gin, whisky, brandy) was sampled for analysis of its alcohol content. Alcohol dose rates ranged
from 0.61 to 2.07 g/kg body weight (mean = 1.20, SD = 0.3).
Approximately 1 to 1.5 hours after drinking stopped, a two course
dinner was served to the volunteers together with coffee or tea.

general casework and it involves use of the following equation
described in the introduction:
BAC = (D/TBW) X Blw X 100 - $m X t
where
(D/TBW) X Blw X 100 = BAC0
The TB W value for each individual was estimated using the following equation, the derivation of which is also described by Watson
et al. (2):
TBW = 2.447 - 0.09516(age) + 0.1074(height)
+ 0.3362(weight)

Blood Sampling
During the experiment, three blood samples were taken from
an antecubital vein of each volunteer. Each sample was analyzed
for alcohol by head space gas chromatography (21). The same
technique was used to determine the alcohol content of the alcoholic beverages. The coefficient of variation for the analysis
method was 1%.
Blood sample 1 was a blank sample taken immediately prior
to the drinking session. Sample 2 was taken between 0.78 and
1.38 hours (mean = 1.04) after drinking stopped, i.e., before
the meal, and sample 3 was taken between 2.13 and 4.27 hours
(mean = 3.26) after drinking stopped, i.e., after the meal. The
results obtained upon analysis of these samples were called
BAC1, BAC2 and BAC3.
For the purposes of a forward estimation of BAC, blood sampling time 2 was considered to be a potentially unreliable "target
time" because the post absorptive state could not be guaranteed
such a short time (0.78 to 1.38 hours) after cessation of drinking.
For this reason, forward estimation to sampling time 2 was considered a good test of the forward estimation methodology under
social drinking conditions. However blood sampling time 3 was
regarded as a more reliable target time for a forward estimation,
more time being available for absorption and distribution of the
total alcohol dose.
Back Estimations
These were performed using the following equation:
BAC2esl « BAC3 + p w X t
where
BAC2est is the estimated BAC at blood sampling time 2.
BAC3 is the measured BAC at blood sampling time 3.
T ' was the elapsed time between the taking of blood sample
2 and blood sample 3.

Forward Estimations
Forward estimations of BAC at blood sampling times 2 and 3
were made so that the estimates could be compared with the two
measured BAC values.
The main method used for forward calculation was that described
by Watson et al. (2). This is the method we use routinely for

where TBW is in liters, age is in years, height is in cm and weight
is in kg. This formula relates specifically to males.
The water content of blood was taken to be 80% v/v, as used
by Watson et al. (2), although 85% v/v has been used by others (12).
Three other methods of forward calculation were also used, the
only difference between the methods being the way in which the
BAC0 was determined. Two of the other methods involved use of
the following equations:
The Widmark method (5): BAC0 = 100 X 1.055* X D/(0.68**
X body wgt)
The method of Lewis (12): BAC0 = 100 X D/(Vs§ X body wgt)
With the dose (D) expressed in grams, and body weight in kilograms, the factor of 100 was necessary to give BAC units of
milligrams per 100 milliliters (mg/dL), the units used in New
Zealand road transport law.
The method of Forrest (22) was the fourth method used. It is
the same as that of Watson et al. (2) except that a different method
of determining total body water is used.
For the purpose of the forward estimations, it was initially
assumed that the fiw for each of the volunteers could have been
as low as 10 and as high as 20 mg/dL/h. This range was chosen
as being representative of most social drinkers, based on reviews
of "normal" blood alcohol clearance rates (6,23). It was felt that
Peo values below this range would be most unlikely in healthy
people and values above this range would be relevant mainly to
chronic heavy drinkers (6).
In this context it must be noted that Lewis (12) does not recommend use of a constant P^ but suggests that the choice of P^
should be based on the relevant BAC range over which a forward
or back estimation is made. Therefore when referring to Lewis's
method of forward estimation we are referring only to his method
of determining the volume of distribution for alcohol and BAC0.
Results and Discussion
BAC Results
No detectable alcohol was found in sample 1 from any of the
volunteers. Therefore the results obtained for samples 2 and 3
(BAC2 and BAC3) were due entirely to the alcohol consumed
during the experiment.
•Average density of blood (g/mL).
**The mean Widmark factor for males.
§Specific volume of distribution for alcohol (L/kg).
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Back Estimations

BAC2 ranged from 32 to 200 mg/dL (mean = 108) and BAC3
ranged from 16 to 130 mg/dL (mean = 66). The wide ranges in
the BAC values reflect the wide range in total alcohol dose taken
by the volunteers. The mean time delay between the taking of
blood samples 2 and 3 was 2.22 hours (range: 1.30 to 3.13).

The results for three subjects are shown in Fig. 1. These results
are representative of all others in this study.
Where BAC2 was estimated from BAC3, 67%, 92% and 100%
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of the experimentally measured BAC2 values were within the
range expected, assuming $m elimination rates of 10-20, 10-25
and 8-28 mg/dL/h respectively.
In the case of subject "IT B AC2 lies within the predicted range,
if ^50 is assumed to be in the 10 to 20 mg/dL/h range. Very similar
results were obtained for another 15 of the 24 subjects.
In the case of subject "C" BAC2 is overestimated although it
is only 2 mg/dL outside the predicted range. This was the only
case where BAC2 was overestimated.
In the case of subject "Z" BAC2 is underestimated if P^ is
assumed to be in the 10 to 20 mg/dL/h range. There were six other
similar cases but in no case was BAC2 more than 14 mg/dL above
the upper limit of the predicted range.
Considering that BAC2 was measured approximately one hour
after drinking stopped, when absorption and equilibration of alcohol may not have been complete, these results are surprising. They
suggest that back estimations up to a relatively short time after
cessation of drinking, may not be subject to gross errors after a
period of social drinking. This conclusion is supported by other
studies involving even shorter periods of social drinking (17-19).
Reliable estimations of post absorptive blood alcohol clearance
rates could not be made in this study because the BAC for each
subject was not followed for a sufficiently long period. Even at
sampling time 3, full absorption and equilibration of the alcohol
dose could not be guaranteed because of the unknown effect of
the large meal. Therefore we cannot be sure whether post drinking
absorption effects, or p ^ values outside the "normal" range were
the main cause of the few apparently inaccurate back estimations
for BAC2.
It is the practice of some forensic scientists to use a P&Q value
of 15 mg/dL/h when performing back estimations. This is widely
regarded as an average value for "normal" social drinkers (16).
The errors associated with the use of this average value are shown
in Table 2. In general these errors were not large. The likely reason
for this is that the back estimations in this study related to a
relatively short time period (1.30 to 3.13 hours). Over longer time
periods greater errors would be expected if a fiw range is not
used (16).
Forward Estimations
The results for three of the volunteers are shown in Fig.- 2.
Again these are representative of all other results. The forward
estimations shown in this figure were made using the method of
Watson et al. (2).
In the case of subject "X" BAC2 and BAC3 are within the
predicted range, assuming a $& of 10 to 20 mg/dL/h. Another 15
of the 24 volunteers gave similar results. This result was also
somewhat surprising given the non-ideal conditions under which
the estimates were made.

TABLE 2—Errors associated with BAC2 back estimates when the
blood alcohol clearance rate was assumed to be 15 mgldUh.
Differences Between Estimated BAC2 Values and
Measured BAC2 Values (n = 24)

Mean
Range

Actual Differences
(mg/dL)

%
Differences§

-9
- 2 8 to +10

~7
- 2 6 to +18

§Actual differences as a percentage of measured BAC2 values.

In the case of subject "T" BAC2 and BAC3 are outside the
predicted range, assuming a P^ of 10 to 20 mg/dL/h. However
when the forward estimation for subject "T" was based on a slightly
extended $m range of 10 to 25 mg/dL/h BAC3 fell within the
predicted range and BAC2 was only just outside the predicted
range (by 1 mg/dL). Subject "T" represents the worst overestimate
seen although there were five other similar cases.
In the case of subject "H" BAC2 was underestimated although
BAC3 fell within the predicted range. There was only one other
subject in this category (Subject "L"). BAC2 was outside the
predicted range by 16 mg/dL in the case of subject UH" and by
12 mg/dL in the case of subject "L"). These are respectively 14%
and 12% deviations from the higher prediction limit.
The apparent underestimation of BAC2 in these two cases is
unlikely to have been caused by a genuinely low p^. If this was
the case BAC3 would have been underestimated as well. The
underestimation was almost certainly caused by a post drinking
BAC "overshoot" prior to equilibration. This phenomenon is commonly observed after rapid bolus consumption of alcohol, especially on an empty stomach (6,24) but our results and those of
others (20) suggest that it may not be common in a social drinking situation.
Table 3 summarizes the forward estimations made using all
four methods.
Because of the small sample number, no rigorous statistical
analysis of these results has been carried out. However, they suggest
that the forward estimation methods of Watson et al. (2), Lewis
(12) and Forrest (22), have a similar degree of accuracy, at least
under the conditions of our study. Widmark's method may be less
accurate than the other three methods. This would be expected
given that this method is the only one of the four methods that does
not take into account differences in body build when estimating the
TBW or the V D for alcohol.
The mean TBW value calculated for the 24 volunteers by the
method of Watson et al. (46.3 L) was very close to that determined
by the method described by Forrest (46.6 L). However TBW values
determined for each subject by the two methods differed by up to
7%. Such differences accounted for the apparent differences in
prediction accuracy between these two methods.
Although the mean blood water content is 85% v/v (25), the
BAC predictions based on the methods of Forrest (22), and Watson
et al. (2) were more accurate if a value of 80% v/v was used, as
recommended by these authors. Use of the lower value lowered
the estimate of BAC 0 by about 6%. Therefore it always lowered
predicted BAC results by more than 6%. Although in our experiments the bulk of the BAC2 and BAC3 results fell within or close
to the predicted range, there was a tendency for the predicted range
to be too high. Therefore any factor which slightly lowered the
predicted range increased the apparent prediction accuracy. It is
possible that use of an erroneous blood water fraction helps compensate for small errors resulting from failure to take any account
of first-pass effects and non-linear alcohol clearance.
In this context it should be noted that Lewis's method generally
gave higher TBW estimates than the other three methods (see
Table 1). Therefore, regardless of which blood water fraction was
used, Lewis's method generally gave lower B A Q values than
the other methods. This is the reason for the apparently superior
accuracy of Lewis's method in estimating BAC2 and BAC3 using
the narrowest of the p^, ranges (see Table 3).
We can only speculate as to why some authors have used 80%
v/v for the blood water content. However one possibility is that
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the volume per weight value (approximately 80%) has been confused with the volume per volume value
It would be of interest to repeat this study, following blood
alcohol concentrations for several more hours to ensure that full
absorption and equilibiation oi the alcohol dose has occurred

Comparing predicted BAC ranges with actual BAC results under
these conditions would give more reliable information on the accuracy of the various forward and back estimation methods
We cannot rule out the possibility that some of the volunteers
had Pe»o values above 20 mg/dL/h and that this was the cause of
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TABLE 3—Summary' offorward estimation results for BAC2 and
BAC3.

Method of
Estimation
Watson et al.
Lewis
Forrest
Widmark

Percentage of BAC2 and BAC3 Results Which Were
Within the Estimated Range (« = 24)
10-20*
P W L = 8-28
J.WJ1
h*Z 10-25
BAC2

BAC3

BAC2

BAC3

BAC2

BAC3

63
67
63
50

79
92
79
58

88
79
83
79

100
100
100
96

92
92
96
96

100
100
100
100

*Uniis for ft* * mg/dL/h.

one or more of the apparent discrepancies between actual and
predicted results.
Table 4 shows the magnitude of the errors associated with forward estimates made using a fixed p ^ of 15 mg/dL/h. The results
in this table suggest that gross errors are likely if a reasonably
wide ^60 range is not used.
When the results in Table 4 are compared with those in Table
2, it is clear that while the back estimates tended to underestimate
actual B AC values, the forward estimates tended to do the opposite.
Similar results have been reported by Shajani and Dinn (20). BAC
"overshoot" conditions or conditions of incomplete absorption and
equilibration do not account for these results. Although there may
be more than one factor responsible for this apparent anomaly
there are two potential causes which by themselves or in combination could explain the observed results.
The first is the possibility that the average $& for the subjects
in our study was above 15 mg/dL/h. Others have found this to be
the case in their studies (16,20). Unfortunately, the experimental
design of our study did not allow accurate determinations of p ^
values.
Some of the volunteers in this study would not be regarded as
moderate drinkers on the basis of their estimated daily alcohol
intake. For example, six of them were consuming more than 40
g per day and four of them were consuming more than 60 g per
day on average. These dose rates in men are regarded respectively
as "hazardous*' and "harmful" by some health professionals (26).
Because there appears to be a positive correlation between mean
daily alcohol intake and the rate of alcohol metabolism (10), some
of our subjects might have had blood alcohol clearance rates well
above average. However there was no clear correlation between
those subjects whose BAC results fell outside the estimated ranges
and high mean daily alcohol intakes.

TABLE 4—Errors associated with BAC forward estimates when the
blood alcohol clearance rate was assumed to be 15 mgldUh.

Method of
Estimation
Watson et al.
Lewis
Forrest
Widmark

Differences Between
Estimated BAC2
Values and Actual
BAC2 Values (as a
percentage of Actual
BAC2 Values) (n = 24)
Mean
Range
+ 10
+1
+9
+21

-28
-37
-30
-31

to
to
to
to

+61
+8
+64
+111

Differences Between
Estimated BAC3
Values and Actual
BAC3 Values (as a
Percentage of Actual
BAC3 Values) (n = 24)
Mean
Range
+30
+ 14
+61
+48

-31
-47
-34
-32

to
to
to
to

+93
+99
+92
+125

The second possibility is overestimation of BAC0. This could
occur as a result of underestimation of TBW, or as a result of firstpass effects, or both.
First pass effects appear to be negligible with alcohol dosages
much lower than those used in this study (27,28). Our experimental
data does not allow us to say whether they might be more significant
when higher doses of alcohol are taken together with food.
It seems unlikely that the TBW values are the only cause of
the above anomaly. TBW values estimated by the methods of
Watson et al., and Forrest, gave mean body water contents of 54
and 55% respectively for the 24 volunteers. The method of Lewis
gave a corresponding value of 62%. As the average body water
content for males is 59-60% (29) Lewis's method might have
been expected to underestimate BAC0, especially since we did not
have a majority of very lean males in our study. Although this
method appeared to be slightly more accurate than the other methods of forward estimation, it still tended to overestimate both
BAC2 and BAC3 (see Table 4).
Conclusion
Our results support the view that back and forward estimations
of BAC can seldom be performed with great accuracy. However
they suggest that such estimates are unlikely to be subject to gross
errors if the person in question has been in a normal social drinking
situation, a $w range of about 10 to 20 mg/dL/h is used, and
accurate dose and anthropometric data sufficient to calculate a VD
or TBW value specific to the individual in question, is available.
If there is reason to believe that the subject in question might
be a chronic heavy drinker, it may be prudent to use a p ^ range
with a maximum of 30 mg/dL/h in any back or forward estimations.
The results of this study do not show any of the four forward
calculation methods as clearly superior to all the others. All are
useful as long as their limitations are understood.
In any particular case, the formula available for BAC estimations
should be used only as a starting point. The results given by
the formula must be interpreted according to the circumstances
surrounding the drinking situation. Good interpretation is unlikely
to be made unless the forensic scientist has a thorough knowledge
of the many factors which influence the absorption, distribution
and metabolism of alcohol.
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Computing a BAC Estimate
According to a recent survey, most Americans think that drivers should not drink alcohol and then drive.
^' Nonetheless, our legal system generally relates certain offenses to the amount of alcohol detected in a
driver's body. The amount of alcohol is usually referred to as BAC — blood alcohol concentration —
although it is often measured in the breath where the alcohol level in the water vapor of the breath
follows the alcohol level in the blood.^
BAC is highly related to the amount of alcohol consumed over time. However, BAC is also influenced
by other factors and the complex relationship makes it difficult for people to easily estimate BACs. For
example, what is the BAC of a 125 pound woman, who is not an experienced drinker, who has four
beers over two hours?
When legislators debate bills that reference particular BACs, statements are often made regarding how
much drinking would be, and would not be, permitted prior to driving. Until now, expert testimony
would be required to confirm or deny such statements.
Recent work, conducted as a part of a report to Congress on alcohol limits for drivers^, provided the
basis for a useful tool that enables anyone with access to a personal computer to look up an estimate of
BAC based on a person's weight, gender, number of drinks consumed, and time for which one is asking
that the estimate be made. It should be understood that what results is an estimate because we calculate
the BAC based on average values, for example, the amount of water in the body and in the blood, the
average metabolism rate for a population, etc. The value estimated will certainly be correct for most

individuals sharing characteristics placed into the computation, but may be greater or lesser depending
on individual factors of which we do not have knowledge.
The estimate of BAC should not be used by individuals to decide whether or not to drive after drinking - impairment can result from any amount of alcohol. However, it does provide the best available
approximation of the number of drinks it takes for individuals to reach specific BACs.

Basis for Calculating the BAC Estimate^
The basic formula for estimating a person's blood alcohol concentration derives from the work done by
Widmark in the early 1930s^. Advancements in this technical area have lead to refinements in
Widmark's basic calculation formula. The particular formula used here incorporates a BAC calculation
procedure provided to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration courtesy of Herbert
Moskowitz, Ph.D., a noted alcohol researcher.
The basis for the calculations are the established physiological facts that alcohol distributes itself in the
total water of the body, and that it is disposed of primarily by metabolism in the liver. The procedure
takes into account the amount of body water in males and females, and the range of metabolic rates to be
found in the population. The procedure, along with a work example, is presented below.
Alcohol concentration is defined in terms of the weight of ethanol (Ethyl alcohol) in a volume of blood
or breath. In the United States the typical measure is grams of ethanol in 100 milliliters of blood or in
210 liters of breath and is reported as, for example, .10 percent or . 1 0 . ^
The procedure by which one calculates how to convert a dose of alcohol into a probable blood alcohol
concentration proceeds in several steps:
1) After absorption, alcohol is eventually distributed in the total water in the body. Begin by calculating
the amount of water in the subject. On average, males have 58 percent of their body weight as water and
females have 49 percent of their weight as water. To find the amount of water in an individual of given
weight, one multiplies the body weight in kilograms by the gender percentage and obtains the amount of
weight of the water in kilograms (one kilogram equals 2.2046 pounds). A kilogram of water occupies
one liter, one can easily convert from weight to volume of water. For example, consider a 128-pound
male of age 25. One hundred and twenty eight pounds divided by 2.2046 converts pounds into 58.06
kilograms, which is his kilogram weight. (The BAC Estimator program makes the conversion
automatically.)
2) To find the total body water, multiply the 58.06 kilograms times .58 (58% of body weight). This
equals 33.675 kilograms of water, which occupies a volume of 33.675 liters or 33,675 milliliters.
3) The next step is to inquire what concentration in water will occur when a given dose of alcohol is
administered. Assume that the dose is one ounce of pure alcohol (i.e., 200 proof). One ounce of alcohol
equals 29.57 milliliters. Since alcohol has a specific gravity of .79, the 29.57 milliliters will weigh 23.36
grams.
One ounce of alcohol (i.e., 23.36 grams), absorbed into a 128-pound male's total body water, produces
an alcohol concentration in water of 23.36 grams divided by 33,675 milliliters, i.e., .0006937 grams
alcohol per milliliter of body water.

4) We now find the alcohol concentration in the blood. On average, blood is composed of 80.6 percent
water. Therefore, the .0006937 grams alcohol per milliliter of water is multiplied by .806. This results
in .000559 grams alcohol per milliliter of blood (this is because each milliliter of blood only has .806
milliliters of water).
5) The result, 0.000559 grams alcohol per milliliter blood, equals 0.0559 grams alcohol per 100
milliliters blood. This is also described as grams per deciliter (i.e., per 1/10 liter of blood), or also
as .0559. It should be noted that our calculations are based on average characteristics for individuals.
While .58 is the mean water body weight percentage of males and .49 is the mean water weight
percentage of females, individuals vary with respect to this figure. Younger people have a higher
proportion of body water as a fraction of their total weight, and older people have less. Overweight
individuals have a smaller proportion of their body weight as water, and lean people have a larger
fraction of their body weight as water. In most cases, this variability will produce a small fraction as
error in calculating BAC. Another source of variation is the amount of water in the blood which we have
estimated as averaging 80.6%, but it varies as a function of several factors including the red blood cell
concentration measured by the hemocrit. But again, .806 is the average value, and deviations typically
are small.
Water body weight percentage is the percentage of total body weight composed of water. This is not the
same as Widmark's "R" factor. The "R" factor is a complex empirical measure that takes into account
both body water percentage and water concentration in blood.
6) We have calculated the theoretical instantaneous BAC for one ounce of alcohol. To adjust this
calculation for the actual content of alcohol in a drink, one multiplies the number of ounces of alcohol in
the drink by the figure for BAC per one ounce alcohol. An example might be a 12-ounce can of beer
drunk by the 128-pound male. Assuming that the concentration of alcohol in the beverage is 4.5 percent
by volume, one multiplies the 12 ounces in the beer can times .045 and determines that the can
contains .54 ounces of alcohol. Therefore, the theoretically peak instantaneous BAC produced by a
single can of beer in our 128-pound male would be .54 times .0559 (the BAC produced by one ounce of
alcohol) equalling .0302.
7) The final factor to take into account is the metabolism or burnoff. Alcohol is metabolized from the
time that ingestion begins. It takes but a few seconds for alcohol to reach the liver and for metabolism to
commence after drinking. Thus, metabolism is occurring during the period that alcohol is being
absorbed and distributed throughout the body. To determine the actual blood alcohol level at any given
time, we must decrease the theoretical instantaneous peak BAC by the amount of alcohol metabolized
from the beginning of drinking. As an example, let us take the 128-pound male who has consumed one
can of beer and determine what his likely BAC level would be at the end of one hour. We have already
determined that if all the alcohol that he consumed were instantaneously distributed throughout the
body, he would have a blood alcohol level of .0302. Now, however, one hour has passed, during which
metabolism has occurred. There is considerable variation in metabolism rate. While there are several
factors that determine metabolism rate, the prime factor is the recent drinking history since the
metabolism rate is determined by the production of an enzyme in the liver which generates more
enzymes if over a period of time (usually several months) it is called upon to process frequent/large
quantities of alcohol.
Although the average metabolism rate for moderate drinkers produces a .017 per hour decline in BAC
level (here termed "Average"), and the average metabolism rate for heavy drinkers (who consume 60
drinks or more in one month) produces a .02 per hour decline (here termed "Above Average"), the range
of metabolism rate in the population can go above .040 and below .010. One can either utilize in the
calculation the average (.017 per hour decline) metabolism rate, or if one wished to use a very

conservative figure, (which less than 20 percent of the population would exhibit), one could use .012 per
hour decline (here termed "Below Average") [Note: the BAC Estimator program provides BAC
estimates for above average, average, and below average metabolism rates automatically. These three
categories of metabolism rate closely approximate a drinker's recent drinking pattern, i.e., frequency and
quantity of consumption.]
If we wish to be sure that we can determine when our blood alcohol concentration level has returned to
zero, it might be well to use this very conservative (below average) figure. Thus we take the .0302 BAC
and subtract .012 for one hour of metabolism and calculate that the estimated BAC at the end of one
hour is .0182 for a 128 pound male who has drunk a 12 ounce can of beer containing 4.5 percent alcohol
by volume, assuming a conservative metabolic rate of .012 per hour. (The BAC Estimator program
rounds-off BAC estimates to two decimal places, thus it would report a calculated BAC of .0182 as .02.)
Example:
Find the BAC for 128 lb. male drinking 12 oz. beer (4.5 percent alcohol by volume) in one hour's time.
A. Convert pounds to kilograms: 1281bs - 2.2046 = 58.06 kg.
B. Find total body water: 58.06 kg. X .58 = 33.675 liters or 33,675 milliliters water
C. Determine the weight in grams of 1 oz. alcohol:
29.57 ml/oz X .79 g/ml - 23.36 grams/oz
D. If we put 1 oz. of alcohol into the subject's total body water, we would have grams of alcohol/ml. of
water, e.g.,
23.36 grams + 33,675 milliliter = .0006937 grams alcohol/ml of water
E. We now want to find the alcohol concentration in the blood. Blood is composed of 80.6 percent
water; therefore, .0006937 X .806 = .000559 grams alcohol/milliliter blood.
F. Instead of grams alcohol per milliliter blood, we need the figure in terms of grams per 100 milliliter,
also known as grams percent. Multiply the .000559 grams alcohol/ milliliter blood by 100, i.e., .000559
grams per milliliter X 100 = .0559 grams alcohol per 100 milliliters, or .0559.
(This is the BAC which 1 oz. of alcohol would produce in a 128 lb male if there were instantaneous
consumption, absorption, and distribution of the alcohol throughout the body.)
G. To adjust for the actual amount consumed, one multiplies the above figure by the amount of alcohol
in the beverage consumed. Thus, if the 128 lb. male described above consumed a single 12 oz. can of
beer containing 4.5 percent alcohol by volume, he would have consumed 12 oz. X .045 = .54 oz. of
alcohol. Since 1 oz. of alcohol would produce a BAC of .0559 and .54 oz. of alcohol has been
consumed, the actual alcohol level would be .0559 x .54 = .030 BAC for one can of beer.
H. In real life, time must pass for the consumption, absorption, and distribution of alcohol throughout
the body. Therefore, we calculate what the actual BAC level would be at the end of one hour after
consuming the single can of beer. During this period, the body would have disposed of alcohol through
metabolism at a rate characteristic of that individual, primarily his recent frequency and quantity of

drinking. Utilizing a conservative (below average) metabolism rate of .012 per hour, we can calculate
the BAC level as .0302 - .012 per hour X 1 hour = .0182 BAC at the end of one hour for our 128 lb.
male who drank 1 can of beer. (As noted above, the BAC Estimator program rounds-off BAC estimates
to two decimal places, thus it would report a calculated BAC of .0182 as .02.) Note that the time of
metabolism is calculated from the beginning of drinking, not when the consumption is completed.
1. National Survey of Drinking and Driving Attitudes and Behavior, draft report, Department of
Transportation, 1993.
2. "BAC" refers to either blood alcohol concentration, stated as grams per 100 milliliters of blood, or
breath alcohol concentration, stated as grams per 210 liters of breath.
3. Driving under the Influence: A Report to Congress on Alcohol Limits. October, 1992. U.S.
Department of Transportation.
4. This procedure was published in Appendix I of Driving under the Influence: A Report to Congress on
alcohol limits. October, 1992. U.S. Department of Transportation.
5. Widmark, E. Die theoretischen grundiagen und die praktische verwendbarkeit der geriehtlichmedizinishen alkoholbestimmung. 1932. Berlin: Urgan and Schwarzenberg.
6. "Percent" in U.S. toxicological circles means grams per 100 milliliter; this is a weight per volume
measure and does not carry the usual meaning of percentage. In this report, BAC is defined as either
blood alcohol concentration, stated as grams per 100 milliliters of blood or as breath alcohol
concentration, stated as grams per 210 liters of breath, and is reported without a "%" sign.
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Summary
The rate and kinetic order of ethanol elimination was evaluated in human volunteers.
Part I of the study involved dosing individuals with alcoholic beverages on two separate
occasions. Breathalyzer tests were performed at 15-min intervals for a period of 6 h.
Attention was focused on values obtained after peak blood ethanol levels had been
reached. The second part of the study included having samples drawn from alcoholics
at predetermined intervals during recovery from alcoholic intoxication, Blood ethanol
concentration data was analyzed for kinetic order and a comparison of ethanol elimination rates of alcoholics and non-alcoholics was made. The predicative capability of
estimating a BAC from both the zero and first order theories was also investigated.
It was concluded that ethanoi elimination is a zero order process. For subjects classified as non-drinkers (consume less than 6 ounces of ethanol/month), the mean ethanol
elimination rate as determined in the study was 1 2 * 4 mg/h. For subjects classified as
social drinkers (consume more than 6 ounces but less than 30 ounces of ethanol/month),
the mean ethanol elimination rate was 16 * 4 mg%/h, and for alcoholics, the mean
ethanol elimination rate was 30 ± 9 mg%/h. These results indicate that the rate of ethanol
elimination increases with drinking experience.
Key words: Blood alcohol concentration; Ethanol; Breathalyzer; Zero order kinetics;
First order kinetics

Introduction
It is common practice to perform a back calculation for estimating a
blood alcohol concentration (BAC) when there is a delay between the time
of an alleged offense and the time of withdrawal of a blood sample. This
back calculation is based on the theory that ethanol elimination is zero
order [ 1 ] . Mellanby, Widmark and numerous others [2] have concluded
that ethanol elimination is a zero order process. However, many other
theories have also been proposed. Haggard and Greenberg [2] claim ethanol
elimination is a first order process, Lunquist and Wolthers postulated
Michaelis-Menton enzyme kinetics, and Marshall and Fritz describe the
ethanol elimination curve as a combination of zero order and first order
kinetics [2]. In a study performed by Bogosz et al [3], it was concluded
that ethanol elimination is not linear, and great individual variability in the
0379-0738/84/$03.00
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rate of ethanol elimination was noted. One of the most recent studies
involving the kinetics of ethanol elimination was performed by Bruno et al
[4]. They characterized the elimination curve by dividing it into three
distinct regions: A fast initial phase which corresponds to the involvement
of an initial amount of free enzyme, a subsequent linear phase reflecting the
saturation of metabolic processes at high doses, and a terminal first order
phase. It was also determined that the half-life was independent of dose and
characteristic for the subject.
This study is an attempt to determine the rate of ethanol elimination and
whether ethanol elimination is more accurately described by zero order
kinetics. This information will allow for a more accurate prediction of a
BAC in medicolegal situations.
Methodology
Analysis of ethanol concentration over time
Twenty individuals, ten classified as non-drinkers (less than 6 ounces of
ethanoi/month), and ten classified as social drinkers (those consuming
greater than 6 ounces of ethanol/month) were selected for this study.
Subjects were instructed to fast for a period of at least 3 h prior to initiation
of testing. Subjects were dosed on two separate occasions. On both occasions
the entire dose of ethanol was to be consumed within a 40-min drinking
period. The first Breathalyzer analysis of blood ethanol concentration was
performed 20 min after the end of the drinking period, and every 15 min
thereafter for a period of 5 h.
Five individuals classified as alcoholics participated in this study. The
subjects were patients in the detoxification unit of an alcoholic rehabilitation hospital. Patient consent for participation in this study was obtained
upon admittance to the hospital emergency room. A total of five blood
samples were collected from each participant at approximately 1-h intervals.
The exact time of withdrawal of each blood sample was recorded along with
a brief patient medical history. Blood samples were analyzed by gas liquid
chromatography, employing the direct injection techniques.
Breathalyzer (chromic acid/photoelectric device)
A Breathalyzer Model 1000 equipped with Breathalyzer ampules (SmithWesson, Springfield, Massachusetts) was used for experimental work in this
study. A breath sample was collected by having the subject blow into a
heated plastic tube connected to the device. The breath sample was bubbled
through a potassium dichromate solution. In the ensuing reaction ethanol
is oxidized to acetic apid while the yellow dichromate is reduced to a bluegreen chromic sulfate compound. The color change is directly proportional
to the amount of ethanol in the sample. A direct reading of ethanol concentration is provided.
A major objective of this study was to obtain the most accurate ethanol
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elimination curve possible for each individual tested. Use of the Breathalyzer
Model 1000 in Part I of the study allowed more frequent sampling than
would have been possible if blood samples had to be drawn.
Gas liquid chromatography
A Perkin Elmer Sigma 4B gas chromatograph equipped with a flame
ionization detector was used for determination of blood ethanol concentrations. The column was a 6 foot by 1/8 inch stainless steel column packed
with 0.2% Carbowax 1500 on 80/100 mesh Carbopack C. The column is
well suited for separation of the lower alcohols. The operating conditions
were as follows:
Oven temperature: 97°C
Injection and detection temperature: 225°C
Flow rate (helium): 32 ml/min
Hydrogen pressure: 21 psi
Attenuation: 10 X 32
Gas chromatography data analysis was performed by a Perkin Elmer
Sigma 10 console. Quantitation was achieved by an internal standard analysis, The amount of component of interest is related to the amount of the
internal standard component by the ratio of peak areas.
Quantitative analysis of ethanol in body fluids by the direct injection
technique
With an automatic pipette 500 /xl of the internal standard solution (npropanol) and 500 pi of deionized water were added to a 5-ml test tube.
With a clean pipette tip, 500 fi\ of water were added to the same test tube.
The tube was stoppered and Vortex-mixed to insure complete mixing of
the sample.
Regression analysis/comparison of zero and first order correlation coefficients
In both parts of the study ethanol elimination curves were constructed
from ethanol concentration over time data. In Part I approximately 20
breath samples were analyzed by the Breathalyzer over a 5-h period. In
Part II, blood samples were collected from alcoholics over a 5-h period.
The samples were analyzed by gas chromatography. For the evaluation of
the kinetic order of ethanol elimination, the concentrations were calculated
and recorded in both milligrams percent and natural logarithms of milligrams percent.
Regression analysis of the ethanol concentration over time data for each
individual tested yielded correlation coefficients which indicated the degree
to which the experimental ethanol elimination data followed zero order
(linear) elimination kinetics. For a first order (exponential) kinetic process,
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the natural log of the ethanol concentration over time data represents a
linear relationship. Regression analysis of the natural log of the ethanol
concentration over time data for each individual tested yielded correlation
coefficients which indicated the degree to which the experimental ethanol
elimination data followed first order kinetics.
Half-life determination
For first order kinetics, the rate of ethanol elimination depends on the
blood ethanol concentration at any given time. Since half-life is a function
of the elimination rate, this first order kinetic parameter was calculated for
all subjects. Twenty subjects were tested on two separate occasions, identified as Trial 1 and Trial 2. In this way it was assured that two different
peak ethanol concentrations would be obtained for each subject. If ethanol
elimination obeyed first order kinetics, the half-life values for a given individual for Trials 1 and 2 should be the same.
Predictive capability of zero and first order elimination theories
The predictive capability of both the zero and first order elimination
theories was investigated. The rate equation describing zero order kinetics
{{d[A]/dt)= —K} was integrated to give an equation which describes a
linear relationship between the concentration of ethanol and time ([A] =
a—kt). In the above equations a equals the initial concentration, A equals
the ethanol concentration at time t, and k is the zero order rate constant.
For each subject a comparison was made using zero order kinetics between
the actual and predicted ethanol concentrations at 2 h and 3 h after the peak
ethanol concentration was reached.
The rate equation which describes first order kinetics ((d[A]/d£) =
—k[A]} was integrated to give an equation which describes an exponential
relationship between the concentration of ethanol and time ([A] = ae~ki).
By taking the natural log of both sides of the equation, a linear relationship
is achieved between the natural log of the ethanol concentrations and time
(In[A] = In a — kt). In the above equations a equals the initial concentration,
A equals the concentration at time t and k is the first order constant. For
each subject a comparison was made using first order kinetics between the
actual and predicted ethanol concentrations at 2 h and 3 h after peak ethanol
concentration was reached.
Evaluation of zero order elimination rate
The zero order elimination rate is equivalent to the slope of the ethanol
concentration over time curve. The zero order elimination rate was calculated for all subjects tested.
Breathalyzer versus gas chromatographic analysis (of simultaneous blood
breath samples)
In order to justify the use of the Breathalyzer for ethanol quantitations,
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a direct comparison of the two methods was performed. Simultaneous
blood and breath samples were obtained from willing subjects. Samples
were analyzed by the gas chromatographic and Breathalyzer methods,
respectively.
Determination of time required to complete absorbtion ofethanol
The time required to reach peak ethanol concentrations from completion
of last drink was recorded for each individual participating in the study.
Results
Regression analysis/comparison of zero and first order correlation coefficients
The mean of the correlation coefficients testing the zero order elimination
theory was 0.9496 ± 0.0783. The mean of the correlation coefficients testing
the first order elimination theory was 0.9270 ± 0.0841. For 69% of the
trials, the zero order correlation coefficients were greater than the first
order correlation coefficients. However, both the zero and first order correlation coefficients indicate close agreement with the respective theories. A
definite answer to the kinetic order of ethanol elimination cannot be made
from the regression analysis alone,
Half-life determination
For the 20 subjects tested, the average absolute difference between the
half-life calculated for Tri^l 1 and Trial 2 was 96.3 min. The mean percent
TABLE 1
BREATHALYZER VERSUS GAS CHROMATOGRAPH ANALYSIS OF BLOOD
ETHANOL CONCENTRATIONS
Sample No.

Breathalyzer
value (mg%)

Gas chromatograph value
(mg%)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

0
0
24
38
62
70
80
85
89
114
123
130

0
0
27
41
66
78
88
91
94
120
128
138

Percent
difference
0.0
0.0
-11.1
-7.3
-4.6
-4,1
-9.0
-6.6
-6.3
-5.0
-3.9
-5.8
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difference was 33 ± 26%. The degree of discrepancy between ethanol halflife values obtained for the same individual indicates that ethanol elimination
is not a first order process.
Predictive capability of the zero and first order elimination theories
For the zero order theory the average percent difference between the
actual and predicted ethanol concentration at 2 h was 11.2 ± 17.9% (range
— 49 to 47%). The average percent difference at 3 h was 17.9 ±21.1% (range
— 60 to 54%). For the first order theory the average percent difference
between the actual and predicted ethanol concentration at 2 h was 24.7 ±
21.0% (range — 73 to 30%). Eighty-four percent of the time, the concentration predicted by the zero order theory was closer to the actual experimentally derived concentration than the concentration predicted by the first
order theory.
Evaluation of zero order elimination
For subjects classified as non-drinkers the mean ethanol elimination rate,
as determined in this study, was 12 ± 4 mg%/h. For subjects classified as
social drinkers the mean ethanol elimination rate was 15 ± 4 rng%/h, and for
alcoholics, the mean ethanol elimination rate was 30 ± 9 mg%/h. These
results indicate that the rate of ethanol elimination increases with drinking
experience. (Table 2).
Breathalyzer versus gas chromatographic analysis of simultaneous blood
and breath samples
The average difference in results obtained was 5.2 ± 3,2% (Table 1).
Determination of the time required for complete absorbtion of ethanol
In this study, after a single dose of ethanol, 63% of the subjects attained
their peak ethanol concentrations 20 min after comsumption of the dose.
After 35 min, 85% of the subjects had reached their peak and after 65 min,
96% of the subjects had reached their peak ethanol concentration.
Discussion
Based on the data presented in this study, ethanol elimination is more
accurately described as a zero order process over the concentration range
of interest. This conclusion is in agreement with the generally accepted
position. This study also demonstrated that variance in ethanol elimination
rates exists among individuals.
More accurate predictions of blood ethanol concentrations could be
made if two breath samples were collected over a specific spaced time
period. Analysis of two spaced samples would allow a calculation of elimination rate and a determination of an individual's position on the blood
ethanol curve.
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Another factor which often enters into the prediction of a BAC is the
time required after drinking for an individual to reach his peak ethanol
concentration. In contrast to the absorbtion rate values reported in this
study, Goodman and'Gillman indicate that ethanol absorption may require
2—6 h [5]. The absorption data in this study are in agreement with the
values of 30—60 min reported elsewhere [1,6].
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